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A CHIP OFF THE OLD ICEBLOCK: HOW
CRYOPRESERVATION HAS CHANGED
ESTATE LAW, WHY ATTEMPTS TO
ADDRESS THE ISSUE HAVE FALLEN
SHORT, AND HOW TO FIX IT
Benjamin C. Carpenter*
For thousands of years, the process for determining one's heirs re-
mained unchanged. For a woman, her heirs were fixed at her death; for
a man, his heirs were fixed no later than nine months after his death.
Then came cryopreservation and, with it, the ability for individuals to
conceive children years after their death. This development has created
many-largely unanswered-questions. While posthumous conception
implicates numerous moral, ethical, and legal issues, this Article focuses
on the legal status of posthumously conceived children in the estate law
context.
Despite pleas from both courts and commentators, few legislatures
have been willing to tackle this sensitive topic. Most judges and scholars
who have addressed it agree the three primary goals of any response
should be to ensure the efficient administration of estates, carry out the
decedent's intent, and protect the children's best interests. However, no
consensus has emerged regarding which of these goals should receive
priority. These goals need not be mutually exclusive, though, but can
each be achieved with appropriate legislation. In this Article, I take a
critical look at the statutory and judicial approaches proposed to date,
break down the strengths and weaknesses of each, and introduce two
new concepts that bridge the gaps in the prior approaches. Specifically,
statutes should (1) separate the question of whether a posthumously con-
ceived child is an heir from whether the child will in fact inherit assets,
and (2) provide fiduciaries discretion to distribute or retain assets when
cryopreserved genetic material exists, based on certain conditions.
These improvements will provide flexibility not found in prior ap-
proaches and, as a result, advance each of the three key goals. This
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Article provides legislatures, judges, and commentators who tackle this
issue with both a comprehensive historical perspective on the issue and a
blueprint to follow going forward.
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INTRODUCTION
From ancient Rome until very recently, determining one's heirs had
been easy: ascertain all family members living on the date of the dece-
dent's death and, if the decedent's wife was pregnant at his death, wait to
see if the child is born alive.' By nine months after the decedent's death,
the class of possible heirs was closed.2 For thousands of years, this ap-
proach remained unchanged. Then came cryopreservation, the ability to
freeze genetic material and use it at a later date. Now individuals-both
male and female-can conceive children after their death. Suddenly, de-
termining one's heirs is no longer so simple.
In 1953, scientists reported the first human pregnancy resulting
from cryopreserved sperm.3 The first child who developed from a cry-
opreserved embryo was born in 1984, and the first child conceived from
a cryopreserved egg was born in 1986.4 In 2004, a child was born who
I See Kristine S. Knaplund, Postmortem Conception and a Father's Last Will, 46 ARIZ.
L. REv. 91, 107-08 (2004) (tracing this approach back to the ancient Romans).
2 See id.
3 Mark S. Frankel, Cryobanking of Human Sperm, 1 J. MED. ETmics 36, 36-38 (1975),
available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMCI 154441/.
4 U.-B. Wennerholm et al., Children Born After Cryopreservation of Embryos or Oo-
cytes: A Systematic Review of Outcome Data, 24 HUMAN REPRODUCHION 2158, 2158 (2009),
available at http://humrep.oxfordjournals.org/content/24/9/2158.full.pdf.
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had been conceived from sperm frozen for twenty-one years.5 Today,
researchers estimate that over 30,000 children are born each year who
were conceived from frozen sperm, and almost 29,000 in vitro fertiliza-
tion transfers each year use frozen embryos.6 The freezing and thawing
of genetic material is not the science of tomorrow-the technology ex-
ists, it is being used daily, and it is becoming more common each year.
This development has created many (largely unanswered) questions
in trust and estate law. For instance, should a child conceived after the
death of a parent inherit from that parent? Should it matter if the child is
born more than one year after the parent's death? Two years later? Ten
years later? Should it matter whether the decedent consented to the pos-
thumous use of his or her genetic material? Should it matter whether the
decedent was married at his or her death? What if the decedent had a
will that had a general provision for his children-should that include
posthumously conceived children? What if the decedent's parents had
created a trust years earlier for their descendants-should such children
be deemed their descendants? Should the answers change with respect to
insurance benefits or retirement plan benefits payable to "issue"? Are
posthumously conceived children eligible to receive Social Security sur-
vivorship benefits? Should an executor, trustee, or custodian be liable
for distributing assets before learning that a decedent left cryopreserved
genetic material?
These issues are not just theoretical-a number of courts have
struggled to answer some of these questions over the past few years. To
do so, they have had to interpret statutes that were never intended to
apply to this scenario. While their decisions have been inconsistent, the
courts uniformly have appealed to their respective legislatures to address
these issues in a thoughtful, comprehensive way. Few legislatures, how-
ever, have done so.
While assisted reproduction raises numerous moral, ethical, and le-
gal questions, this Article focuses exclusively on the legal status of post-
humously conceived children in the estate law context. To date, there is
no consensus regarding the best approach, or even the appropriate goals.
Of the few states that have addressed the issue, most have chosen not to
recognize these children, placing primary importance on the efficient ad-
ministration of estates. Most commentators, on the other hand, argue
that these children should be recognized, though their reasons differ.
5 Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, Conceiving the Inconceivable: Legal Recognition of the
Posthumously Conceived Child, 34 ACTEC J. 154, 155 (2008) (citing Baby Born from Frozen
Sperm for Record 21 Years, OBESITY, FITNESS & WELLNESS WEEK, Jun. 19, 2004, at 59).
6 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERvS., 2008 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOL-
OGY SUCCESS RATES, NATIONAL SUMMARY AND FERTILITY CLINIC REPORT 91 (2010) [herein-
after 2008 ART REPORT], available at http://www.cdc.gov/art/ART2008/PDF/01_ART
SuccessRates08-FM.pdf.
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Some advocate that the decedent's intent should govern, while others
assert that the children's best interests should control.
These three interests-efficient administration, decedent's intent,
and children's best interests-need not be mutually exclusive, though;
each can be achieved by allowing posthumously conceived children to
inherit, but under the right set of conditions. While others have proposed
some such conditions, including the decedent's consent to posthumous
conception, a notice requirement, a time limitation, and a marriage re-
quirement, each approach to date has flaws. This Article takes a critical
look at these approaches, breaks down the strengths and weaknesses of
each, and suggests the best set of conditions for legislatures to adopt
going forward.
In addition, I introduce two important concepts that have not yet
been proposed. In each existing approach, a child is an heir, and there-
fore may receive assets, only if all of the required conditions are met.
First, legislatures should separate the question of whether a posthu-
mously conceived child is an heir from the question of whether the child
will, in fact, inherit assets from the estate. This distinction is critical for
those scenarios where the birth of a posthumously conceived child may
adversely affect other's interests. In that event, this distinction would
allow a statute to exclude a child from receiving a share of the decedent's
estate. However, it would still allow the child to receive other benefits
that are contingent on the child's status as an heir, but which have no
affect on the decedent's estate (such Social Security survivor benefits or
inheritance through, rather than from, the decedent). And to be deemed
an heir, the only relevant condition should be the decedent's consent that
his or her genetic material be used for posthumous conception.
Second, any remaining conditions (including, I suggest, a notice re-
quirement and time limitation) should serve merely to protect the fiduci-
ary or recipient from liability for distributions, not to bar the child from
sharing in any assets that may remain in the estate. In other words, if
these conditions are not met, the fiduciary should have discretion to (1)
distribute trust or estate assets to the then-existing heirs or beneficiaries
without liability or (2) retain the assets until the fiduciary deems it appro-
priate to make distributions-for instance, if the surviving spouse or
partner is actively attempting to have the decedent's child, until that child
is born. This would allow an executor or trustee to balance the interests
of all parties to the estate, including the potential children, as may be
appropriate in each specific situation.
To be sure, assisted reproduction and posthumous conception raise
sensitive issues many legislators would prefer to avoid and simply pass
3512011]
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on to judges.7 The time has come, though, for legislatures to take up the
challenge, think critically about and debate the issues, and respond with
clear, comprehensive provisions. This Article provides a comprehensive
blueprint for legislatures to consider as they tackle these issues. Part I
provides background for this discussion by giving a brief history of as-
sisted reproduction, showing why posthumous reproduction will continue
to increase in the future, and explaining why individuals choose posthu-
mous conception. Part II traces the evolution of the statutory and judicial
responses to date and critiques the strengths and weaknesses of each.
Finally, Part III takes a step-by-step approach through the issues a legis-
lature today must consider when drafting legislation on this topic, pro-
poses two new concepts that bridge the gaps in the previous approaches,
and explains my recommendation for each issue.8
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTION
Assisted reproduction is generally defined as any technique used to
conceive a child other than sexual intercourse. 9 While there are numer-
ous variations, a basic understanding of four key concepts is sufficient
for purposes of this Article: (1) artificial insemination, (2) in vitro fertili-
zation, (3) surrogacy, and (4) cryopreservation. The following summa-
rizes each of these concepts, then addresses why assisted reproduction
will continue to increase and why some individuals choose posthumous
conception.
A. Artificial Insemination
Artificial insemination, also called intrauterine insemination, occurs
when sperm is placed through artificial means into a woman's uterus to
7 See Laurence C. Nolan, Critiquing Society's Response to the Needs of Posthumously
Conceived Children, 82 OR. L. REv. 1067, 1102-04 (2003) (noting reasons why individual
legislators may be hesitant to address these issues).
8 Unless otherwise specified, I intend all references in this Article to "posthumous con-
ception" and "posthumously conceived" to include not just the scenario in which an egg is
fertilized after a parent's death, but also the scenario in which an egg is fertilized and frozen
prior to a parent's death, then implanted into a woman's uterus after a parent's death.
9 See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 102 (amended 2002), available at http://www.law.
upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/upa/final2002.pdf; UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-115(2) (amended
2008), available at http://www.law.upenn.edulbll/archives/ulc/upc/2008final.pdf. Alterna-
tively, the federal government has defined "assisted reproductive technology" only to include
procedures in which a woman's oocytes are retrieved from her body. See 42 U.S.C. § 263a-
7(1) (2006) (defining "assisted reproductive technology" for purposes of the Fertility Clinic
Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992). This definition would exclude artificial insemi-
nation, however, and is too limited for purposes of this Article because an individual can use a
deceased partner's frozen sperm to create a posthumously conceived child through artificial
insemination.
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facilitate fertilization.10 The first documented use of artificial insemina-
tion by humans occurred in England in 1770.11 The first reported use in
the United States occurred in 1866.12 The technique did not become
widely used, however, until the 1950s.13 In 1980, approximately 10,000
children were born in the United States who had been conceived through
artificial insemination. 14 By 1996, the number had jumped to approxi-
mately 65,000 children.15 The numbers likely have continued to in-
crease. However, if they merely remained static, there would have been
over 1 million children born in the United States over the past fifteen
years who were conceived by artificial insemination.
B. In vitro Fertilization
In vitro fertilization (IVF) is a much newer, and more expensive,
technique than artificial insemination. IVF involves providing medicine
to a woman to stimulate multiple egg production, extracting her eggs,
fertilizing them in a laboratory, culturing the zygotes for three or more
days, and then transferring one or more embryos to a woman's uterus.16
Most commonly, fertilization is accomplished by intracytoplasmic sperm
injection, in which a single sperm is injected directly into the egg.17 As
10 See CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR. & MAUREEN MCBRIEN, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY: A LAWYER'S GUIDE To EMERGING LAW AND SCIENCE 29-30 (2006). The
sperm may come from the woman's partner or from a third-party (typically anonymous) donor.
Id. at 31-32.
11 Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 284 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (citing E.
Donald Shapiro & Benedene Sonnenblick, The Widow and the Sperm: The Law of Post-
Mortem Insemination, 1 J.L. & HEALTH 229, 234 (1986)).
12 Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., Dead Dads: Thawing an Heir From the Freezer, 35 Wm.
MITCHELL L. REv. 433, 434 n.4 (2009) (citing Johnson v. Superior Court, 101 Cal. App. 4th
869, 881 (2002)).
13 Kristine S. Knaplund, Legal Issues of Maternity and Inheritance for the Biotech Child
of the 21st Century, 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 393, 395 (2008).
14 S.J. Behrman, Artificial Insemination and Public Policy, 300 NEW ENG. J. MED. 619,
619 (1979).
15 Mary Patricia Byrn, From Right to Wrong: A Critique of the 2000 Uniform Parentage
Act, 16 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 163, 174 (2007).
16 See generally AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE, ASSISTED REPRO-
DucrlvE TECHNOLOGIES, A GUIDE FOR PATIENTS (2008) [hereinafter ART GUIDE], available at
http://www.asrm.org/uploadedFiles/ASRMContent/Resources/PatientResources/Fact_
SheetsandInfoBooklets/ART.pdf; Machelle M. Seibel, A New Era in Reproductive Tech-
nology, 318 N. ENGL. J. MED. 828, 829-31 (1988); 2008 ART REPORT, supra note 6, at 3.
Although I refer to an embryo throughout this discussion, there are similar techniques in which
the oocyte is fertilized and transferred to the woman's fallopian tubes before the zygote be-
comes an embryo (called zygote intrafallopian transfer, or ZIFT) or the oocyte and sperm are
mixed and transferred to the woman's fallopian tubes before fertilization occurs (called gamete
intrafallopian transfer, or GIFT). ART GUIDE, supra, at 10; 2008 ART REPORT, supra note 6,
at 3. These techniques, however, account for less than one percent of IVF procedures. See id.
at 91.
17 See Taun Jain, M.D. & Ruchi S. Gupta, M.D., M.P.H., Trends in the Use of Intra-
cytoplasmic Sperm Injection in the United States, 357 N. ENGL. J. MED. 251, 253 (2007); see
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with artificial insemination, the sperm may be from the woman's partner
or a third-party donor.18 With IVF, however, the eggs also may derive
from a third-party donor.19
The first child conceived through IVF was born in 1978,20 and the
first in the United States was born in 1981.21 Since then, the number of
children conceived each year by IVF has increased sharply.22 In 1996,
over 20,000 children conceived by IVF were born in the United States. 23
In 1999, the number increased to over 30,000.24 In 2008, the number
jumped to over 60,000.25 Now, over one percent of the children born
each year in the United States are conceived by IVF. 2 6
C. Surrogacy Arrangements
A surrogacy arrangement is an arrangement in which a woman (the
surrogate mother) agrees to carry a child to term for another individual or
couple.27 A surrogate mother becomes pregnant through either artificial
insemination or IVF.28 A surrogate mother who uses her own egg is
referred to as a "traditional surrogate," while a surrogate who has no
genetic connection to the child is referred to as a "gestational
surrogate." 29
also 2008 ART REPORT, supra note 6, at 91 (showing that 64% of procedures in 2008 used
intracytoplasmic sperm injection).
18 ART GUIDE, supra note 16, at 11.
19 Id.
20 Seibel, supra note 16, at 828.
21 Byrn, supra note 15, at 174.
22 Id. at 174-75.
23 See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 2006 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECH-
NOLOGY SUCCESS RATES, NATIONAL SUMMARY AND FERTILITY CLINIC REPORT 61 (2008)
[hereinafter 2006 ART REPORT], available at http://www.cdc.gov/ART/ART2006/508PDF/
2006ART.pdf. Since 1992, all clinics providing IVF services must report certain information
to the Center for Disease Control. See The Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act
of 1992, 42 U.S.C. § 263a-1 to 263a-7 (2006).
24 See 2008 ART REPORT, supra note 6, at 65.
25 Id. Because the report documents live births, there is a necessary nine-month period
after the end of the year before the final results can be determined. Id. at 4. The 2008 num-
bers are based on reports from 436 of the 475 medical centers in the United States that provide
assisted reproduction services. Id. at 15. Only two states, Montana and Wyoming, had no
center. See id. Because some women give birth to multiple children, the number of women
who gave birth to a live child during these years was somewhat lower. In 1996, there were
21,746 live-birth deliveries; in 2008, there were 46,326. Id. at 65.
26 See 2006 ART REPORT, supra note 23, at 13.
27 The first known surrogacy contract in the United States was signed in 1976. Keith J.
Hey, Assisted Conception and Surrogacy-Unfinished Business, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 775,
787 (1993).
28 If a man and woman conceive a child through intercourse, they are deemed to be the
child's parents regardless of any agreement to the contrary. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 701
cmt. (amended 2002). Thus, a valid surrogacy arrangement requires the use of assisted repro-
duction. Id.
29 Byrn, supra note 15, at 174 n.43.
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Many couples who wish to have a genetic child rather than to adopt
a child rely on surrogates. For instance, a married couple may hire a
surrogate mother if the wife is incapable of carrying a child to term.
Likewise, a gay couple must rely on a surrogate to have a child using one
of the men's sperm. With the use of surrogacy, however, determining
the parent-child relationship becomes particularly complicated. For in-
stance, if a husband is infertile and his wife cannot carry a child to term,
a fertility clinic may retrieve eggs from the wife, fertilize the egg with
sperm from a third-party donor by IVF, then transfer the embryo to a
gestational surrogate. Here, four people-the husband, wife, sperm do-
nor, and gestational surrogate-arguably could be deemed a parent of the
child.
The laws governing surrogacy are rapidly evolving and beyond the
scope of this Article. To the extent that an individual's genetic material
is transferred to a surrogate after that individual's death, however, the
interests of the resulting children fall within the scope of this Article.
Generally, in the surrogacy context, most states would recognize the par-
ent-child relationship established by the state's parentage statutes for
probate purposes, as well.
D. Cryopreservation
Cryopreservation creates the specific issue this Article addresses-
the ability to conceive children after the death of a person. For cry-
opreservation, the genetic material (sperm, eggs, or embryos) is treated
with glycerol, cooled to about -80 degrees centigrade, then stored in liq-
uid nitrogen at -196 centigrade.30 Like surrogacy, cryopreservation may
be used with artificial insemination or IVF. Today, all clinics in the
United States that provide assisted reproduction services offer
cryopreservation.31
Though scientists had tried to preserve tissue for centuries, cry-
opreservation of gametes for human reproduction was not possible until
scientists discovered in 1949 that they could keep sperm viable by using
glycerol in the freezing process. 32 Shortly thereafter, men began to suc-
cessfully freeze sperm,3 3 and the first human pregnancy resulting from a
30 Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. & Steven H. Snyder, Clarifying the Law of ART: The New
American Bar Association Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology, 42 FAM.
L.Q. 203, 211 n.35 (2008).
31 See 2008 ART REPORT, supra note 6, at 91.
32 See Eric M. Walters et al., The History of Sperm Cryopreservation, in SPERM BANK-
ING: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1, 4, 6 (Allan A. Pacey & Matthew J. Tomlinson eds., 2009).
33 Knaplund, supra note 13, at 395.
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frozen sperm was reported in 1953.34 By 1988, approximately 30,000
children conceived from frozen sperm were being born each year.35
Likewise, women can freeze their eggs for future use.3 6 The first
child conceived from a frozen egg was born in 1986.37 The success rate
using thawed eggs was very low initially, but it has increased over the
past decade.38 In 2007, 138 assisted reproduction clinics reported that
they freeze human eggs-twice the number from 2004.39
Finally, couples can freeze embryos for future use. In 1984, the
first child who developed from a cryopreserved embryo was born.40 To-
day, many couples who attempt IVF freeze excess embryos for later pos-
sible use because it is both less invasive and less expensive to use their
frozen embryos than to retrieve fresh eggs an additional time.41 As of
2002, clinics reported having 396,526 frozen embryos on hand, 88.2% of
which were designated for reproductive purposes (as opposed to research
or other uses).42 In 2008, 21.4% of the 148,055 IVF cycles performed
used frozen eggs or embryos. 43
Cryopreserved genetic material can remain viable for many years.
In 2004, a child was born who was conceived using sperm that had been
frozen for twenty-one years,1" and scientists speculate that embryos may
remain viable for fifty years. 45 Although the time frames undoubtedly
34 Frankel, supra note 3 (citing R.G. Bunge & J.K. Sherman, Fertilizing Capacity of
Frozen Human Spermatozoa, 172 NATURE 767, 767-68 (1953)). In 1961, astronauts stored
frozen sperm before venturing into space. Nolan, supra note 7, at 1071 n.24 (citing W. Barton
Leach, Perpetuities in the Atomic Age: The Sperm Bank and the Fertile Decedent, 48 A.B.A. J.
942, 943 (1962)).
35 Bym, supra note 15, at 174 n.46.
36 Id. at 174 n.43.
37 Id.
38 See Filippo Ubaldi et al., Cumulative Ongoing Pregnancy Rate Achieved With Oocyte
Vitrification and Cleavage Stage Transfer Without Embryo Selection in a Standard Infertility
Program, 25 Hum. REPROD. 1199, 1199-2000 (2010).
39 Knaplund, supra note 13, at 395-96 n. 11 (citing Rob Stein, Women Hedge Bets by
Banking Their Oocytes, WASH. POST, May 13, 2007, at Al).
40 Wennerholm, supra note 4, at 2158.
41 See 2006 ART REPORT, supra note 23, at 11; 2008 ART REPORT, supra note 6, at 58.
42 David I. Hoffman et al., Cryopreserved Embryos in the United States and Their Avail-
ability for Research, 79 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1063, 1066-68 (2003), available at http://
www.asrm.org/uploadedFiles/ASRMContent/NewsandPublications/Selected-Articles-
fromFertility-and-Sterility/cryoembryos-may2003.pdf. These numbers greatly exceeded
most estimates at that time, which placed the number of cryopreserved embryos between
30,000 and 200,000, and which assumed most were stored for research purposes, not for repro-
duction. Id. at 1068.
43 See 2008 ART REPORT, supra note 6, at 16.
44 Lorio, supra note 5.
45 Kindregan, Jr., supra note 12, at 434 n.5 (citing R.G. Edwards & Helen K. Beard,
Destruction of Cryopreserved Embryos: UK Law Dictated the Destruction of 3000 Cry-
opreserved Human Embryos, 12 Hum. REPROD. 3, 3 (1997)).
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will increase as the science advances, they are already long enough to
create serious consequences in the administration of decedents' estates.
E. The Future of Assisted Reproduction
An estimated 3.5 million children have been conceived through as-
sisted reproduction, 46 and four factors indicate that this trend will con-
tinue to increase. First, as assisted reproduction has increased, the stigma
associated with the practice has decreased.4 7 Second, many couples are
waiting longer to have children than in previous decades, which has led
to increased infertility and reliance on assisted reproduction. The aver-
age age of first-time mothers in the United States increased from 21.4
years in 1970 to 25.0 years in 2006.48 During this period, the number of
women who had their first child when they were age thirty-five or older
increased from one in one hundred to one in twelve. 49 In 2002, approxi-
mately 7.4 million women of reproductive age in the United States re-
ported that they had received infertility services at some point during
their lives, and eighty-eight percent of IVF procedures in 2008 involved
women who were over thirty years of age.50 Third, the success rate has
increased. In the mid-1980s, the success rate for IVF procedures was
about five percent.51 In 2008, the success rate was over thirty percent.5 2
Finally, more individuals are able to afford these procedures than previ-
ously. Although the average cost per IVF cycle has increased over the
years, 5 3 the actual cost to a couple for a successful delivery is often much
lower today due to the increased success rate (thus, fewer cycles are
needed to achieve a successful pregnancy) and increased insurance cov-
erage for fertility issues.54
46 Wennerholm, supra note 4, at 2158.
47 See KINDREGAN, JR. & MCBRIEN, supra note 10, at 15-19.
48 See T.J. MATHEWS & BRADY E. HAMILTON, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuMAN SERVS.,
DELAYED CHILDBEARING: MORE WOMEN ARE HAVING THEIR FIRST CHILD LATER IN LIFE 1
(2009), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db21.pdf.
49 Id. at 2.
50 See 2008 ART REPORT, supra note 6, at 3, 28.
51 Byrn, supra note 15, at 174-75.
52 See 2008 ART REPORT, supra note 6, at 65.
53 In 1988, the average cost for a single cycle of IVF was approximately $6,000. Seibel,
supra note 16, at 832. In 1994, the average cost for a single cycle increased to approximately
$8,000. Peter J. Neumann et al., The Cost of a Successful Delivery with In Vitro Fertilization,
331 NEw ENG. J. MED. 239, 239-40, 241 (1994). In 2005, the average cost for a single cycle
was over $13,000. Mark P. Connolly et al., The Cost and Consequences ofAssisted Reproduc-
tive Technology: An Economic Perspective, 16 HUM. REPROD. UPDATE 603, 605 (2010); see
also Iva Skoch, Should IVF Be Affordable for All?, NEWSWEEK, Jul. 21, 2010 (discussing the
comparatively high costs of fertility treatments in the United States).
54 See KINDREGAN, JR. & MCBRIEN, supra note 10, at 199-204; see also Jain & Gupta,
supra note 17, at 255 (noting the higher use of certain assisted reproduction techniques in
states with mandated insurance coverage for IVF services than in states without mandated
coverage).
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Just as IVF and cryopreservation were once science fiction, addi-
tional assisted reproduction techniques are sure to develop in the future.
For instance, human cloning and "designer babies" are foreseeable,55
scientists are developing artificial wombs in which an embryo could de-
velop completely outside of the body, 56 and some scientists believe arti-
ficial sperm may be developed from bone marrow.57 While each new
technique will present its own ethical issues, each will result in children
who, as with all children, had no say in the method by which they were
created.58 As legislatures decide how to treat these children, they should
keep in mind these and other possible methods, not just the current reali-
ties. Indeed, it was the failure of legislatures to look ahead (or, at the
least, respond promptly) that has led to the unresolved issues this Article
addresses.
F. The Reasons for Posthumous Conception
Although the reasons that couples turn to assisted reproduction to
achieve a pregnancy are self-evident, it may be less clear why an individ-
ual would use his or her deceased partner's genetic material to create a
child. There are, however, many reasons why an individual may do so,
particularly if the individual does not intend to remarry. Some do so as a
tribute to a deceased partner.59 Others may do so for religious reasons. 60
Still others may do so out of a desire to know the child's genetic origin.61
Likewise, if a couple had a child before the decedent's death, the surviv-
ing parent can produce a full sibling rather than a half sibling for that
child by using the decedent's genetic material.62 Further, if a couple had
embryos frozen before the decedent's death and the surviving partner is
55 See Danielle Simmons, Genetic Inequality: Human Genetic Engineering, NATURE
EDUC. (2008), http://www.nature.com/scitable/topicpage/genetic-inequality-human-genetic-en-
gineering-768.
56 See Knaplund, supra note 1, at 99.
57 Lee-ford Tritt, Sperms and Estates: An Unadulterated Functionally Based Approach
to Parent-Child Property Succession, 62 SMU L. REV. 367, 393 (2009) (citing Charles P.
Kindregan, Jr., Thinking About the Law of Assisted Reproductive Technology, 27 Wis. J. FAM.
L. 123 (2007)).
58 See UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION Acr, prefatory note (1988)
("Although without guile or fault, but because of the accident of birth, these children of the
new biology have been deprived of certain basic rights.").
59 Knaplund, supra note 13, at 398.
60 Id. Although Catholicism, for instance, rejects most forms of assisted reproduction,
other religions do not. Even among many Catholics, however, individuals who have begun the
in vitro fertilization process may choose to use the embryos they created with their partner
rather than destroying them. Id.; see also J.G. Schenker, Women's Reproductive Health: Mon-
otheistic Religious Perspectives, 70 INT'L J. GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRIcs 77, 84-86 (2000);
Lynn D. Wardle, Global Perspectives on Procreation and Parentage by Assisted Reproduc-
tion, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 413, 428-29 (2006).
61 Knaplund, supra note 13, at 398.
62 Id. at 399.
A CHIP OFF THE OLD ICEBLOCK
now sterile, the use of the frozen embryos may be the only way for the
survivor to have his or her own genetic child.63 Also, in many cases it
will cost significantly less to use the deceased partner's genetic material
than to obtain gametes from a new donor.M Finally, as the remainder of
this Article discusses, doing so may allow the child to inherit from cer-
tain individuals (including the decedent or other family members), to
qualify as a beneficiary of certain trusts, or to receive Social Security or
other survivor benefits.65
HI. EXISTING LEGAL APPROACHES TO POSTHUMOUS CONCEPTION
Before reviewing the various statutory and judicial approaches to
date regarding posthumously conceived children, it is important to iden-
tify and understand the specific legal issues involved. For purposes of
this Article, the interests affected can be grouped into two categories: (1)
probate-related issues and (2) class-gift issues. The first category in-
cludes pretermitted-heir 66 status under a state probate code, inheritance
rights under state intestacy statutes, and other interests dependent upon a
person's right to inherit under state intestacy statutes. For instance, eligi-
bility for Social Security survivor benefits depends in part on one's status
as an heir under state law.6 7 Similarly, life insurance policies and retire-
ment plan documents often defer to state intestacy statutes if the owner
dies without a valid beneficiary designation. The class-gift issues con-
cern the interpretation of wills, trust agreements, or beneficiary designa-
tions that include a general provision for a person's issue, heirs,
descendants, children, grandchildren, or the like.
To put these issues into perspective, consider two common scena-
rios.68 First, an engaged couple learns there is a significant chance the
man may become sterile-for example, he is diagnosed with a form of
cancer requiring aggressive treatment, or he serves in the military and is
63 Id.
64 Id. at 399-400. This is particularly true if the survivor must rely on IVF and the
couple had preserved "extra" embryos during prior IVF attempts. 2008 ART REPORT, supra
note 6, at 58 (noting that the use of frozen embryos avoids the cost of fertility drug stimulation
and egg retrieval).
65 See Knaplund, supra note 13, at 399-401.
66 Pretermitted-heir statutes provide generally that a child born after his or her parent
executed a will shall have an interest in that parent's estate, unless the parent expressly omitted
the future child. See, e.g., UNIt. PROBATE CODE § 2-302 (amended 2008).
67 Social Security Act § 216(h)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (2006); see infra Part
II.B.
68 For simplicity and consistency, I have assumed in each scenario that the man dies and
the woman uses the genetic material after his death. However, the same questions would arise
if the woman died first and the man, with the help of a surrogate, used her genetic material
after her death. For a list of additional scenarios, see KINDREGAN, JR. & MCBRIEN, sLpra note
10, at 10-12.
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deployed to a war zone. 69 Before he starts treatments or is deployed, the
man has his sperm cryopreserved to preserve the possibility that he and
his fianc6e may have children together. Sadly, he does not survive the
treatments or his tour. After a period of grieving, his former fianc6e
decides to conceive a child using his preserved sperm. Years after his
death, she gives birth to a child the man never met.
Because the man was young, unmarried, and had no children, he
never created a will. Accordingly, intestacy laws will govern the distri-
bution of his assets. This raises several questions. Should this child be
his heir under the law? Should it matter whether he consented to the
posthumous use of his sperm? If so, how must his consent be proven?
Should there be a presumption of consent? Should clear and convincing
proof be required? Must the consent be in writing? Should it matter if
the child was born more than one year after the husband's death? Two
years later? Ten years later? Should it matter whether the couple was
married? What if the couple was a same-sex couple? Should it matter if
the husband's executor had already distributed his estate to others? If so,
should the executor, the recipients, or both be liable?
Alternatively, imagine a healthy, young, married couple. After they
have their first child, they create wills that include provisions for their
children. They try unsuccessfully for two years to conceive a second
child, then attempt IVF. A fertility clinic harvests a number of the wife's
eggs, fertilizes them using her husband's sperm, transfers two of the em-
bryos to her uterus, and freezes the remaining embryos. A few months
later, the husband dies unexpectedly in an accident. Shortly after his
death, the wife miscarries, but she decides to try again to have another
child using the cryopreserved embryos. Should the posthumously con-
ceived child be included in the class of "children" under his will? If the
will instead referred specifically to the first child, should the second child
be a pretermitted heir (and, thus, be entitled to a share of the decedent's
estate)?
In either scenario above, assume that the decedent had life insurance
and a retirement account (either privately, through his employer, or
both), and he contributed regularly to Social Security-a common scena-
rio for many employees. On the beneficiary designations for his insur-
ance and retirement account, he simply checked a box naming his "heirs"
as his primary beneficiaries. Should the posthumously conceived child
be deemed an heir for these purposes as well? If so, and if the custodians
had already distributed the insurance proceeds or account assets, would
69 See Knaplund, supra note 1, at 91-92 (citing various reports of soldiers cryopreserv-
ing their sperm before being deployed).
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the custodians face liability for improper distributions? 70 Furthermore,
should the child be eligible to receive Social Security survivorship bene-
fits as a child dependent on the decedent?71 If the decedent died while at
work, should the child receive worker's compensation survivor benefits
under state law?72  If the decedent died due to another's negligence,
should the child be eligible to receive wrongful death proceeds?
Finally, assume the decedent's parents had created a trust years ear-
lier for their descendants.73 Should the posthumously conceived children
be deemed their grandparents' descendants and, therefore, be eligible to
receive distributions from the trust? Should the answer differ whether
the trusts terminated at the decedent's death or continued after his death?
Now, assume the surviving partner, the decedent's executor, the
trustee of the grandparent's trust, the life insurance company, or the re-
tirement account custodian researches state law to find answers to these
questions. In thirty-three of the fifty states, that person will find that the
code and case law say absolutely nothing about any of these issues.74 In
the other seventeen, she will find that the states' approaches vary
greatly-nine states do not recognize posthumously conceived children
in any probate situation,75 while eight states do, subject to various condi-
70 In the first scenario, the heirs typically would be the decedent's children, then parents,
then siblings. It would be extremely likely that the custodian would distribute the assets to the
parents or, if none, the siblings shortly after his death. In the second scenario, the sole heir
typically would be the surviving spouse, even if the decedent had children, so the concern to
the custodian would not be as great. See infra Part II.A.1.b.
71 This last question is surprisingly complicated and has garnered the most attention to
date by courts. Part II.B, infra, discusses further the issues relating to Social Security survivor
benefits.
72 See Finley v. Farm Cat, Inc., 288 S.W.3d 685 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008).
73 In 2009, trustees of over 2.6 million trusts for individuals filed federal income tax
returns. 2009 SOI Tax Stats-Fiduciary Returns-Sources of Income, Deductions, and Tax Lia-
bility-Type of Entity, IRS.oov, http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=225291,00.htm (fol-
low "2009" hyperlink). This included complex trusts (1,344,911), simple trusts (706,775), and
grantor trusts (567,585). Id. Presumably, a large majority of these trusts had provisions for
children, grandchildren, issue, heirs, descendants, or similar class designations. Notably, not
all grantor trusts file tax returns and, thus, the actual number of trusts is somewhat higher. See
SOI Tax Stats-Income from Trusts and Estates Study Data Sources and Limitations, IRS.GOV,
http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/indtaxstats/article/0,,id=214746,00.html.
74 See infra Table 1.
75 The nine states that do not recognize posthumously conceived children are Arkansas
(Finley v. Astrue, 270 S.W.3d 849 (Ark. 2008)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-1(b)(1)
(West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-108 (West,
Westlaw through chs. 1-335 effective on or before July 1, 2011)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 524.2-120(10) (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.)); South Carolina (S.C. CODE
ANN. § 62-2-108 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg. Sess.)); South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 29A-2-108 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess., Exec. Order 11-1 and S. Ct.
Rule 11-17)); New York (N.Y. EsT. POWERS & TRUSTs LAW § 5-3.2(a)-(b)); Virginia (VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-164 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.)); and New Hampshire (Khab-
baz ex rel. Eng v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 930 A.2d 1180, 1182 (N.H. 2007)). In New
York, although the statute excludes posthumously conceived children for probate purposes, a
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tions.76 The following breaks down each of these approaches, starting
with statutory approaches and then the judicial approaches.
A. Statutory Approaches
With respect to posthumously conceived children, state statutes fall
into three categories: (1) statutes based on model or uniform codes (the
most common), (2) statutes not based on model or uniform codes and
that pre-date cryopreservation, and (3) statutes that expressly address
posthumously conceived children. The following summarizes the vari-
ous statutes that fall in each category, the strengths and weaknesses of
those statutes, and the states that have adopted each.
1. States with Statutes Based On Model or Uniform Acts
Twenty-six states have a probate or parentage code that includes an
"afterborn-heirs" provision based on a model or uniform act.77 The fol-
lowing summarizes the historical development of model and uniform
codes as they relate to posthumously conceived children and identifies
the states that have adopted and still follow each.
a) Model Probate Code (1946)
In 1946, the Probate Law Division of the American Bar Association
published the first model or uniform probate act,7 8 the Model Probate
Code (MPC). The MPC included an "afterborn-heirs" provision which
court has recognized them for class-gift purposes. In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d 207, 212
(Sur. Ct. 2007)).
76 The eight states that recognize posthumously conceived children are California (CAL.
PROB. CODE §§ 249.5-249.8 (West, Westlaw through ch. 312 of 2011 Reg. Sess. and ch. 11 of
2011-12 1st Ex. Sess.)); Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-120 (West, Westlaw
through Ist Reg. Sess. of the 68th Gen. Assemb., 2011)); Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 742.17(4) (West, Westlaw through ch. 236 of 2011 1st Reg. Sess. of the 22nd Leg.)); Iowa
(IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.220 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.)); Louisiana (LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1(A) (West, Westlaw through 2011 1st Extraordinary Sess.)); Massachu-
setts (Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002)); New Jersey (In re
Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000)); and North Dakota (N.D.
CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-19 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.)).
77 See infra Table 1. In addition to the twenty-six states shown in Table 1, Minnesota
and Iowa have probate statutes based on a model or uniform code; however, because they have
also enacted provisions that directly address posthumously conceived children, I have classi-
fied them differently for purposes of this Article. See infra Part H.A.3. Generally speaking, a
model act provides an example for each state to consider, evaluate, and adapt as it sees fit,
whereas uniform acts are intended to be adopted, largely intact, by a majority of states in order
to provide uniformity among the states. See MICH. LEGAL STUD., PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW
10 (1946); Kindregan, Jr. & Snyder, supra note 30, at 206.
78 MICH. LEGAL STUD., supra note 77 (including a complete copy of the Model Probate
Code).
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codified the traditional rule that all heirs must be living or in gestation at
the moment of the decedent's death. 7 9 Section 25 stated:
Descendants . . . of the intestate, begotten before his
death but born thereafter, shall inherit as if they had been
born in the lifetime of the intestate and had survived
him. With this exception, the descent and distribution of
intestate estates shall be determined by the relationships
existing at the time of the death of the intestate.s0
Read strictly, posthumously conceived children-who are not "be-
gotten" before the decedent's death-do not fit within the limited excep-
tion stated in the first sentence and, therefore, would be excluded under
the second sentence's general rule. However, there is little doubt that the
drafters did not specifically intend to bar such children. This language
was approved in 1946, before scientists discovered how to freeze sperm
while retaining its viability,81 and it is based on a rule that had existed
unchanged for over a thousand years. 8 2 Posthumous conception was lit-
erally science fiction both when the rule was established and when the
MPC drafters codified it. Accordingly, courts should not feel obligated
to read the language strictly. Rather, they should deem themselves free
to create a new exception for posthumously conceived children. 8 3
If a court reads the language strictly, however, the MPC's use of
"begotten" is problematic given today's science. For instance, if "begot-
ten" is synonymous with conception-the moment that the sperm fertil-
izes the egg-this language would provide different interests to children
depending on the specific assisted reproductive technique used. If a
couple froze an embryo prior to the father's death, that child technically
would have been "conceived" or "begotten" prior to the father's death-
even if the mother did not implant the embryo until after his death-and
the child would fall within the statute. Alternatively, if the father froze
79 See, e.g., In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1260-61 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
2000). The court noted:
However, there have long been exceptions to the rule that the identity of takers from
a decedent's estate is determined as of the date of death. Those exceptions are based
on human experience going back to time immemorial. We have always been aware
that men sometimes cause a woman to become pregnant and then die before the
pregnancy comes to term ....
Id.
80 MODEL PROBATE CODE § 25 (1946).
81 See Walters et al., supra note 32, at 4.
82 See Knaplund, supra note 1, at 105-08.
83 Just before publication of this Article, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit interpreted this language, which was a part of the Iowa Code, and applied it
strictly. Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 965 (8th Cir. 2011). However, two other courts have
looked past the statute's plain language when considering similar language because of the
legislature's lack of actual intent. See infra Parts IV.B. 1 and IV.B.2.
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his sperm and the mother used the frozen sperm after his death, the re-
sulting child would not be "conceived" or "begotten" until after the fa-
ther's death and, thus, would not fall within the statute. It is extremely
unlikely that the drafters intended to draw such an arbitrary line when
they approved the language in 1946. More likely, they simply had not
considered the possibility of posthumous conception, which remained a
scientific impossibility at that time.
Four states, Indiana, Maryland, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, still have
this language from the 1946 MPC in their probate codes. 84 Until these
states amend their statutes or courts interpret this language, it is unknown
whether a posthumously conceived child would be recognized for pro-
bate and class-gift purposes in these states.
b) Uniform Probate Code (1969, 1990)
In 1969, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and the American Bar Association approved the Uniform
Probate Code (UPC), which replaced the MPC. 85 The Commissioners
incorporated the MPC's afterborn-heirs provision, but they changed "be-
gotten" to "conceived" and dropped the second sentence. 86 Section 2-
108 of the UPC stated simply, "Relatives of the decedent conceived
before his death but born thereafter inherit as if they had been born in the
lifetime of the decedent."87 The changes appear to be merely stylistic,
however, not substantive.88
84 IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-6 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.); MD. CODE
ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.);
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.14 (West, Westlaw through 2011 files 1-27, 29-47, and 49 of
the 129th Gen. Assemb., approved by Sept. 26, 2011 and filed with the Sec. of State by Sept.
26, 2011); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2104(4) (West, Westlaw through 2011 Acts 1-75). The
language in the Maryland code is slightly different: "A child of the decedent who is conceived
before the death of the decedent, but born afterwards shall inherit as if he had been born in the
lifetime of the decedent. No other after-born relation may be considered as entitled to distribu-
tion in his own right." Mo. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107 (Westlaw). Likewise, the
Pennsylvania legislature omitted the second sentence because the traditional rule is "already
well established" in case law. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2104(4), cmt. para. 4 (Westlaw).
Iowa's code also includes this language, IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.220 (West, Westlaw through
2011 Reg. Sess.), but its legislature adopted additional language in 2011 that specifically ad-
dresses posthumously conceived children. Id. § 633.220A. See infra Part II.A.3.b.
85 The original Uniform Probate Code is available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/
archives/ulc/upc/upc_1 969.pdf.
86 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-108 (1969) (amended 2008), available at http://www.
law.upenn.edulbll/archives/ulc/upc/upc-1969.pdf.
87 Id.
88 The Commissioners did not provide a comment to § 1-208 to explain the changes,
which they likely would have done had they introduced a new approach. Further, although
they removed the reference to the traditional rule, § 1-103 of the Uniform Probate Code stated,
"Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Code, the principles of law and equity
supplement its provisions."
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For the reasons mentioned above regarding the MPC, it is uncertain
how a court would apply this language, if at all, in the context of posthu-
mously conceived children. One court, however, has held that the 1969
UPC language does not apply to posthumously conceived children, and
the court created its own exception for such children.89 Three states,
Maine, Nebraska, and Tennessee, still have this language from the 1969
UPC in their probate codes, and it is uncertain what interests a posthu-
mously conceived child would have in these states.90
In 1990, the Commissioners revised section 2-108 to state, "An in-
dividual in gestation at a particular time is treated as living at that time if
the individual lives 120 hours or more after birth." 91 The Commissioners
did not provide a comment to explain the intent of this change, but it is
likely that, this time, they intended to exclude posthumously conceived
children. By 1990 cryopreservation was becoming more common, and
the change to "in gestation" removed the ambiguity inherent in the words
"begotten" (from the MPC) and "conceived" (from the 1969 UPC). In
addition, two years earlier the Commissioners had proposed the Uniform
Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act (discussed next), which
provided that posthumously conceived children have no interest in their
deceased parent's estate. 92 Like this change to the UPC, that act also
used the term "in gestation."
On the other hand, one could reasonably conclude that UPC section
2-108 does not preclude posthumously conceived children from inherit-
ing. In fact, the drafters of the Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills &
89 In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000). The New
Jersey legislature has since amended its statute and adopted the afterborn-heir language used in
the 1990 Uniform Probate Code. See infra Part I.B.I.
90 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A § 2-108 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 447 of the 2011
1st Reg. Sess. of the 125th Leg.); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2308 (West, Westlaw through 102nd
Leg. 1st Reg. Sess. 2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-2-108 (West, Westlaw through 2011 1st
Reg. Sess.). A small number of additional states still include the "conceived before" language
in their statutes, but they have recently amended the statutes to clarify that the birth must occur
within ten months after the decedent's death. See infra Part II.3.a. Florida's probate code
includes section 108 of the 1969 Uniform Probate Code as well, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.106
(West, Westlaw through Ch. 236 of 2011 1st Reg. Sess. of the 22nd Leg.), but its legislature
passed a separate statute in 2003 specifically addressing posthumously conceived children. Id.
§ 742.17. See infra Part 0.0.b.
91 UNr'u. PROBATE CODE § 2-108 (amended 1990). In 2008, this language was revised to
read, "An individual in gestation at a decedent's death is deemed to be living at the decedent's
death if the individual lives 120 hours after birth." UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-104(a)(2)
(amended 2008) (moving the prior section 2-108 to section 2-104(a) and revising the lan-
guage). However, as discussed next, additional provisions were added to the Uniform Probate
Code in 2008 that provided that certain posthumously conceived children after a parent's death
would be deemed "in gestation" at the decedent's death.
92 See infra Part II.A.1.c.
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Other Donative Transfers take this position,93 noting that "[m]ost statu-
tory codifications, including enactments of the Original or Revised Uni-
form Probate Code . .. do not preclude inheritance by a child conceived
after the decedent's death. They merely provide that a child who is in
gestation at the decedent's death is treated as then living." 9 4 In other
words, they do not apply to section 2-108 the canon of construction ex-
pressio unius, exclusio alterius.95 In any event, the Commissioners' in-
tent-regardless of what it may have been-does not necessarily reflect
the intent of the legislatures in the states that have adopted the 1990
UPC.
Nine states, Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, Michigan, Montana, New
Jersey, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin, still have this language
from the 1990 UPC in their probate codes.96 Notably, none of these
states adopted the 1988 Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Concep-
tion Act. In these nine states, a court may or may not read the statutory
language strictly, and, thus, may or may not exclude posthumously con-
ceived children. 97
93 Mary F. Radford, Postmortem Sperm Retrieval and the Social Security Administra-
tion: How Modem Reproductive Technology Makes Strange Bedfellows, 2 EsT. PLAN. &
CMTY. PROP. L.J. 33, 43 (2009). The drafters note that, despite Uniform Probate Code section
2-108, a posthumously conceived child may inherit from a genetic parent, so long as the child
is "born within a reasonable time after the decedent's death in circumstances indicating that
the decedent would have approved of the child's right to inherit." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.1 cmt. d (1999).
94 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.5 cmt. I
(1999).
95 Expressio unius, exclusio alterius is a Latin phrase meaning "the expression of one
thing excludes another." HELENE S. SHAPO, ET AL., WRITING AND ANALYSIS IN THE LAW
110-11 (Found. Press 5th ed. 2008).
96 ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 13.12.108 (West, Westlaw through Sept. 8, 2011 of Ist Reg.
Sess. and Ist Spec. Sess. of 27th Leg.); AR1z. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2108 (West, Westlaw
through Ist Reg. Sess. and 3rd Spec. Sess. of the 50th Leg., 2011); HAW. REv. STAT. § 560:2-
108 (West, Westlaw with amendments through Act 235 of the 2011 Reg. Sess.); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 700.2108 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 2011, No. 151 of the 2011 Reg. Sess. of
96th Leg.); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-118 (West, Westlaw through 2011 laws eff. through
July 1, 2011); 14; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:5-8 (West, Westlaw through L. 2011, Ch. 124 and
J.R. No. 6); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 303 (West, Westlaw through No. 46 of the 2011-12 sess.
of the Vt. Gen. Assemb.) (non-Uniform Probate Code, but same language); W. VA. CODE
ANN., §§ 42-1-3f, 42-1-8 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.); Wisc. STAT. §§ 852.03,
854.21 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Act 31) (non-Uniform Probate Code, but similar lan-
guage). Minnesota also has this language in its code, MINN. STAT. § 524.2-108 (2010), but in
2010 it added a specific provision excluding posthumously conceived children, id. § 524.2-
120(10). Similarly, New Mexico and Utah have this language in their statutes but have
adopted the 2000 Uniform Parentage Code provisions addressing posthumously conceived
children. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-1 1A-707 (West, Westlaw through Ist Reg. Sess. of the 50th
Leg., 2011) (parentage); § 45-2-108 (afterborn heirs); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-15-707
(West, Westlaw through 2011 2nd Spec. Sess.) (parentage); 75-2-104(1)(b) (afterborn heirs).
97 A federal court considering Arizona state law held that this language excluded posthu-
mously conceived children. See Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 231 F. Supp. 2d 961 (D. Ariz.
2002), rev'd on other grounds, 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004). That decision, however, does not
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c) Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act
(1988)
In 1988, the Commissioners proposed for the first time language
that specifically addressed the interests of posthumously conceived chil-
dren."9 The Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act
(USCACA) provided that a child conceived after a parent's death is not a
child of that parent for any purpose.99 Section 4(b) stated, "An individ-
ual who dies before implantation of an embryo, or before a child is con-
ceived other than through sexual intercourse, using the individual's egg
or sperm, is not a parent of the resulting child." Section 10 clarified that
this rule controlled for purposes of intestate succession, "probate law ex-
emptions, allowances, or other protections for children in a parent's es-
tate," and determination of class members for donative transfers.
The Commissioners excluded posthumously conceived or implanted
children "to avoid the problems of intestate succession which could
arise" from posthumous conception. 00 The decision to exclude such
children in favor of administrative convenience is puzzling, however,
given the Commissioners' child-centric mandate. The Act's prefatory
note stated that the Commission's singular goal was to provide for the
children conceived through assisted reproduction. Specifically, "[tihe
Committee was given the responsibility to draft an act, a child oriented
act, to provide order and design that would inure to the benefit of those
children who have been born as a result of this new modern miracle." 01
Further, the Commissioners noted that "[t]he narrowness of the Act is
designed to limit its applicability to what is best for children." 0 2 Fi-
nally, they added, "Children then are the first priority, others can wait, at
least until the children are taken care of."10 3 However, with respect to
intestate succession, the Commissioners chose expediency over the inter-
ests of these children.104
necessarily reflect the position of the Arizona Supreme Court and is not binding on an Arizona
court. Also, although the New Jersey Superior Court held in 2000 that posthumously con-
ceived children may inherit under the 1969 Uniform Probate Code, In re Estate of Kolacy, 753
A.2d 1257 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000), the New Jersey legislature later adopted the 1990
Uniform Probate Code language. See 2004 N.J. Laws Serv. 1442 (effective Feb. 27, 2005).
Accordingly, it is unclear whether future courts will follow Kolacy.
98 The Commissioners intended the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception
Act to complement the existing Uniform Parentage Act, which at the time did not address
posthumously conceived children. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT
§ 1 cmt. (1988), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/uscaca88.pdf.
99 Id.
100 Id. § 4(b) cmt.
101 Id. prefatory note, at 2.
102 Id.
103 Id. prefatory note, at 1.
104 The Commissioners noted, "Of course, those who want to explicitly provide for such
children in their wills may do so." Id. § 4(b) cmt.
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The USCACA was not a rousing success, and only North Dakota
and Virginia adopted it.105 In 2000, the Commissioners rolled parts of
the USCACA into a revised Uniform Parentage Act and withdrew their
recommendation that states enact the USCACA.1 06 North Dakota re-
pealed its version of the USCACA in 2005 and replaced it with the re-
vised Uniform Parentage Act.'07 Virginia has kept the act, but its
version is a bit different than the USCACA language.108
d) Uniform Parentage Act (2000)
Twelve years later, the Commissioners again addressed posthu-
mously conceived children and, for the first time, provided that they may
be treated as children of the deceased parent. In 2000, the Commission-
ers incorporated parts of the USCACA into the Uniform Parentage Act
(UPA), 10o which had not previously addressed the interests of posthu-
mously conceived children. However, the Commissioners did not adopt
section 4(b) of the USCACA. Instead, they provided that a child con-
ceived after a parent's death would be deemed a child of the deceased
parent if the deceased parent gave consent. Specifically, section 707 of
the UPA provided, "If a spouse dies before placement of eggs, sperm, or
embryos, the deceased spouse is not a parent of the resulting child unless
the deceased spouse consented in a record that if assisted reproduction
were to occur after death, the deceased spouse would be a parent of the
105 N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-18-04 (West, Westlaw through Reg. Sess. of the 54th
Leg. Assemb. 2005, at ND-STMANN95) (repealed 2005); 1991 Va. Acts 1104-11.
106 See UNW. PARENTAGE Act, prefatory note at 2 (amended 2002) ("The promulgation of
the Uniform Parentage Act in 2000, as amended in 2002, is now the official recommendation
of the Conference on the subject of parentage [and] . . . relegates to history [the] . . .USCACA
(1988).").
107 See 2005 N.D. Laws 719. North Dakota subsequently adopted the 2008 revisions to
the Uniform Probate Code, as discussed infra Part II.A. .e.
108 Virginia's version provides interests to posthumously conceived children only if the
birth occurs within ten months after the death of a parent, VA. CODE ANN. § 20-164 (West,
Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.), and either "(i) implantation occurs before notice of the
death can reasonably be communicated to the physician performing the procedure or (ii) the
person consents to be a parent in writing executed before the implantation." Id. § 20-158(B).
See also Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. & Maureen McBrien, Posthumous Reproduction, 39 FAM.
L.Q. 579, 590 (2005) (explaining related conflicts and inconsistencies in Virginia's statutes
relating to posthumous reproduction).
109 PROPOSED REVISION OF THE UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr prefatory note at 1 (2000), availa-
ble at http://www.law.upenn.edulbllarchives/ulc/upa/upa300.pdf. The original Uniform Par-
entage Act was approved and recommended by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in 1973. Id.; see also UNw. PARENTAGE ACT (1973), available at http://
www.1aw.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/1990s/upa7390.pdf.
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child."110 In 2002, the Commissioners replaced the references to
"spouse" with "individual" and made other minor changes.I"I
Thus, for the first time, a model or uniform act recognized a par-
ent-child relationship between a posthumously conceived child and the
deceased parent-in at least some circumstances. However, this ap-
proach has two significant problems. First, the statute is a parentage act,
not a probate act, and it does not clarify whether, or how, it apples in the
probate context. Second, if it does apply in the probate context, the pro-
vision is so broad that it would create numerous administrative
difficulties.
Regarding the first problem, the UPA primarily addresses the rights
and responsibilities that flow from a parent-child relationship during the
lifetime of the parties, such as child custody, visitation rights, and sup-
port obligations.1 12 Although the UPA recognizes a parent-child rela-
tionship between parties, it does not articulate the effect this relationship
has in the probate or class-gift context. It does not grant the child any
interests in the deceased parent's estate, nor does it address the child's
interest in class gifts. Nonetheless, the act states broadly that it "applies
for all purposes, except as otherwise specifically provided" by another
law of the state.113 Thus, if a state does not specifically address the sta-
tus of posthumously conceived children in its probate code, a court may
look to the UPA to determine the parties' relationship.
If a state adopted this provision in its parentage statutes, but it did
not amend its probate code to clarify the interests of posthumously con-
ceived children, it is unclear what, if any, interests the child would actu-
ally have. Specifically, one could reasonably argue either that this new,
broader provision expands (or, more accurately, creates an exception to)
the UPC's "posthumous heirs" provision, or that the "posthumous heirs"
language-when read strictly-specifically covers posthumously con-
ceived children and is therefore unaffected by the UPA.
Most likely, this act would not be construed to create probate inter-
ests for posthumously conceived children. The Commissioners noted
110 Id. § 707 (revised 2000), available at http://www.law.upenn.edulbll/archives/ulc/upal
upasty l020.pdf.
111 Id. (amended 2002), available at http://www.law.upenn.edulbll/archives/ulclupalfinal
2002.pdf. Notably, although a single use of "spouse" remains in the amended section 707, this
appears to be an oversight; the inclusion of "spouse" in that one spot is inconsistent with the
balance of section 707 and the stated intent of the Commissioners. Id. prefatory note at 2
("Article 7 . . . recodifies USCACA (1988), but applies its provisions to nonmarital as well as
marital children born as a result of assisted reproductive technologies.").
112 See Paula A. Monopoli, Nonmarital Children and Post-Death Parentage: A Different
Path for Inheritance Law?, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 857, 887-88 (2008); Wardle, supra note
60, at 444-46.
113 UNW. PARENTAGE Acr § 203 (amended 2002); see also Radford, supra note 93, at 39
(noting the scope of the applicability of the UPA).
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that these changes to the UPA "recodify" the USCACA, which expressly
did not recognize posthumously conceived children, as discussed
above.' 14 And despite the linguistic change from the USCACA on this
issue, the comment to section 707 is almost identical to the comment to
section 4(b) of the USCACA:
This section is designed primarily to avoid the problems
of intestate succession which could arise if the posthu-
mous use of a person's genetic material leads to the de-
ceased being determined to be a parent. Of course, an
individual who wants to explicitly provide for such chil-
dren in his or her will may do So. 1 15
Accordingly, a court may conclude that by the addition in the UPA of
"unless the deceased spouse consented in a record," the drafters did not
intend to grant new interests, but simply to clarify that a provision for
such children in a will would be respected.
This uncertainty highlights a structural problem that legislatures
should avoid by addressing posthumous conception in their probate
codes, not solely in their parentage acts. Parentage acts and probate
codes are entirely different animals with distinct focuses.11 6 Parentage
acts are concerned primarily with a child's best interests. For instance, if
an individual chooses to have intercourse, parentage acts will hold the
individual financially responsible for a resulting child, whether intended
or not. Children have a right to such support; a parent cannot opt out of
these obligations." 17
On the other hand, the primary goal of intestacy laws traditionally
has been to satisfy the decedent's likely intent." 8 While the United
States Supreme Court has recognized that an individual has a right to
dispose of her assets,"l 9 it has never held that an individual-not even a
114 See UNF. PARENTAGE Acr prefatory note at 2 (amended 2002).
115 Id. § 707 cmt.
1 16 As noted by Professor Lee-ford Tritt, "Estates law and family law have very different
goals in defining a parent-child relationship. Many salient concerns regarding various issues
evoked from a parent-child relationship during the parties' lifetime are not necessarily rele-
vant to issues concerning the distribution of one's estate." Tritt, supra note 57, at 370; see also
In re Estate of Palmer, 658 N.W.2d 197, 200 (Minn. 2003) (stating that, in recognition of the
distinct purposes of probate and family law, a state legislature's decision "not to make the
Parentage Act the sole means of establishing paternity for the purposes of probate" was
justified).
117 See Monopoli, supra note 112, at 887.
118 See Tritt, supra note 57, at 370-71.
119 See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987) (holding unconstitutional a section of
the Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983 that required that certain undivided fractional inter-
ests in land must escheat to the tribe, and stating that "the right to pass on property-to one's
family in particular-has been part of the Anglo-American legal system since feudal times");
but see Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1942) (stating that "[n]othing in the
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decedent's spouse or children-has a constitutional right to inherit as-
sets. 1 2 0 Accordingly, legislatures are generally free to dictate the terms
of one's inheritance.121 Indeed, because the interests are different in the
parentage and probate contexts, a legislature may reasonably decide to
treat posthumously conceived children differently in each context. In
any event, legislatures should avoid any confusion by addressing the is-
sue in both places.122
Regarding the second problem, if courts do construe the statute to
give posthumously conceived children an interest in the deceased par-
ent's estate, the statute goes too far. There is no time limitation before
which the child must be born. If the husband gave written consent for
his sperm to be used after his death, the wife seemingly would have an
unlimited time under this statute to become pregnant. This would hold
up estate administrations indefinitely (in violation of the stated purpose
of the provision) or, depending on the state's probate laws, expose a per-
Federal Constitution forbids the legislature of a state to limit, condition, or even abolish the
power of testamentary disposition over property within its jurisdiction.").
120 Rights commonly provided by statute, however, include an elective share for a surviv-
ing spouse, a family allowance, and a homestead allowance. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE
§§ 2-201 to 2-214 (amended 2008) (elective share), 2-404 (family allowance), 2-402 (home-
stead allowance).
121 See Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 537 (1971) ("[T]he choices reflected by the
intestate succession statute are choices which it is within the power of the State to make.").
Commentators have questioned, however, whether statutes treating posthumously conceived
children differently than children conceived prior to a decedent's death may violate equal
protection rights. See generally Julie E. Goodwin, Not All Children Are Created Equal: A
Proposal to Address Equal Protection Inheritance Rights of Posthumously Conceived Chil-
dren, 4 CONN. PuB. INT. L.J. 234 (2005) (discussing Equal Protection inheritance claims of
non-marital children under traditional common law and analyzing the right of posthumously
conceived children to inherit from a decedent's estate under the Equal Protection Clause);
Gloria J. Banks, Traditional Concepts and Nontraditional Conceptions: Social Security Survi-
vor's Benefits for Posthumously Conceived Children, 32 Lov. L.A. L. REv. 251 (1999) (dis-
cussing whether it is permissible under the Equal Protection Clause to exclude posthumously
conceived children from survivor benefits under the Social Security Act). Courts have held
that certain statutes denying interests to posthumously conceived children do not violate equal
protection principles. See Finley v. Astrue, 601 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1099-1106 (E.D. Ark.
2009); Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 231 F. Supp. 2d 961, 969-70 (D. Ariz. 2002), rev'd on
other grounds, 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004).
122 There are other notable instances in which it is unclear whether provisions in a parent-
age act apply in the probate context, For instance, section 5 of the 1973 Uniform Parentage
Act addressed assisted reproduction but not posthumous conception. It recognized a par-
ent-child relationship only in the context of a married couple working with a licensed physi-
cian and using sperm from a sperm donor. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (1973) (amended 2002).
Even if these requirements were met, it did not address what rights or interests the child would
have in the probate context. Similarly, some states require in their parentage acts that paternity
be determined during the father's lifetime, others require that paternity be determined within
300 days after the father's death, and others do not limit the time for paternity actions. See
Kristine S. Knaplund, Equal Protection, Postmortem Conception, and Intestacy, 53 U. KAN. L.
REV. 627, 645-49 (2005); Knaplund, supra note 1, at 97; see also In re Estate of Kolacy, 753
A.2d 1257, 1262-63 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000) (declining to apply the 300-day rule in
New Jersey's parentage act in the probate context).
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sonal representative to indefinite liability for distributing assets to im-
proper heirs. Further, the statute does not state what this "consent" must
entail. For instance, an individual may want the child to be recognized
as his own, but he may not want a portion of his estate to go to the child.
This could be the case, for instance, if the man had other children-from
either a prior marriage or the same marriage-whom he knew and would
prefer to benefit. 123
Seven states-Alabama, Delaware, New Mexico, Texas, Utah,
Washington, and Wyoming-have adopted the 2000 UPA but do not ex-
pressly address posthumously conceived children in their probate
code. 124 For the above reasons, the interests of posthumously conceived
children remain unclear in these states.
e) Uniform Probate Code (2008)
In 2008, the Commissioners amended the UPC to address posthu-
mously conceived children. For the first time, the Commissioners ex-
pressly provided that, subject to certain conditions, a posthumously
conceived child may be included in both intestate succession 25 and class
gifts. 126
For probate purposes, a posthumously conceived child will be
deemed a child of the deceased parent if two conditions are met. First,
the deceased parent must have intended to be "treated as a parent." 127
This intent can be shown by a "signed record that, considering all the
facts and circumstances, evidences the individual's consent,"1 28 or by
clear and convincing evidence of the deceased parent's intent. 129 How-
123 While the decedent could address this in a will, intestacy statutes apply, by definition,
to those without a will.
124 ALA. CODE §§ 26-17-707 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.) (parentage), 43-8-
47 (afterborn heirs); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-707 (West, Westlaw through 78 Laws 2011,
chs. 1-125) (parentage); tit. 12, §§ 310, 505 (posthumous children); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-
11A-707 (parentage), 45-2-108 (afterborn heirs) (West, Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. of
50th Leg. 2011); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.707 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.
and 1st Called Sess of 82nd Leg.) (parentage); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 41(a) (West, Westlaw
through 2011 Reg. Sess. and 1st Called Sess of 82nd Leg.) (afterborn heirs); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 78B-15-707 (West, Westlaw through 2011 2nd Spec. Sess.) (parentage), 75-2-104(l)(b)
(afterborn heirs); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.730 (West, Westlaw through 2011 legis.)
(parentage); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-2-907 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Gen. Sess.) (parent-
age), 2-4-103 (posthumous persons). Notably, Texas, Utah, and Washington each retained the
word "spouse" (as in the 2000 revision of the Uniform Parentage Act), rather than using "indi-
vidual" (as in the 2002 amendments to the Uniform Parentage Act). Also, Texas requires that
a licensed physician maintain the record. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.707 (Westlaw); see
also Kindregan, Jr., supra note 12, at 441-42.
125 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-116 (amended 2008).
126 Id. § 2-705(g)(2).
127 Id. § 2-120(f).
128 Id. § 2-120(f)(1).
129 Id. § 2-120(f)(2)(C).
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ever, if a couple was married at the time they contributed their respective
genetic material and no divorce proceeding was pending at the first
spouse's death, the UPC presumes such intent unless clear and convinc-
ing evidence shows otherwise.' 30 Second, the child must be "in utero not
later than thirty-six months after the individual's death[, or] born not
later than forty-five months after the individual's death." 31
For class-gift purposes, a posthumously conceived child will be
deemed the child of the deceased parent if the first condition described
above (decedent's consent) is met, absent a contrary provision in the
governing instrument.132 However, if the class closes due to the de-
ceased parent's death, then the second condition above (time limitation)
applies, as well. 13 3 As a result, a child born ten years after a deceased
parent's death could be a trust beneficiary if the trust remained ongoing.
However, if the trust terminated as a result of the deceased parent's
death, the child must be conceived within thirty-six months or born
within forty-five months of the parent's death. 134 These class-gift rules
apply to governing instruments of any type, including "a deed, will, trust,
insurance or annuity policy, account with POD designation, security reg-
istered in beneficiary form (TOD), pension, profit-sharing, retirement, or
similar benefit plan, instrument creating or exercising a power of ap-
pointment or a power of attorney, or a dispositive, appointive, or nomina-
tive instrument of any similar type."1 35
The Commissioners chose a three-year period for two reasons.136
First, it "allow[s] the surviving spouse or partner a period of grieving,
130 Id. § 2-120(h)(2).
131 Id. § 2-120(k). Specifically, section 2-120(k) provides:
If, under this section, an individual is a parent of a child of assisted reproduction
who is conceived after the individual's death, the child is treated as in gestation at
the individual's death for purposes of Section 2-104(a)(2) if the child is: (1) in utero
not later than 36 months after the individual's death; or (2) born not later than 45
months after the individual's death.
Under section 2-104(a), the child must also survive for at least 120 hours after birth. Id. § 2-
104(a).
132 Id. § 2-705(b). This is a rule of construction, not a mandatory rule. Sheldon F. Kurtz
& Lawrence W. Waggoner, The UPC Addresses the Class-Gift and Intestacy Rights of Chil-
dren of Assisted Reproduction Technologies, 35 ACTEC J. 30, 31 (2009).
133 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-705(g)(2) provides:
If a child of assisted reproduction or a gestational child is conceived posthumously
and the distribution date is the deceased parent's death, the child is treated as living
on the distribution date if the child lives 120 hours after birth and was in utero not
later than 36 months after the deceased parent's death or born not later than 45
months after the deceased parent's death.
134 Id. § 2-705(g)(2) cmt.
135 Id. § 1-201(18) (defining "governing instrument").
136 The Commissioners added the forty-five-month reference for situations when the im-
plantation or insemination procedure is not done in a medical facility and there is no clear
evidence of the specific date that the child first is in utero. Id. § 2-120(k) cmt. However,
while artificial insemination can be accomplished without clinical assistance, see Nolan, supra
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time to make up his or her mind about whether to go forward with as-
sisted reproduction, and a reasonable allowance for unsuccessful at-
tempts to achieve a pregnancy."l 37 Second, it mirrors the three-year
period that an individual has under section 3-1006 to recover from a dis-
tributee the value of assets improperly distributed to that distributee.138
In addition, the Commissioners intended for these provisions to apply
whether or not the parents were married and whether the deceased parent
was the child's genetic mother or father.139
The 2008 UPC is a significant step forward, but it too has flaws.
For one, the "treated as a parent" language regarding consent is vague in
the posthumous conception context. 140 In addition, it does not include
any requirement that a surviving spouse or partner notify the fiduciaryl 41
that she intends to use the decedent's genetic material. As explained in
Part III.B.2, such a requirement would aid in the efficient administration
of estates and reduce the possibility of premature distributions. Further-
more, when a class closes, the act only recognizes posthumously con-
ceived children of the individual whose death "closed" the class. As
discussed in Part III.A.2, this limitation in unnecessary and could lead to
inequitable results.
To date, only Colorado and North Dakota have adopted these
provisions.14 2
note 7, at 1069 n.9, it is doubtful that any method requiring cryopreservation-which would be
necessary for posthumous conception-may be accomplished without clinical assistance.
137 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(k) cmt.
138 Id. § 2-705(g)(2) cmt. However, the time periods do not truly match up, because the
requirement is just that the child be in utero within thirty-six months, not that the child be
born-or that the executor be notified of the pregnancy-within thirty-six months.
139 These interests apply whether the woman who gives birth to the child is the birth
mother or a gestational carrier. Id. §§ 2-120 (addressing the issue in the context of a birth
mother), 2-121 (addressing the issue in the context of a gestational carrier). A "gestational
carrier" is a woman who gives birth under a gestational agreement and is not an intended
parent. Id. § 2-121(a)(2). A "birth mother" is any woman other than a gestational carrier who
gives birth to a child, and she is always deemed an intended parent. Id. § 2-120(a)(1). While
this typically would be the genetic mother, it need not be. Id.
140 Id. § 2-120(f). The act does not define "treated as a parent," but the comment to § 2-
115 provides that "functioning as a parent" includes providing economic support. Accord-
ingly, although it is not expressly stated, the consent likely must be not just that the surviving
spouse could use the sperm, but that the decedent intended for a portion of the estate to benefit
the child. This should be clarified in the statute, though, not hinted at through the comments.
141 This could be a trustee, an executor with respect to probate assets, or a custodian of
the decedent's nonprobate assets.
142 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-120 (West, Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. of the
68th Gen. Assemb., 2011); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 30.1-04-19 (West, Westlaw through
2011 Reg. Sess.).
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f) Other Approaches
To complete the picture, two additional approaches merit mention,
although no state has adopted either.143 In 2008, the American Bar As-
sociation completed a twenty-year project by proposing the Model Act
Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology. 144 With respect to post-
humously conceived children, the act simply adopts, almost verbatim,
section 707 of the 2000 UPA. 145 Accordingly, like the 2000 UPA (and
unlike the 2002 UPA), the act refers to "spouse" rather than "individ-
ual," thereby limiting the class of posthumously conceived children who
may be deemed an heir of a deceased parent to children of married part-
ners. 14 6 It would not apply to engaged individuals or individuals in any
other long-term relationship.'4 7 The act differs from the 2000 UPA in
two key regards, though. First, the act specifies that the consent must be
(among other requirements) signed and dated by not just the participant,
but also by his or her healthcare provider. 148 Second, it defines "spouse"
as any couple having a legally recognized relationship that state law ac-
cords rights and responsibilities "equal to, or substantially equivalent to,
those of marriage."' 4 9 Thus, it would apply to same-sex couples in states
that recognize civil unions, not just gay marriage.
Finally, the drafters of the Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills &
Other Donative Transfers have suggested an extremely broad, fact-sensi-
tive approach: "[T]o inherit from the decedent, a child produced from
genetic material of the decedent by assisted reproductive technology
must be born within a reasonable time after the decedent's death in cir-
cumstances indicating that the decedent would have approved of the
child's right to inherit."' 50 The drafters added, "A clear case would be
143 For a summary of approaches taken in other countries, see Knaplund, supra note 1, at
100-01.
144 Kindregan, Jr. & Snyder, supra note 30, at 204. This act was prepared by the Ameri-
can Bar Association's Section of Family Law's Committee on Reproductive and Genetic
Technology and approved by the Section Council. See MODEL ACT GOVERNING AssIsTED
REPROD. TECH., prefatory note (2008), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/family/com-
mittees/artmodelact.pdf.
145 MODEL ACT GOvERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 607 provides:
Except as otherwise provided in the enacting jurisdiction's probate code, if an indi-
vidual who consented in a record to be a parent by assisted reproduction dies before
placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos, the deceased individual is not a parent of the
resulting child unless the deceased spouse consented in a record that if assisted re-
production were to occur after death, the deceased individual would be a parent of
the child.
146 See Raymond C. O'Brien, The Momentum of Posthumous Conception: A Model Act,
25 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 332, 376-77 (2009).
147 MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 102(21).
148 Id. § 202(1)(b).
149 Id. § 102(21).
150 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.5 cmt. I
(1999).
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that of a child produced by artificial insemination of the decedent's
widow with his frozen sperm."15' If born within a reasonable time after
the husband's death, the child "should be treated as the husband's child
for purposes of inheritance from the husband ... [and] for all purposes of
inheritance by, from, or through [any other] intestate decedent who dies
thereafter." 5 2 In addition, the child would be a child of the deceased
parent for class-gift purposes. 53 While this approach may be fine for a
court that is required to wrestle with this issue before its legislature has,
legislatures should be more precise in their statutes to provide
predictability.
2. States with Statutes Similar to a Model or Uniform Act
Ten additional jurisdictions have provisions in their codes that, on
their face, appear to grant or deny interests to posthumously conceived
children. However, like the MPC and 1969 UPC provisions above, these
statutes were adopted (and last revised) before cryopreservation was
available or widely used. Accordingly, despite a literal reading, it is not
clear whether courts in these states would apply the statutes in the con-
text of posthumously conceived children.
In six states and the District of Columbia, the statutes appear to
recognize posthumously conceived children with no limitations. For in-
stance, Connecticut adopted a statute in 1975 which provides that chil-
dren born to a married couple and conceived through assisted
reproduction will be deemed the child of both parents. 154 Further, class
designations such as children, issue, heirs, or descendants, "when used in
any will or trust instrument, shall, unless the document clearly indicates a
contrary intention, include children born as a result of [assisted reproduc-
tion]." 5 5 Similarly, the District of Columbia's intestacy statutes state
simply, "[A] child or descendant of the intestate born after the death of
the intestate has the same right of inheritance as if born before his
death." 5 6 Illinois's probate code has long provided, "A posthumous
child of a decedent shall receive the same share of an estate as if the
child had been born in the decedent's lifetime."15 7 Kansas's intestacy
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id. § 14.8 cmt. h (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2001).
154 See CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 45a-771 to -779 (West, Westlaw through Gen. Stat., rev. to
Jan. 1, 2011). The act defines "artificial insemination" to include both intrauterine insemina-
tion and in vitro fertilization. Id. § 45a-771a(1).
155 Id. §§ 45a-778(a); see also id. § 45a-262.
156 D.C. CODE § 19-314 (West, Westlaw through July 27, 2011) (section last revised in
1965).
157 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-3 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 97-304, with the ex-
ception of P.A. 97-227, P.A. 97-229, P.A. 97-244, and P.A. 97-284, P.A. 97-297 to P.A. 97-
299, and P.A. 97-300, of the 2011 Reg. Sess.).
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statute states merely, "'Children' means biological children, including a
posthumous child . . . ."158 Missouri's probate code provides, "All pos-
thumous children, or descendants, of the intestate shall inherit in like
manner, as if born in the lifetime of the intestate ... ."159 Oklahoma's
probate code states, "Posthumous children are considered as living at the
death of their parents." 160 Finally, Rhode Island's afterborn-heirs provi-
sion states, "No right in the inheritance shall accrue to any persons what-
soever other than to the children of the intestate, unless such persons are
in being and capable in law to take as heirs at the time of the intestate's
death."t 61
Alternatively, three states have adopted provisions similar to the
UPC's "afterborn-heirs" provision that, if read strictly, would-at least
by negative implication, or expressio unius, exclusio alterius-exclude
posthumously conceived children. Kentucky's code provides that chil-
dren born within ten months of a decedent shall inherit as if the child was
living on the date of death, but that provision has not been revised since
1944.162 Likewise, North Carolina's version states, "Lineal descendants
and other relatives of an intestate born within 10 lunar months after the
death of the intestate, shall inherit as if they had been born in the lifetime
of the intestate and had survived him." 163 Oregon's probate code reads,
"The relationships existing at the time of the death of the decedent gov-
ern the passing of the net intestate estate, but persons conceived before
the death of the decedent and born alive thereafter inherit as though they
were alive at the time of the death of the decedent." 164
Finally, the Mississippi and Nevada statutes do not address in any
manner posthumous heirs-whether conceived before or after the death
of a parent.16 5
158 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-501 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg. Sess.) (section last
revised in 1939). Kansas also has had a provision in its parentage act since 1968 that provides
that all children conceived through heterologous artificial insemination "shall be considered at
law in all respects the same as a naturally conceived child" if the parents are married and both
spouses consent. Id. § 23-129.
159 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.050 (West, Westlaw through 2011 1st Reg. Sess. of the 96th
Gen. Assemb.) (section last revised in 1955).
160 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 228 (West, Westlaw through chs. of the 1st Reg. Sess. of
the 53rd Leg. eff. Aug. 26, 2011) (section last revised in 1910).
161 R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 33-1-4 (West, Westlaw through ch. 407 of the Jan. 2010
Sess.) (emphasis added) (section last revised in 1938).
162 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 391.070 (West, Westlaw through 2011 legis.).
163 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-9 (West, Westlaw through ch. 18) (last revised in 1959).
164 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 112.075 (West, Westlaw through ch. 733 of the 2011 Reg.
Sess.) (last revised in 1969).
165 See Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 91-1-1 to -31 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.);
NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. chs. 133-34 (through 2009 75th Reg. Sess. and 2010 26th Spec. Sess.).
Mississippi has a provision in its probate code regarding "illegitimate children," defined as "a
person who at the time of his birth was born to natural parents not married to each other and
said person was not legitimized by subsequent marriage of said parents or legitimized through
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3. States with Statutes Not Based On a Model or Uniform Act
Finally, the legislatures in ten states (in addition to Colorado and
North Dakota, which adopted the 2008 UPC provisions) have expressly
addressed the interests of posthumously conceived children.166 Six deny
status to posthumously conceived children, and four recognize them in
certain circumstances.
a) States That Have Excluded Posthumously Conceived
Children
The Georgia, Idaho, Minnesota, South Carolina, and South Dakota
legislatures recently revised their statutes to clarify that posthumously
conceived children have no right to inherit from the deceased parent's
estate.167 The Georgia, Idaho, South Carolina, and South Dakota statutes
state that children must be born within ten months after the death of a
parent to inherit from that parent,168 and the Minnesota statute states that
the child must be "in gestation prior to" the parent's death.169
In Georgia, Idaho, and South Carolina, the language appears to be
limited to inheritance rights; it is not clear how posthumously conceived
children are to be treated for class-gift purposes under a will or other
a proper judicial proceeding." Miss. CODE ANN. § 91-1-15(1)(C) (Westlaw). Such children
may inherit through their mother, but may inherit through their father only if there was an
adjudication of paternity within the earlier of ninety days after the administrator's first publica-
tion to creditors or one year. Id. § 91-1-15(2)-(3). Although a posthumously conceived child
technically would fit this definition, it is unclear whether a court would apply it in this context.
166 Although Iowa (Model Probate Code) and Minnesota (Uniform Probate Code) have
adopted a uniform code, their provisions regarding posthumously conceived children do not
follow the uniform codes. Accordingly, I have placed Iowa and Minnesota in this category for
purposes of this Article.
167 GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-l(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.) (relevant
language added by 1996 Ga. Laws 529); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-108 (West, Westlaw
through chs. 1-335 that are effective on or before July 1, 2011) (relevant language added by
2005 Idaho Sess. Laws 407); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-120(10) (West, Westlaw through
2011 Reg. Sess.) (relevant language added by 2010 Minn. Laws 1007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-
2-108 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg. Sess.) (relevant language added by 1990 S.C. Acts
2279); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-108 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess., Exec.
Order 11-1, and S. Ct. Rule 11-17) (relevant language added by 2007 S.D. Sess. Laws 413).
168 GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-1(b)(1) (Westlaw); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-108 (Westlaw);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-108 (Westlaw); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-108 (Westlaw). Nota-
bly, Kentucky and North Carolina likewise have a ten-month requirement, but in each case, the
language was added before cryopreservation was available. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.070
(Westlaw); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-9 (Westlaw).
169 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-120(10) (Westlaw).
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donative instrument.1 70 In Minnesota and South Dakota, the rule ex-
cludes posthumously conceived children from class gifts, as well.' 7 '
In 2006, the New York legislature expressly excluded posthumously
conceived children from its pretermitted-heir statute.172 The memoran-
dum supporting the bill notes that the limitation prevents "children born
during the testator's lifetime [from being] unfairly deprived of their ex-
pected inheritance by a child with whom the testator had no relationship,
a possibility that in all likelihood would have not been foreseen or de-
sired by the testator." 73 Notably, the legislature did not revise its pos-
thumous-heirs or class-gifts provisions, both of which (like the 1969
UPC summarized above) still refer simply to children "conceived
before" the decedent's death. A New York court held in 2007 that post-
humously conceived children may be included in the class of "issue"
under a trust agreement.174 However, the court indicated that a posthu-
mously conceived child would not inherit under New York law.175
b) States That Have Included Posthumously Conceived
Children
As noted above, Colorado and North Dakota have adopted the 2008
UPC, thereby granting status to posthumously conceived children for in-
heritance and class-gift purposes. Four additional states, Florida, Louisi-
ana, California, and Iowa, have enacted statutes granting status to
posthumously conceived children in limited circumstances. 7 6
Florida was the first state to recognize posthumously conceived
children in the probate context. In 1993, the Florida legislature provided
that posthumously conceived children are eligible for a "claim against
the decedent's estate[,]" but only if the decedent provided for the child in
170 See Mary F. Radford & F. Skip Sugarman, Georgia's New Probate Code, 13 GA. ST.
U. L. REV. 605, 621 (1997) (explaining that the legislative purpose behind the limitation was
to provide for the efficient administration of estates); 2005 Idaho Sess. Laws 407 (same); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 62-2-108 (Westlaw).
171 MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 524.2-705, -708 (Westlaw) (incorporating the intestate succes-
sion rules into class gifts); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 29A-2-705, -708 (Westlaw) (incorporating
the intestate succession rules into class gifts).
172 2006 N.Y. Laws 3055 (amending N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTs LAW § 5-3.2(a)-(b)).
173 Memorandum from the N.Y. State Judiciary in Support of B. Al0721 (2005), availa-
ble at http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?defautt-fld=&bn=Al0721&term=2005&Summary=Y&
Memo=Y.
174 In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d 207, 212 (Sur. Ct. 2007); see also infra Part II.B.6.
175 Id. at 209 (noting that under state law, "the right of a posthumous child to inherit ... is
limited to a child conceived during the decedent's lifetime.").
176 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17(4) (West, Westlaw through ch. 236 of 2011 1st Reg. Sess.
of the 22nd Leg.); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1(A) (West, Westlaw through 2011 1st Ex-
traordinary Sess.); CAL. PROB. CODE H§ 249.5-249.8 (West, Westlaw through ch. 312 of 2011
Reg. Sess. and ch. 11 of 2011-12 1st Ex. Sess.); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.220 (West, Westlaw
through 2011 Reg. Sess.).
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the decedent's will.177 The practical effect of the statute, however, is
questionable. First, it is in Florida's parentage act, not its probate code.
Second, it does not clarify what "claim" the child may have. A claim
could mean the child may inherit as an heir, is entitled to statutory al-
lowances, can be a pretermitted heir, or has some other undesignated
interest (or some combination of these). If the purpose is to grant inheri-
tance rights, yet the child must be named in the will, the benefit would be
illusory in most instances because an "heir" is only entitled to assets not
governed by a will or will substitute, such as a trust or beneficiary desig-
nation. In other words, if the decedent had a will, there typically would
be little, if any, assets to inherit through intestacy. Third, the statute does
not provide any procedure or time limitation for the not-yet-born child
(or a representative for that child) to assert any of these claims.178 If a
child were born three years after the decedent's death, there would not
likely be assets remaining to satisfy a claim for an allowance or
pretermitted-heir share. Finally, as one court has noted, the statute is not
clear whether the reference in the will must be specific, or whether a
general reference to "my children" or "my issue" would be deemed to
include posthumously conceived children. 17 9 This is another example of
a quick fix in the parentage provisions that creates uncertainty in the
probate context.180
In 2001, the Louisiana legislature improved on Florida's effort and
provided that a posthumously conceived child is a decedent's "legitimate
child" if (1) the decedent, in writing, authorized the surviving spouse to
use the genetic material, and (2) the child was born within two years after
the decedent's death.181 In 2003, the legislature extended the time limi-
tation to three years and clarified that this included the right to inherit
assets:
Notwithstanding the provisions of any law to the con-
trary, any child conceived after the death of a decedent,
who specifically authorized in writing his surviving
spouse to use his gametes, shall be deemed the child of
such decedent with all rights, including the capacity to
inherit from the decedent, as the child would have had if
the child had been in existence at the time of the death of
the deceased parent, provided the child was born to the
177 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17(4) (Westlaw) ("A child conceived from the eggs or sperm
of a person or persons who died before the transfer of their eggs, sperm, or preembryos to a
woman's body shall not be eligible for a claim against the decedent's estate unless the child
has been provided for by the decedent's will.").
178 Id.
179 Stephen v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 386 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1265 n.10 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
180 See discussion supra Part II.A.I.d.
181 2001 La. Acts 1044.
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surviving spouse, using the gametes of the decedent,
within three years of the death of the decedent.18 2
Although the statute allows "his surviving spouse to use his gametes,"
the comment to this provision notes that the statute is gender neutral with
respect to the deceased parent.' 83 The comment also notes that the lan-
guage "allows the child to qualify for Social Security benefits of the de-
ceased parent pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A)."18 4
The scope of this statute is fairly limited. Because the legislature
used "surviving spouse," a posthumously conceived child will not be rec-
ognized as the deceased parent's child unless the parents were married at
the decedent's death. Also, the statute does not expressly address
whether a posthumously conceived child is included in a class of heirs,
issue, descendants, or the like for class-gift purposes. Given the broad
language used-"with all rights, including the capacity to inherit" 8 5 -
the child seemingly would be included in such a class, but only if born
within three years of the parent's death. As a result, if a surviving spouse
had one child within three years after the decedent's death and one child
after three years, the children could be treated differently both for inheri-
tance and class-gift purposes.
In 2005, California adopted the most extensive statute to address
posthumously conceived children to date.'8 6 It provides that a posthu-
mously conceived child will be deemed to have been living at the de-
ceased parent's death if three conditions are met.' 87 First, the decedent
must state in writing that his or her genetic material may "be used for
posthumous conception."' 88 The writing must be signed and dated, must
designate a person to "control the use of' the genetic material, and may
be revoked or amended only by a signed and dated writing.18 9 Second,
the designated person must give written notice to the person with author-
182 2003 La. Acts 1918.
183 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1(A) cmt. (West, Westlaw through 2011 1st Extraordi-
nary Sess.).
184 Id.
185 Id. § 9:391.1(A).
186 See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 249.5-249.8 (West, Westlaw through ch. 312 of 2011 Reg.
Sess. and ch. 11 of 2011-12 1st Ex. Sess.) (added by 2004 Cal. Legis. Serv. 4551-57 (West),
amended by 2005 Cal. Legis. Serv. 2224-26 (West)). In addition to the probate provisions
summarized below, the bill included corresponding changes to sections 10172 and 10172.5 of
the California Insurance Code.
187 See id.
188 Id. § 249.5(a).
189 Id. § 249.5(a)(1)-(3). The original version did not require that the writing be dated,
but did require that it be witnessed by at least one competent witness. 2004 Cal. Legis. Serv.
4555 (West). The California Health & Safety Code further requires that
[a]ny entity that receives genetic material of a human being that may be used for
conception shall provide to the person depositing his or her genetic material a form
for use by the depositor that, if signed by the depositor, would satisfy the conditions
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ity to distribute the decedent's property that the decedent's genetic mate-
rial may be used for posthumous conception. 190 This notice must be sent
by certified mail within four months from the date the decedent's death
certificate is issued or a judgment is entered declaring the death, which-
ever occurs first. 191 Third, the child must be in utero within two years
from this date.192 These conditions must be satisfied by clear and con-
vincing evidence.19 3
Once these conditions are met, the person with the power to dis-
tribute the assets may not distribute any assets that could become distrib-
utable to a posthumously conceived child until the two-year window has
closed. 194 The person with the power to distribute assets shall not be
liable for any distributions made prior to receiving the written notice or
acquiring actual notice that the decedent left genetic material available
for posthumous conception.195 However, for a period of three years after
such transfer,19 6 the recipient of the property may be personally liable to
any posthumous children for the fair market value of the assets
distributed. 9 7
California's statute does not expressly extend interests in class gifts
to posthumously conceived children. Although California courts would
likely recognize such children in a class-gift context, it is not clear
whether these conditions would apply when construing a reference to
issue, descendants, or the like in a trust agreement of the decedent or a
will or trust agreement of another individual.
Most recently, Iowa enacted a 2011 statute that recognizes posthu-
mously conceived children for inheritance purposes if (1) the decedent
authorized in writing the posthumous use of the decedent's genetic mate-
rial, (2) the material is used by the decedent's surviving spouse, and (3)
the child is born within two years of the decedent's death.19 8 This test
also applies in the context of pretermitted heirs under a will or a revoca-
set forth in § 249.5 of the Probate Code, regarding the decedent's intent for the use
of that material.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1644.7 (West, Westlaw through ch. 135 of 2011 Reg. Sess.
and ch. 8 of 2011-12 1st Ex. Sess.).
190 CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5(b) (Westlaw). Generally, this person will be the executor,
trustee, or custodian of assets subject to a beneficiary designation.
19' Id.
192 Id. § 249.5(c).
193 Id. § 249.5.
194 Id. § 249.6(a)-(b).
195 Id. § 249.6(d).
196 Id. § 249.6(g).
197 Id. § 249.6(e). Further, any person who fraudulently secures the transfer of such prop-
erty is liable for three times the property's value. Id. § 249.6(f). The original version of this
statute did not include subsections (e), (f), or (g). 2004 Cal. Legis. Serv. 4555-56 (West).
198 See IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.220A (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.).
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ble trust agreement.199 The Iowa code also requires a personal represen-
tative to state in the final accounting whether the decedent left genetic
material and, if so, (1) whether the personal representative has set aside
an appropriate amount to fund a potential distribution to a posthumous
child, (2) that the personal representative will wait until two years after
the decedent's death to make the final distribution, and (3) that the per-
sonal representative will file a supplemental report at that time. 200
B. Judicial Approaches
The first published decisions regarding posthumous conception oc-
curred in the early 1990s. In those cases, the issues revolved around
ownership of cryopreserved genetic material after a marriage ends or af-
ter a contributor's death.201 Since then, courts have addressed the inter-
ests of the children conceived from such material in ten published
opinions. Nine of these cases concerned a posthumously conceived
child's ability to receive survivor benefits under the Social Security
Act-the answer to which depends on state intestacy laws. 2 0 2 In the
other case, the court considered whether a posthumously conceived child
may share in a class gift, notwithstanding that the applicable state's stat-
utes deny posthumously conceived children status for inheritance pur-
poses. This Part will focus first on six of the Social Security cases, 203
and it will then address the single case regarding class gifts.
199 Id. §§ 633.267(2), 633A.3106(2). The Iowa code does not expressly address class
gifts, though, and it is not clear whether, or how, this rule would be applied in the class gift
context.
200 Id. § 633.477.
201 See Hall v. Fertility Inst. of New Orleans, 647 So.2d 1348 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (in-
volving a contest between a decedent's parent and his girlfriend regarding the disposition of
his preserved sperm); Hecht v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. App. 4th 836 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)
(involving a contest between a decedent's girlfriend and children regarding the disposition of
his preserved sperm, which he had devised to his girlfriend in his will); Davis v. Davis, 842
S.W.2d 588, 603-04 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that an individual's interest in destroying embryos
created during marriage outweighed the former spouse's interest in donating the embryos to a
third party).
202 Although eligibility to receive these benefits depends on one's status as an heir, the
benefits are available whether the decedent had a will or died intestate. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.355(b)(1) (2011). Thus, even if a decedent had a will that covered all of her property
and clearly stated her intentions regarding posthumously conceived children, this issue still
may apply.
203 In the other three Social Security cases, the facts "fit" squarely within the state statutes
and the issue was easily resolved. In Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 52, 55-56 (4th Cir.
2011), the court held that the child was not an heir under the Virginia statute previously dis-
cussed because the child was born more than ten months after the decedent's death. The court
also addressed in further detail the interpretation of the Social Security Act continued, but it
quickly resolved whether the child was an "heir" under Virginia law. Id. In Vernoff v. Astrue,
568 F.3d 1102, 1109-11 (9th Cir. 2009), the court applied a prior California statute but also
analyzed the facts under the current California statute previously discussed. In Stephen v.
Comm'r of Social Security, 386 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1265 (M.D. Fla. 2005), the court held that
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Before reviewing the cases, it is important to understand the Social
Security provisions at issue and their importance to many individuals.
Since 1939,204 the Social Security Act has provided "survivor benefits"
to replace the economic support a family loses after a parental death. 205
Specifically, if a worker is currently or fully insured under the Social
Security Act at the worker's death, each of the worker's children who
was dependent on that worker at the worker's death may receive monthly
benefits if the child is not married and (1) is under eighteen years of age,
(2) is under nineteen years of age and in high school, or (3) is under a
disability the child attained before age twenty-two. 206 In addition, if the
worker's spouse provides primary care for an eligible child, the spouse
may also receive monthly benefits until that child reaches age sixteen or
is no longer disabled. 207 The amount payable to a survivor equals 75%
of the decedent's primary insurance amount, which is the monthly bene-
fit amount that would have been payable to the worker upon initial enti-
tlement at full retirement age.208 However, a family maximum provision
limits the total benefits to a family to between 150% and 188% of the
worker's primary insurance amount.209
This can be a great benefit to a family. In 2010, the average
monthly award to an eligible child was $750 ($9,000 annually). 210 Thus,
for an "average" family with one child, the annual survivor benefits to
the child and surviving spouse would total $18,840.211 Over eighteen
years, these benefits would total $306,000.212 For a high-earning family,
the child was not an heir because the decedent had not consented to provide for the child in his
will as required under the Florida statute previously discussed. In both Vernoff and Stephen,
the surviving wife, without her husband's consent, had sperm retrieved from his body shortly
after his unexpected death. Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1105 (stating that the husband died in a car
accident); Stephen, 368 F. Supp. 2d at 1259 (stating that the husband died of a heart attack
three weeks after the couple's marriage). For more on postmortem sperm retrieval, see gener-
ally Radford, supra note 93.
204 Social Security Act § 201 (1939), 53 Stat. 1362, 1364-66 (1939).
205 See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
206 Social Security Act § 202(d)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)(B) (2006).
207 42 U.S.C. § 402(g); 20 C.F.R. § 404.341(b) (2011). In addition, the surviving spouse
is not eligible if she remarries or is eligible for survivor benefits under another provision. Id.
208 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(d)(2), (g)(2).
209 For an explanation of the family allowance and how to calculate it, see Social Security
Online, Formula for Maximum Family Benefit, available at http://www.ssa.gov/oact/colal
familymax.html.
210 The exact amount was $751.09, but I have rounded for convenience. See Benefits
Awarded in 12-Month Period Ending in 2010, Soc. SEC. ONLINE, http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/
ProgData/awards.html (type in "2010" at "Select year," click on "Dec" at "Select month end-
ing the time period," then click on "12" at "Select number of months in period").
211 Id.
212 While the child's benefit would continue until the child reaches age eighteen, the
surviving spouse's benefit would cease when the child reaches age sixteen (unless the child is
disabled). See Types of Benefits, Soc. SEC. ONLINE, http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/ProgDatal
types.html.
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or a family with multiple children, the benefit can be even greater. For
instance, if a thirty year-old worker had paid the maximum Social Secur-
ity tax since age twenty-one, then died in 2011, the worker's spouse and
dependent children each would receive $1,902 monthly ($22,824 annu-
ally), subject to a $4,440 monthly family maximum ($53,287 annu-
ally). 2 1 3 Over eighteen years, these benefits could total over $900,000.
In either scenario, if children conceived years after the worker's death
qualify, the benefits could extend well beyond eighteen years. 2 14
With this background, should posthumously conceived children re-
ceive survivor benefits? In other words, does the Social Security Act
deem them (1) to be children of the worker (2) who were dependent on
the worker at his death? To answer the first question, one must look to
the intestacy laws of the state where the worker resided at his or her
death.2 15 Section 216(h) of the Social Security Act, titled "Determina-
tion of family status," provides:
In determining whether an applicant is the child or par-
ent of a fully or currently insured individual for purposes
of this subchapter, the Commissioner of Social Security
shall apply such law as would be applied in determining
the devolution of intestate personal property by the
courts of the State in which such insured individ-
ual . . . was domiciled at the time of his death .... .216
The Regulations add, "You may be eligible for benefits as the insured's
natural child if . .. [y]ou could inherit the insured's personal property as
his or her natural child under State inheritance laws . . . ."217 Thus, if the
intestacy laws of the state where the worker lived at his death would
recognize a posthumously conceived child as an heir, the applicant is
considered a "child" of the worker for benefit purposes. 218
213 See Quick Calculator Benefit Estimates, Soc. SEC. ONLINE, http://www.ssa.gov/
OACT/quickcalc/index.html (enter "7/01/1981" at "Enter your date of birth," enter "$200,000"
at "Enter earnings in the current year," and select "today's dollars" under "Select to see your
benefit estimate in").
214 The benefit also would continue past eighteen years if the decedent had an adult child
who was disabled prior to age twenty-two. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)(B) (2006).
215 See id. § 416(e).
216 Id. § 416(h)(2)(A).
217 20 C.F.R. § 404.355(a) (2011).
218 Technically, heirs are those individuals who would actually receive a share of the
decedent's estate, not those who would have been next in line. For instance, if a man died
with a wife and two children, but the statute provided that the decedent's entire intestate estate
shall be distributed to the wife, the children are not heirs-the decedent's wife is the only heir.
Likewise, if a man died with a will that completely disposed of his estate, he would have no
heirs. However, the Code of Federal Regulations requires only that the child could have inher-
ited under the applicable state's intestacy laws if the decedent did not have a will, not that the
individual actually inherit. See id. § 404.355(b)(1).
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Regarding the dependency element, common sense dictates that a
child born after a parent's death was not dependent on that parent at the
time of his or her death. However, the Act deems all "legitimate" chil-
dren to be dependent on their parents. 219 Further, the Act also deems any
child to be "legitimate" who (1) is deemed legitimate under applicable
state law 2 2 0 or (2) satisfies the intestacy test set out in section 216(h). 221
Accordingly, if the intestacy laws of the state where the worker
lived at his death would recognize a posthumously conceived child as an
heir, that worker's child will be deemed both a "child" of the worker and
"dependent" on that worker for purposes of the Act-and the child and
the worker's spouse may receive survivor benefits. If the state's intes-
tacy laws do not recognize the child as the decedent's heir, neither the
child nor the spouse can receive those benefits.222 As the following
cases illustrate, however, the answer becomes much murkier when courts
construe each state's intestacy laws-most of which were written de-
cades before this issue crossed any legislator's mind.
1. Estate of Kolacy (New Jersey Law)
In 2000, the New Jersey Superior Court became the first court to
publish an opinion that addressed whether a posthumously conceived
child may inherit from the deceased parent.223 The court construed the
New Jersey probate code, which mirrored the 1969 UPC, and held that it
did not apply because the legislature did not intend for it to cover posthu-
mously conceived children. 224 Rather, the court established its own
guidelines under which such children could inherit.
219 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3).
220 See id.; see also Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 599 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Legit-
imacy in § 402(d)(3) is determined in accordance with state law.").
221 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3) (citing § 416(h)(3)); see also Vernoff v. Astrue, 568 F.3d 1102
(9th Cir. 2009).
222 If a child does not qualify in this way, the Social Security Administration will also
recognize a child as the worker's child under other methods, including if the worker "had
acknowledged in writing that the applicant is his or her son or daughter . . . ." 42 U.S.C.
§ 416(h)(3)(C)(i)(I). The Social Security Administration's position is that a child must meet
one of the tests in 42 U.S.C. § 416(h). The Third and Ninth Circuits, however, have ruled
otherwise. See Capato v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626 (3rd Cir. 2011); Gillett-Netting,
371 F.3d at 599; see also discussion infra note 282.
223 In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000). The issue
came before the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana in 1996. But
before the court ruled, the Social Security Commissioner agreed to pay survivor benefits,
which made the issue moot, and noted, "'[r]ecent advances in modem medical practice, partic-
ularly in the field of reproductive medicine, . . . should involve the executive and legislative
branches, rather than the courts."' Banks, supra note 121, at 256 (quoting News Release from
Shirley S. Chater, Comm'r of Soc. Sec. at 1 (Mar. 11, 1996)).
224 Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1261, 1264.
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In Estate of Kolacy, a husband had deposited sperm with a sperm
bank before he started unsuccessful chemotherapy treatments. 2 2 5 One
year after his death at age twenty-six, his wife used his sperm for IVF
and became pregnant.2 2 6 Seven months later-nineteen months after her
husband died-she gave birth to twin girls. 2 2 7 The Social Security Ad-
ministration denied her application for survivor benefits for her daugh-
ters on the basis that they were not children of the deceased worker. 228
As the case worked its way through the Administration's appeal process,
the wife petitioned the New Jersey Superior Court for a declaration that
her daughters were heirs under New Jersey law. 2 2 9
New Jersey's probate code included the following afterborn-heirs
provision from the 1969 UPC: "Relatives of the decedent conceived
before his death but born thereafter inherit as if they had been born in the
lifetime of the decedent." 230 Because the children were conceived after
their father's death, the children did not fall within the statute's
afterborn-heirs exception. 231 Nonetheless, the judge made his own ex-
ception. He explained that when the legislature adopted that statute, "it
was not giving any thought whatsoever to the kind of problem . .. in this
case." 2 3 2 The judge added, "It is my view that the general intent should
prevail over a restrictive, literal reading of statutes which did not con-
sciously purport to deal with the kind of problem before us." 23 3 Rather,
the legislature had otherwise "manifested a general intent that the chil-
dren of a decedent should be amply provided for with respect to property
passing from him or through him as the result of a death." 2 34
225 Id. at 1258.
226 Id. The opinion does not indicate whether the husband consented to the post-death use
of his sperm.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 1259.
229 Id. The court strained a bit to accept this case, and it seems the court wanted this
opportunity to speak on the matter. The court agreed to hear the matter despite the objection
of New Jersey's Deputy Attorney General and despite that its decision would not bind the
Administration or a later federal court. Id. The court noted that it was not determining
whether the twins were entitled to Social Security benefits, which a federal court could later
determine, but simply whether the daughters were heirs under New Jersey law. Id. at 1260.
The court added that "it would clearly be unfortunate for those federal adjudicatory processes
to reach a result based in part upon an incorrect determination by federal tribunals of New
Jersey law." Id. at 1259.
230 Id. at 1260 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:5-8). In 2004, the legislature amended the
statute to make it consistent with the 1990 version of the Uniform Probate Code. 2004 N.J.
Laws 1442 (effective Feb. 27, 2005). It now reads, "An individual in gestation at a particular
time is treated as living at that time if the individual lives 120 hours or more after birth." N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 3B:5-8 (West, Westlaw through L. 2011, ch. 124 and J.R. No. 7).
231 See Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1262 (noting that the court would not adopt a restrictive,
literal reading of the statute).
232 Id. at 1261.
233 Id. at 1262.
234 Id.
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Accordingly, the judge established that posthumously conceived
children should be granted "the legal status of being an heir of the dece-
dent, unless doing so would unfairly intrude on the rights of other per-
sons or would cause serious problems in terms of the orderly
administration of estates." 235 Because the husband had died with no
other children and no probate assets, the court noted that granting heir
status would violate neither of these caveats in this case.2 3 6 Therefore,
the judge concluded, "I believe it is entirely fitting to recognize that [the
twins] are the legal heirs of William Kolacy under the intestate laws of
New Jersey." 237
This court's approach to the issue is commendable. Rather than
forcing the issue into a statute that was never intended to cover the situa-
tion, the court addressed the issue head-on and created a working rule.
There is no question that the judge made law here, and he acknowledged
that he was doing so, stating, "[lIt would be helpful for the Legislature to
deal with these kinds of issues. In the meanwhile, life goes on, and peo-
ple come into the courts seeking redress for present problems." 238 The
judge added, "We judges cannot simply put those problems on hold in
the hope that someday (which may never come) the Legislature will deal
with the problem in question. Simple justice requires us to do the best
we can with the statutory law which is presently available." 239 Notably,
over ten years later, the New Jersey legislature still has not addressed the
issue.240
Furthermore, the court was honest about its reasoning and motiva-
tions. After first expressing reservations about encouraging "parents to
move precipitously in this area," the judge added that "once a child has
come into existence, she is a full-fledged human being and is entitled to
all of the love, respect, dignity[,] and legal protection which that status
requires." 241 Accordingly, the judge concluded, "It seems to me that a
fundamental policy of the law should be to enhance and enlarge the
rights of each human being to the maximum extent possible, consistent
with the duty not to intrude unfairly upon the interests of other
persons." 242
235 Id.
236 Id
237 Id. at 1264.
238 Id. at 1261.
239 Id. at 1261-62.
240 Although the legislature amended the statute in 2004 (to make it consistent with the
1990 version of the Uniform Probate Code, see 2004 N.J. Laws 1442 (effective Feb. 27,
2005)), the legislature did not address posthumously conceived children.
241 Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1263.
242 Id
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While commendable in its honesty, the test established is not ideal.
Determining heirship is generally a black-and-white test. This approach
introduces a facts-and-circumstances analysis that would require a case-
by-case determination. For instance, what if the next couple already has
one child and that child would inherit a share but now must wait? Would
the delay "unfairly intrude" on that child's rights or "cause serious
problems in the orderly administration of the estate"? If so, is the posthu-
mously conceived child not an heir-and therefore not entitled to survi-
vor benefits (which are independent of the other child's rights or the
administration of the estate)?
Unlike legislatures, however, courts-and particularly trial level
courts-are required to rule on the facts before them. They do not have
the liberty to establish specific conditions outside of the facts they are
presented with. That said, this court could have phrased its holding dif-
ferently and provided that posthumously conceived children are always
heirs of the deceased parent, though in certain circumstances they may be
estopped from inheriting. This distinction is important because, in future
cases where a posthumously conceived child's interests may unfairly in-
trude on another's inheritance, it would still allow this child, as an heir,
to receive Social Security survivor benefits. 243
2. Woodward v. Commissioner (Massachusetts Law)
Two years later, a state's highest court considered for the first time
whether a posthumously conceived child may inherit under that state's
intestacy laws.2 4 4 As in Kolacy, the Massachusetts' Supreme Judicial
Court also refused to read its state's statutory language strictly, although
in this case the language would have, in fact, allowed the children to
inherit. 2 4 5 Instead, the court also established its own rule that permits
posthumously conceived children to inherit in limited circumstances. 246
In Woodward v. Commissioner, a husband had his sperm frozen
before he began unsuccessful leukemia treatments. 24 7 Two years after he
died, his wife gave birth to twin daughters she conceived using his pre-
served sperm and artificial insemination. 248 She then applied for Social
Security survivor benefits, was denied, and appealed to the United States
243 See discussion infra Part tI.B. The court does suggest that payments made in the
routine course of administration before the advent of after-born children could be deemed
vested, and those following the birth would be made to both categories of children. Kolacy,
753 A.2d at 1262. While this is a practical approach that responds to this concern, it is only
dicta.
244 Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002).
245 Id. at 261-63.
246 Id. at 259.
247 Id. at 260.
248 Id.
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District Court for the District of Massachusetts. 249 The district court
asked the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, by certified question,
whether posthumously conceived children may inherit under Massachu-
setts' law. 250
Massachusetts had a statute that, on its face, answered the question
directly: "Posthumous children shall be considered as living at the death
of their parent." 251 The court noted, however, that this provision was
added to the intestacy statutes in 1836.252 Furthermore, it codified an
1834 holding that children in utero on the date of their father's death are
deemed "in being" and entitled to inherit. 253 Accordingly, the legislature
did not have the present scenario in mind when it adopted that amend-
ment, and the court declined to read the statute literally.254 Nor was the
court willing to hold that the exception was limited to the facts of the
earlier case.2 5 5 The court noted that while assisted reproductive technol-
ogies have been widely known for several decades, the legislature had
not restricted the statute's broad language in any way. 2 5 6
Instead, the court established a rule under which such children
would be deemed "issue" for Massachusetts' inheritance law in "certain
limited circumstances." 257 Specifically, the child will be granted inheri-
tance rights as the deceased parent's issue if (1) time limitations do not
bar the child's claim, and (2) the surviving parent (or other representative
of the child) can establish three facts: (a) a genetic relationship exists
between the child and the decedent, (b) the decedent consented to post-
death conception, and (c) the decedent consented to support any resulting
child.258 The court tried to balance the best interests of the children, the
249 Id. at 260-61
250 Id. at 261. The exact question certified was:
If a married man and woman arrange for sperm to be withdrawn from the husband
for the purpose of artificially impregnating the wife, and the woman is impregnated
with that sperm after the man, her husband, has died, will children resulting from
such pregnancy enjoy the inheritance rights of natural children under Massachusetts'
law of intestate succession?
Id. at 259.
251 Id. at 264 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190, § 8 (1994)).
252 Id.
253 Id. (citing Hall v. Hancock, 15 Mass. 255 (15 Pick. 1934)).
254 See id.; see also Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 231 F. Supp. 2d 961, 968 (D. Ariz. 2002)
(discussing Woodward), rev'd on other grounds, 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004).
255 Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 264.
256 Id. at 264-65.
257 Id. at 259.
258 Id. Massachusetts' probate code requires that, for nonmarital children to be deemed
heirs, a paternity action must be commenced and notice given to the executor of that action
and all other interested parties, within one year from the decedent's death. Id. at 267, 271.
The court recognized that children conceived after the death of a parent are by definition
nonmarital children, but questioned whether this time limitation would apply to posthumously
conceived children. Id. at 267-68. The court declined to answer this question, though, be-
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reproductive rights of the parents, and all parties' interests in the orderly
and prompt administration of estates. 259 The court did not answer
whether the wife in this case had met her burden, but left that to the
district court to determine. 2 6 0
As in Kolacy, the court was clear about its approach and motiva-
tions. The court urged the legislature to address the issue of posthu-
mously conceived children, noting that:
[T]he complex moral, legal, social, and ethical questions
that surround their birth.. . . cry out for lengthy, careful
examination outside the adversary process, which can
only address the specific circumstances of each contro-
versy that presents itself. They demand a comprehensive
response reflecting the considered will of the people. 2 6 1
The court concluded that "[i]n the absence of statutory directives, we
have answered the certified question by identifying and harmonizing the
important State interests implicated therein." 2 6 2  Notably, more than
eight years later, the Massachusetts legislature still has not addressed the
issue. 263
This approach provides great flexibility for a court but, like the ap-
proach set out in Kolacy, provides little guidance or certainty. For in-
stance, it does not state what evidence may be sufficient to establish the
decedent's consent to post-death conception or support, nor does it indi-
cate what length of time may preclude a claim.2M Rather, it requires that
every such situation go before a judge. 265 As noted above (and as the
cause Social Security Administration regulations instruct that time limitations delineated in
state intestacy statutes for determining paternity shall be ignored for purposes of determining
eligibility for benefits. Id. at 267-68.
259 Id. at 265.
260 Id. at 270-71.
261 Id. at 272.
262 Id.
263 In 2008, an administrative law judge applying Massachusetts law relied on the "lim-
ited circumstances" standard set forth in the Woodward decision and granted survivor benefits
to a posthumously conceived child and his mother. See Hanson v. Astrue, 733 F. Supp. 2d
214, 215 (D. Mass. 2010). The decedent and his wife had unsuccessfully tried IVF for two
years prior to the husband's unexpected death. Id. Three months after his death, she became
pregnant using an embryo they had preserved during the IVF process. Id. In this case, the
genetic material included his sperm but an egg from a third-party donor. Id. Following the
administrative law judge's determination, the Social Security Administration Appeals Council
reopened the case sua sponte and reversed the decision to grant benefits. Id. at 216. On
appeal, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts ruled that the Appeals
Council exceeded its authority in reopening the case, and the court reinstated the administra-
tive law judge's decision. Id. at 219. The court, however, did not address the substantive issue
of whether the posthumously conceived child and mother were entitled to the benefits. Id. at
215.
264 See Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 269-70.
265 Id. at 266-67.
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court recognized), however, this is probably about the best result a court
can come up with given its limited role.2 6 6
Woodward marked the end of the road for claimants. In the follow-
ing string of cases, each court held that statutes similar to those in Wood-
ward and Kolacy expressly excluded posthumously conceived children.
3. Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart (Arizona Law)
Later in 2002, the United States District Court for the District of
Arizona became the first federal court to address this situation in a pub-
lished opinion. 267 Unlike the courts in Kolacy and Woodward, this court
strictly applied the statutory language to the facts and held that posthu-
mously conceived children may not inherit as heirs under Arizona law. 26 8
In Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, a husband deposited sperm prior to
undergoing chemotherapy treatments. 269 Both his wife and the doctor
who assisted the couple stated that the husband agreed that, if he died,
his wife could use his sperm after his death.270 Ten months after his
death, doctors fertilized one or more of her eggs with his sperm by IVF,
and she gave birth to twins almost eight months later. 271 She applied for
survivor benefits for the twins, was denied, and appealed to the Arizona
federal district court.272 The court did not certify the question to the
Arizona Supreme Court but analyzed Arizona law itself in a brief
discussion.273
Arizona's probate code was (and still is) based on the 1990 UPC.
The court noted that Arizona Statute section 14-2104 requires that all
heirs must "survive" the decedent.274 The court, citing no authority, con-
strued this survivorship requirement to mean that all heirs "must be in
existence at the time of the decedent's death." 275 The court recognized
that Arizona Statute section 14-2108 provides an exception for posthu-
mous heirs by stating that "'[a] child in gestation at a particular time is
treated as living at that time if the child lives at least one hundred twenty
hours after its birth.' "276 However, because the twins were neither in
gestation at their father's death nor born within 120 hours after his death,
266 See id. at 272.
267 Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 231 F. Supp. 2d 961 (D. Ariz. 2002), rev'd on other
grounds, 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004). For more information on Gillett-Netting at the Ninth
Circuit, see infra note 282.
268 Gillett-Netting, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 970.
269 Id. at 963.
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 Id. at 964.
273 See id. at 966-67.
274 Id. at 966.
275 Id. (emphasis added).
276 Id. (quoting ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 14-2108).
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the court held that "they could not inherit . .. under the plain language of
Arizona's intestacy laws."2 7 7
Although the court strictly construed the statute, it ignored-in fact,
completely failed to mention-that Arizona's probate code defines "sur-
vive." The statute provides that a person survives if that person "has
neither predeceased an event, including the death of another person, nor
is deemed to have predeceased an event under section 14-2104 or 14-
2702."278 If read literally, this would include a posthumously conceived
child, who certainly could not predecease the decedent or any other event
in the sections cited. Similarly, the court noted that Arizona Statute sec-
tion 14-2108 "specifically states that a child must at least be 'in gesta-
tion' at the time of decedent's death." 2 7 9  It does not. It simply
recognizes that children in gestation at the death of the decedent may
inherit-not that the child "must at least be in gestation."28 0 To reach
this result, the court strictly construed one section of the statute, ignored
one section altogether, and then misstated another.
Finally, the court distinguished its case from Woodward because the
Massachusetts legislature (1) used "posthumous children" rather than "in
gestation," and (2) could not have considered this issue when it approved
the language in 1836.281 However, what else could the Massachusetts
legislature have been considering in 1836 if not children in gestation?
Cryopreservation was still more than a hundred years in the future. Fur-
ther, the court does not cite any evidence that the Arizona legislature
considered this issue when it passed its statute containing this language.
I am not arguing that the court's decision was right or wrong. Nor
am I arguing that the court had a responsibility to create an inheritance
right as the courts in Kolacy and Woodward did. What is troubling, how-
ever, is that the judge seems to have decided the case on unexpressed
moral, public policy, or other grounds, then selectively-and awk-
wardly-worked backward through the statute to justify the result. This
concern applies in any state that has not addressed these issues through
its legislature. Although this case is instructive, the decision was re-
versed on other grounds and was not made by an Arizona state court, and
thus did not establish Arizona law. 2 8 2 Accordingly, it remains unclear
277 Id.
278 ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-1201(53) (West, Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. and 3rd
Spec. Sess. of the 50th Leg., 2011).
279 Gillett-Netting, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 968 (emphasis added).
280 ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-2108 (Westlaw).
281 Gillett-Netting, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 968.
282 Even if it were not reversed, a federal court's decision on a state law issue is not
binding on an Arizona court. In its opinion reversing this decision, the Ninth Circuit did not
address whether the children were "heirs" under Arizona law. Rather, the Ninth Circuit held
that under the plain language of the Social Security Act, all biological children of a decedent
are "children" if there is no dispute that the decedent is the biological parent of the child,
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today what interests, if any, posthumously conceived children may have
under Arizona law.
4. Finley v. Astrue (Arkansas Law)
In 2008, the Arkansas Supreme Court became the first state court to
deny heirship status to posthumously conceived children. 28 3 The court
construed language almost identical to that in Kolacy, but it reached the
opposite result. As in Gillett-Netting, this court too seemed to reach its
decision on unstated policy grounds, then applied the statutes selectively
to support its decision.
In Finley v. Astrue, a young couple produced ten embryos through
IVF, and the husband died in an accident shortly thereafter.284 Eleven
months after his death, the wife had two of the embryos transferred to her
uterus, and she gave birth to a daughter nine months later. 2 8 5 She applied
for dependent benefits, was denied, and appealed to the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. 286 The district court
which there rarely will be with posthumous conception. Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d
593, 596-97 (9th Cir. 2004). The court explained that a state's intestacy laws are relevant only
if there is a dispute regarding the parentage of the decedent, at which point a state's intestacy
laws are one of several options under 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) a claimant has for proving the child
was dependent on the decedent. Id. at 597. Finally, the court held that because Arizona Re-
vised Statutes section 8-601 provides that "[elvery child is the legitimate child of its natural
parents," and 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3) deems all legitimate children to have been dependent on
their parents, the children satisfy the dependency element as well. Id. at 598-99. Because the
Ninth Circuit's opinion and reasoning address a technical interpretation of the Social Security
Act independent of Arizona's intestacy statutes, id. at 599 n.8, that discussion is not directly
relevant to the scope of this Article. The Social Security Administration disagreed with the
reasoning and holding in Gillett-Netting, and its interpretation remains that a child is only a
"child" under § 402(e) if the child can demonstrate a connection to the insured under
§ 416(h)(2)-which includes the intestacy requirement. See Vernoff v. Astrue, 568 F.3d 1102,
1106 (9th Cir. 2009); 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(e), 416(h)(2) (2006). Nonetheless, the Social Security
Administration has acquiesced to the extent that cases are brought in the Ninth Circuit. SSAR
05-1(9), 70 Fed. Reg. 55,656-57 (Sept. 22, 2005); see also Vemoff, 568 F.3d at 1105.
In early 2011, the Third Circuit reached the same conclusion as the Ninth Circuit by
holding that where parentage is undisputed, it is unnecessary to look to state intestacy laws to
determine whether a child is a "child" of the worker under the Social Security Act. Capato ex
rel. B.N.C. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 629-30 (3d Cir. 2011), petition for cert.
filed, 2011 WL 3511023 (U.S. Aug. 8, 2011) (No. 11-159). Most recently, however, both the
Fourth Circuit and the Eighth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion and held that § 416(h)
provides the "exclusive means by which an applicant can establish 'child' status under
§ 416(e) as a natural child." Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 960 (8th Cir. 2011) (reversing the
district court which had followed Gillett-Netting); see also Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 63
(4th Cir. 2011) (2-1 decision). In light of the clear split of authority on this issue, it is likely
that either the United States Supreme Court or the Social Security Administration itself may
address the issue shortly.
283 Finley v. Astrue, 270 S.W.3d 849, 854-55 (Ark. 2008).
284 Id. at 850.
285 Id. at 850-51.
286 Id. at 851. The wife also brought a claim for worker's compensation benefits for the
child under Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-527(c) (2002). Finley v. Farm Cat, Inc.,
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certified the following question to the Arkansas Supreme Court: "Does a
child, who was created as an embryo through in vitro fertilization during
his parents' marriage, but implanted into his mother's womb after the
death of his father, inherit from the father under Arkansas intestacy law
as a surviving child?" 28 7
Arkansas's intestacy statute is not based on the UPC, but it includes
an almost identical afterborn-heirs provision that reads: ''Posthumous de-
scendants of the intestate conceived before his or her death but born
thereafter shall inherit in the same manner as if born in the lifetime of the
intestate." 288 The court first concluded that it is "clear" from the plain
language of the statute that a child must be conceived prior to her par-
ent's death to inherit through intestate succession. 2 8 9 Having "resolved"
this issue, the court turned to the definition of conception, which the
statute left undefined. The wife relied on a medical dictionary that de-
fined conception as the moment that the egg is fertilized.2 9 0 The Com-
missioner responded that this could not have been the legislature's intent;
rather, it must have intended "conceived" to mean become pregnant.291
Both parties cited public policy to support their respective
interpretations. 2 9 2
The court sidestepped this thorny question altogether, however, and
stated that it need not define the term because "we can definitively say
that the General Assembly, in enacting . . . Ark. Code Ann. § 28-9-210,
did not intend for the statute to permit a child, created through in vitro
fertilization and implanted after the father's death, to inherit under intes-
tate succession." 2 9 3 The court reasoned, "Not only does the instant stat-
ute fail to specifically address such a scenario, but it was enacted in
1969, which was well before the technology of in vitro fertilization was
developed." 2 9 4 The court somehow concludes that because the legisla-
288 S.W.3d 685, 687 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008). Like the Social Security Act, this statute requires
that the applicant be a child of the worker who was "wholly and actually dependent" on the
worker at the worker's death. Id. at 688. The statute does not, however, look to the state's
intestacy laws to determine whether a child is the worker's "child." The court declined to
define child but held that the child was not dependent on the worker at the time of the worker's
death. Id. at 689. The court rejected the applicant's creative argument that by paying storage
fees to keep the frozen embryos viable, the worker was in essence "providing shelter" for the
embryos and they were dependent on the worker. Id.
287 Finley, 270 S.W.3d. at 850. The United States District Court for the District of Mas-
sachusetts faced this scenario-pre-death conception, post-death implantation-just last year,
but the court resolved the case on procedural grounds. See Hanson v. Astrue, 733 F. Supp. 2d
214, 219 (D. Mass. 2010).
288 ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-210(a) (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.).
289 Finley, 270 S.W.3d at 853.
290 Id. at 851.
291 Id.
292 Id. at 851-52.
293 Id. at 853.
294 Id.
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ture did not consider the possibility of such children, it intended to treat
them differently.
The court also addressed a provision that provided, "'Any child
conceived following artificial insemination of a married woman with the
consent of her husband shall be treated as their child for all purposes of
intestate succession.' "295 The court determined that this section was ir-
relevant for two reasons. First, the court noted that the statute addresses
the legitimacy of a child. 2 9 6 Although it does, it does so expressly "for
all purposes of intestate succession." 2 9 7 Second, the court noted that the
statute only addressed children born through artificial insemination, a
"completely different procedure[ ]" than in vitro fertilization. 298 Techni-
cally, the procedures are different. But as the court had explained just
two paragraphs earlier, the legislature drafted the statute "well before" in
vitro fertilization existed.299 Thus, the legislature was not drawing a dis-
tinction between procedures but was simply addressing the assisted re-
productive technology as it then existed-and extending rights to
children born from that technology.
The court closed by excusing itself from any responsibility for the
effect of its decision:
Our role is not to create the law, but to interpret the law
and to give effect to the legislature's intent. In vitro fer-
tilization and other methods of assisted reproduction are
new technologies that have created new legal issues not
addressed by already-existing law . . . . With this in
mind, we strongly encourage the General Assembly to
revisit the intestacy succession statutes to address the is-
sues involved in the instant case and those that have not
but will likely evolve.30
The difference in reasoning between the Supreme Court of Arkan-
sas in Finley and the Superior Court of New Jersey in Kolacy, while
construing essentially identical language, is telling. The Arkansas court
stated:
Were we to define the term "conceive," we would be
making a determination that would implicate many pub-
lic policy concerns . . . . That is not our role. The deter-
mination of public policy lies almost exclusively with
295 Id. at 854 (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-209(c) (Repl. 2004)).
296 See id.
297 See id.
298 See id.
299 See id. at 853.
300 Id. at 854-55 (internal citations omitted).
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the legislature, and we will not interfere with that deter-
mination in the absence of palpable errors. 301
Alternatively, the New Jersey court recognized, "It would undoubtedly
be useful for the Legislature to deal consciously and in a well-informed
way with at least some of the issues presented by reproductive technol-
ogy .... In the meanwhile, life goes on, and people come into the courts
seeking redress for present problems." 302 The New Jersey court then
concluded, "We judges cannot simply put those problems on hold in the
hope that someday (which may never come) the Legislature will deal
with the problem in question. Simple justice requires us to do the best
we can with the statutory law which is presently available." 3 0 3
Both courts, of course, are establishing policy-they have charted
the law in their respective states regarding this issue until the legislature
takes it up. One court, however, was forthright in its approach; the other
hid behind the legislative process.
5. Khabbaz v. Commissioner (New Hampshire Law)
In 2007 the Supreme Court of New Hampshire considered whether
"a child conceived after her father's death via artificial insemination [is]
eligible to inherit from her father as his surviving issue under New
Hampshire intestacy law . . . ."30 This court, too, held that posthu-
mously conceived children may not inherit.305
In Khabbaz ex rel. Eng v. Commissioner, Social Security Adminis-
tration, a young couple banked the husband's sperm after he was diag-
nosed with a terminal condition.306 The husband signed a written
consent stating that the wife could use his sperm "to achieve a preg-
nancy" and that he "desire[d] and inten[ded] to be legally recognized as
the father of the child to the fullest extent allowable by law."307 Two
years after his death, his wife gave birth to their daughter.30 8
New Hampshire is one of three states without an express posthu-
mous-heirs provision in its probate code.309 Rather, the New Hampshire
code simply provides that "surviving issue" shall inherit a share of the
estate.310 The court focused on the "surviving" requirement and adopted
301 Id. at 855.
302 In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1261 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).
303 Id. at 1261-62.
304 Khabbaz ex rel. Eng v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 930 A.2d 1180, 1182 (N.H. 2007).
305 See id. at 1186.
306 Id. at 1182.
307 Id.
308 Id.
309 See id. at 1183 (quoting N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 561:1 (2007)); see also supra note
146 and accompanying text (noting that the other two states are Mississippi and Nevada).
310 See Khabbaz, 930 A.2d at 1183 (quoting N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 561:1 (2007)).
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the Webster's dictionary definition for "surviving," which is "remaining
alive or in existence." 31' Because a posthumously conceived child is
neither remaining alive nor in existence at the decedent's death, the court
held that the statute does not include posthumously conceived chil-
dren.312 Notably, the court's reasoning leaves open whether a child con-
ceived prior to a parent's death through IVF, but implanted after the
death of a parent, is "in existence" and, thus, "surviving" under the
statute.
As in Finley, the court claimed that its hands were bound by its
limited role in shaping policy. The applicant asked the court to adopt a
Woodward-type approach, but the court responded:
[T]he intestacy statute . . . essentially leaves an entire
class of ... children unprotected. However, the present
statute requires that result. To reach the opposite result
and adopt the reasoning of Woodward would require us
to add words to a statute. We reserve such matters of
public policy for the legislature.313
A concurring judge added, "I . . . respectfully urge the legislature to
examine, within the context of the state's intestacy statute, the conflu-
ence of new, ever-expanding birth technologies and the seemingly arcane
language and presumptions attendant to the settlement of decedents' es-
tates." 314 As in Arkansas, Massachusetts, and New Jersey, the New
Hampshire legislature has ignored this appeal.3 15
6. Beeler v. Astrue (Iowa Law)
Most recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit addressed the issue under Iowa law.3 16 Iowa's afterborn-heirs
provision was based on the Model Probate Code's "begotten before [the
intestate's] death but born thereafter" language. 317 In Beeler v. Astrue, a
married couple had the husband's sperm frozen before he started treat-
ment for leukemia. 318 The man, in writing, authorized his wife to use his
sperm after his death and stated that he intended to support any child. 319
With little discussion, the court held that because the child was not con-
311 Id. at 1183-84 (quoting WEBSTER' S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2303
(unabridged ed. 2002)).
312 Id. at 1184.
313 Id. at 1186 (internal citations omitted).
314 Id. at 1187 (Broderick, C.J., concurring specially).
315 See infra Table 1.
316 Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2011).
317 MODEL PROBATE CODE § 25 (1946); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.220 (West, Westlaw
through 2011 Reg. Sess.).
318 Beeler, 651 F.3d at 956.
319 Id.
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ceived until a year after the decedent's death, the child was not "begot-
ten" before his death, as required by the plain language of the statute. 3 2 0
The court did not address, however, whether the result may have been
different had the couple instead used IVF and preserved one or more
embryos before the decedent's death. In any event, the Iowa legislature
amended the statute while the case was pending and now specifically
recognizes posthumously conceived children in limited circumstances. 3 2 1
However, this opinion may still be instructive for courts in the four states
that still have the Model Probate Code language as their afterborn-heirs
provision. 32 2
7. In re Martin B. (New York Law)
The New York Surrogate's Court is the only court to issue a pub-
lished decision regarding posthumous conception outside of the Social
Security context. 3 2 3 In 2007, the court held that a posthumously con-
ceived child may share in a class gift for "issue" under an existing trust
agreement, 324 notwithstanding that New York law expressly precludes
posthumously conceived children from sharing in their deceased parent's
probate estate.325
In In re Martin B., a grantor had created seven irrevocable trust
agreements in 1969.326 The agreements (1) authorized the trustee to dis-
tribute principal among the grantor's "issue" and (2) directed the trustee
to distribute any assets remaining at the death of the grantor's wife
among the grantor's issue.327 The grantor had two sons, but one, James,
died of cancer in 2001 without children. 3 2 8 Before James died, however,
he had sperm frozen for his wife's later use. 3 2 9 Three years after his
death, his wife had a child she conceived using James's sperm.330 Five
years after his death, she had a second child by this method.33 ' The
320 Id. at 965. The Federal District Court for the Northern District of Iowa had also held
that the child did not qualify under section 633.220. Id. The district court also addressed
section 633.222, which provides that a child may inherit from the biological father if the father
recognizes the child as the father. Although the district court held that the child satisfied this
test based on the decedent's written consent, the Ninth Circuit reversed on this issue and held
that the specific scope of the afterbom-heirs provision (section 633.220) controls the issue, not
the general language of section 633.222. Id.
321 See IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.220A (Westlaw); supra Part II.A.3.b.
322 These states are Indiana, Maryland, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. See Part II.A. .a.
323 In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d 207 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2007).
324 Id. at 211.
325 Id. at 209.
326 See id. at 207-08.
327 Id. at 208.
328 Id.
329 Id.
330 Id.
331 Id.
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trustees asked the court whether James's children were "issue" of the
grantor under the trust agreements. 332 If so, they would be eligible for
distributions; if not, only the grantor's surviving son and his children
would be eligible. 333
New York had amended its probate statutes in 2006 to clarify that a
child must be conceived before a parent's death to be a pretermitted heir
of that parent. 334 The court noted, however, that this statute applied only
to wills, not trust agreements, and only to the testator's children, not the
children of third parties.335 Furthermore, the policies supporting the stat-
utes-efficient estate administration and fairness to the living devisees-
are irrelevant in the context of an ongoing trust. 33 6 Accordingly, the
court refused to apply the statute and instead looked to the grantor's in-
tent. However, the court recognized that the grantor likely had no intent
regarding this possibility when he created the trusts in 1969.337 There-
fore, the court adopted its own policy, stating, "[Wlhere a governing in-
strument is silent, children born of this new biotechnology with the
consent of their parent are entitled to the same rights 'for all purposes as
those of a natural child."' 338 The court added, "[I]f an individual consid-
ers a child to be his or her own, society through its laws should do so as
well." 339 Finally, the court stated, "As can be seen from all of the above,
there is a need for comprehensive legislation to resolve the issues raised
by advances in biotechnology. Accordingly, copies of this decision are
being sent to [the legislature]. "340 Here, too, the legislature has not acted
further.
If there is one take-home from these cases, it is this: until a legisla-
ture addresses this issue clearly, the approach a court will take is any-
body's best guess. In each of the cases above, the courts were required
to construe statutes drafted without consideration of posthumous concep-
tion. 341 Though the language in each was essentially identical, the out-
comes varied widely. A few courts refused to read the statutes literally
and established an exception for posthumously conceived children; 342 the
others held that they were constrained to read the statutes literally and
excluded the children. 343 The former acknowledged that they were es-
332 See id.
333 See id.
334 See id. at 209 (citing N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-3.2).
335 Id. at 209-10.
336 See id.
337 Id. at 211.
338 Id. (quoting In re Estate of Park, 207 N.E.2d 859, 861 (N.Y. 1965)).
339 Id.
340 Id. at 212.
341 See supra Part II.B.
342 See supra text accompanying notes 231-34, 256, and 323-24.
343 See supra text accompanying notes 267, 289, 309-11, and 316-322.
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tablishing policy; 3"4 the latter denied this, asserting that only the legisla-
ture can do so. 34 5 These decisions chart the law, though, and in so doing
establish the state's policy on these matters. Unfortunately, this policy is
not based on the collective and representative will of the legislature after
study, deliberation, and debate; rather, it is based on a particular judge's
(or panel of judges') personal view regarding these morally complex is-
sues. 34 6 Sometimes the judges are open about this; sometimes they are
not. This uncertainty is unnecessary, and it is costly for individuals fac-
ing these issues as they seek answers. As each of the above courts has
implored, it is time for all legislatures to address this issue in a thought-
ful, comprehensive manner. 3 4 7
C. Summary of the Existing Approaches
Thirty-three states, plus the District of Columbia, still have not ad-
dressed whether a posthumously conceived child has any interest in the
deceased parent's estate, or whether such a child can be included as a
child, issue, heir, descendant, or similar term under a class-gift provision
in a will, trust agreement, or other governing instrument.348 Until these
legislatures address the issue, the interests of posthumously conceived
children will be determined by a court's construction of statutory provi-
sions that pre-date the present issue. As shown above, how a particular
court will resolve the issue is anyone's best guess. 34 9
Of the seventeen states that have addressed the issue, the states are
almost evenly split.3 50 Eight states have granted status to posthumously
conceived children for probate purposes. Six have done so by statute,3 5 1
and two have done so through the courtS352-though only one was the
state's highest court, and in the other state, New Jersey, the legislature
344 See supra text accompanying notes 237-38, 260-61, and 338.
345 See supra text accompanying notes 298, 312, and 313.
346 See supra text accompanying notes 232, 260-61, and 334-36.
347 See supra Part II.B.
348 See infra Table 1.
349 See supra Part I.B.
350 See infra Table 1.
351 These states are California (CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 249.5-249.8 (West, Westlaw
through ch. 312 of 2011 Reg. Sess. and ch. 11 of 2011-12 1st Ex. Sess.)); Colorado (COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-120 (West, Westlaw through Ist Reg. Sess. of the 68th Gen. As-
semb., 2011)); Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17(4) (West, Westlaw through ch. 236 of 2011
1st Reg. Sess. of the 22nd Leg.)); Iowa (IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.220 (West, Westlaw through
2011 Reg. Sess.)); Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1(A) (West, Westlaw through
2011 1st Extraordinary Sess.)); and North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 30.1-04-19
(West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.)).
352 These states are Massachusetts (Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257
(Mass. 2002)) and New Jersey (In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 2000)).
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subsequently amended the statute at issue.353 Of the six states that have
addressed the issue by statute, only two expressly extend the status to
both the probate and class-gift contexts. 354 In the other four states, it is
unclear whether, or how, the statutes apply to class gifts. 355
The other nine states have denied status to posthumously conceived
children for probate purposes. Seven have done so by statute,356 and two
have done so through the courts.357 Of these seven states, only three
have expressly provided that the exclusion applies in both probate and
class-gift contexts.358 In New York, although the legislature provided
that posthumously conceived children have no interest in the probate
context, the New York Surrogate's Court held that such children none-
theless may be considered a decedent's heirs for class-gift purposes.359
In the remaining three states, the statute is silent regarding class gifts,
and the distinction remains unresolved. 360
Notably, in the four court cases that have established the law in their
respective jurisdictions, the courts split while construing essentially iden-
tical provisions. 361 In each case, though, the court urged its respective
legislature to address the issue in a thoughtful, comprehensive way. 3 6 2
None of these legislatures has done so. 3 6 3
353 See supra Part II.B.1 (New Jersey) and III.B.2 (Massachusetts).
354 These states are Colorado (COLo. REv. STAT. § 15-11-120 (Westlaw)) and North Da-
kota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-19 (Westlaw)). See supra Part H.A.I.e.
355 See supra Part II.A.3.b.
356 These states are Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-1(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through
2011 Reg. Sess.)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-108 (West, Westlaw through chs. 1-335
that are effective on or before July 1, 2011)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-120(10)
(West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.)); South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-108
(West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg. Sess.)); South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-108
(West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess., Exec. Order 11-1, and S. Ct. Rule 11-17)); New
York (N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-3.2(a)-(b)); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 20-164
(West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.)). In New York, although the statute excludes post-
humously conceived children for probate purposes, a court has recognized them for class-gift
purposes. In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d 207, 212 (Sur. Ct. 2007).
357 These states are Arkansas (Finley v. Astrue, 270 S.W.3d 849 (Ark. 2008)) and New
Hampshire (Khabbaz ex rel. Eng v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 930 A.2d 1180, 1182 (N.H.
2007)).
358 These states are Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 524.2-705, -708 (Westlaw)); South
Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 29A-2-705, -708 (Westlaw)); and Virginia (VA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-164 (Westlaw)).
359 See In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d 207 (Sur. Ct. 2007); supra Part II.B.6.
360 See supra Part II.A.3.a.
361 See infra Table 1. I have excluded Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 231 F. Supp. 2d 961
(D. Ariz. 2002), rev'd 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004), because the decision was reversed, and
Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.2d 954 (8th Cir. 2011), because the Iowa statute it interpreted has been
amended and now clearly addresses posthumously conceived children. In addition, though I
have included Kolacy, its precedential weight at this time is questionable. See infra note 368.
362 See supra Part II.B.
363 See supra Part II.B.
A CHIP OFF THE OLD ICEBLOCK
The following table summarizes which states recognize posthu-
mously conceived children for probate purposes, which states do not, for
which states the answer remains unclear, and the source of the law in
each scenario.
TABLE 1: APPROACHES TO POSTHUMOUSLY CONCEIVED CHILDREN FOR
PROBATE PURPOSES BY JURISDICTION 3 6
Source Includes Excludes Unclear Jurisdiction
1946 MPC
1969 UPC
1988 USCACA
1990 UPC
2000 UPA
2008 UPC
Other statute
2
4
4 Indiana, Maryland, Ohio,
Pennsylvania
3 Maine, Nebraska, Tennessee
1 Virginia 365
8 Alaska, Arizona 366 , Hawaii,
Michigan, Montana,
Vermont, West Virginia,
Wisconsin
7 Alabama, Delaware, New
Mexico, Texas, Utah,
Washington, Wyoming
Colorado, North Dakota
6 12 Includes:
California, Florida, Iowa,
Louisiana
Excludes:367
Georgia, Idaho, Minnesota,
South Carolina, South
Dakota, New York
Unclear: Connecticut,
District of Columbia,
Illinois, Kansas, Missouri,
Oklahoma, Kentucky, North
Carolina, Oregon, Rhode
Island, Mississippi, Nevada
364 See supra Part H.A.1 (statutes), H.B (caselaw).
365 Virginia law excludes posthumously conceived children for both probate and class-gift
purposes. See supra Part II.A. I.c.
366 Although the United States District Court for the District of Arizona held that
posthumously conceived children are excluded under Arizona law, the decision was reversed
on other grounds. Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 231 F. Supp. 2d 961 (D. Ariz. 2002), rev'd 371
F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004). In addition, its holding does not necessarily reflect the view of the
Arizona Supreme Court and would not have been binding on Arizona courts. See supra Part
II.B.3.
367 In Minnesota and South Dakota, the exclusion also applies to class gifts. See Supra
Part II.A.3.a. In Georgia, Idaho, New York, and South Carolina, the statutes do not state
whether the exclusion also applies to class gifts. See supra Part II.A.3.a. In New York,
however, the Surrogate's Court has allowed posthumously conceived children to participate in
class gifts. See supra Part II.B.6.
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Caselaw 2 2 Includes: Massachusetts
(Woodward); New Jersey
(Kolacy)3 68
Excludes: Arkansas
(Finley); New Hampshire
(Khabbaz)
Total 8 9 34
III. A BLUEPRINT FOR FUTURE STATUTES
Judges across the country have urged their respective legislatures to
address the issues raised by posthumously conception in a thoughtful,
comprehensive manner. 369 Few, however, have answered the call. And
in those states where legislatures have, the approaches have been diverse
and the statutes vague and incomplete. 370
The following addresses the key issues a legislature should address
when drafting such legislation, the benefits and drawbacks of the various
options, and the approach I suggest for each issue. Specifically, legisla-
tures first must decide whether to recognize posthumously conceived
children for probate purposes, class-gift purposes, both, or neither. If
they decide to recognize such children, they must decide what condi-
tions, if any, should apply. These conditions include whether (1) the
decedent's consent should be required, (2) the surviving parent should be
required to provide notice of his or her intent to use the decedent's ge-
netic material, (3) the surviving parent should be required to have the
child within a certain period of time, and (4) the parents must have been
married at the decedent's death.
No consensus has emerged as to the best approach.371 Some states
have chosen not to recognize posthumously conceived children, placing
primary importance on the efficient administration of estates. 372 Others
do recognize these children.373 Some commentators advocate that the
decedent's intent should govern;374 others assert that the children's best
interests should control.375 While a uniform approach may be ideal, the
368 Although the New Jersey Superior Court held that the posthumously conceived
children may be heirs under the 1969 UPC, In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 2000), it was a trial court decision and the New Jersey legislature subsequently
revised the statute's language from that found in the 1969 UPC ("conceived before") to that in
the 1990 UPC ("in gestation"), 2004 N.J. Law 1442 (effective Feb. 27, 2005). Therefore,
Kolacy likely has little remaining force. See supra Part II.B. .
369 See supra Part II.B.
370 See supra Part II.A-B.
371 See supra Table 1.
372 See supra Part II.A-B.
373 See supra Table 1.
374 See Tritt, supra note 57, at 404-06.
375 See Nolan, supra note 7, at 1068.
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lack of uniformity is not the greatest problem. Rather, the bigger prob-
lem is that in most states, nobody can say whether such children would
be recognized or not.37 6 The first priority should be for legislatures to
adopt a clear approach-whether or not their approach recognizes post-
humously conceived children. Only then will citizens be able to act ac-
cordingly. The following provides a roadmap for legislatures to follow
as they consider these issues.
A. For What Purposes Should Legislatures Recognize A
Parent-Child Relationship?
The first question a legislature must answer is whether to recognize
a parent-child relationship between a deceased parent and posthumously
conceived child for probate purposes, class-gift purposes, both, or
neither. In this context, "probate purposes" includes intestacy statutes
and pretermitted-heir statutes. Class-gift purposes include designations
of heirs, descendants, issue, children, grandchildren, or similar terms
under a will, trust agreement, beneficiary designation, or other donative
document.377 For the reasons set out below, I recommend that legisla-
tures recognize posthumously conceived children for both purposes, sub-
ject to the conditions discussed in Part III.B.
1. Probate Context
Nine states do not recognize posthumously conceived children for
probate purposes, while eight states do (if certain conditions are met).3 78
On its face, the "no recognition" approach has four main benefits: it (1)
facilitates the efficient administration of estates, (2) is consistent with the
traditional rule that all parties must be living or in gestation at the dece-
dent's death, (3) promotes the traditional two-parent family, and (4) sim-
plifies the preparation of estate tax returns. In application, however, the
purported benefits are minimal and are outweighed by the interest in car-
376 See supra Table 1.
377 Importantly, life insurance companies and retirement account custodians are free as a
matter of contract law to draft into their customer agreements their own default rules for the
distribution of assets they hold. In most cases, these entities will want to limit any delay in the
distribution of assets after the death of an insured or plan participant. Therefore, they may
adopt a "no recognition" approach for assets they hold. However, if their contracts or plan
documents simply refer to state law regarding determination of heirs, they too may be bound
by these statutes.
378 See generally supra Part II. Georgia, Idaho, Minnesota, South Carolina, South Da-
kota, New York, and Virginia have passed statutes excluding posthumously conceived chil-
dren, while the Arkansas and New Hampshire courts have interpreted existing statutes to
exclude them. California, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, and North Dakota have passed
statutes recognizing posthumously conceived children for probate purposes, and the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court has held that posthumously conceived children may be heirs
for probate purposes. The New Jersey Superior Court has held so as well, although the New
Jersey's legislature later amended the statute at issue. See supra Part II.
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rying out the decedent's likely intent and the best interests of the
children.
a) Administrative Ease
The primary reason cited for the "no recognition" approach is that it
facilitates the orderly and efficient administration of estates, which helps
to prevent fraudulent claims and provides finality for the parties receiv-
ing assets.379 This is an appropriate consideration, and probably the
strongest argument in favor of excluding posthumously conceived chil-
dren altogether. However, a legislature can ameliorate these concerns by
requiring that certain conditions be met for a posthumously conceived
child to inherit, as proposed below in Part III.B. An absolute exclusion
of these children-regardless of the decedent's intent or interests of the
parties in the particular case-is unnecessary.380
First, fraudulent claims are a minor concern in the context of pos-
thumous conception. The possibility of a fraudulent claim by a child is
almost nonexistent in light of today's genetic testing capabilities, com-
bined with the medical involvement needed to successfully thaw and
transfer genetic material. 381 On the other hand, if a legislature requires
that the decedent consented to the posthumous use of his or her genetic
material, fraudulent claims by the surviving spouse or partner regarding
the decedent's intent are foreseeable. A legislature can address those
concerns, though, by creating time limitations or establishing a height-
ened standard of proof, as discussed below in Part HI.B. 3 82 The legisla-
ture need not rely on a blanket denial to protect against this concern.
Second, concerns regarding an heir's expectation of a prompt ad-
ministration appear a bit overblown when considering the issue in the
context of existing probate practices and statutes, which already allow
for extended administrations in many scenarios. To the surprise (and
dismay) of many heirs, the distribution of a decedent's assets is rarely an
immediate event. As a general matter, an executor's primary responsibil-
ity is to ensure that the appropriate parties receive their appropriate share
379 See, e.g., Khabbaz ex rel. Eng v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 930 A.2d 1180, 1184
(N.H. 2007) (noting that "waiting for the potential birth of a posthumously conceived child
could tie up estate distributions indefinitely"); In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d 207, 209 (Sur.
Ct. 2007) (noting that New York's statutory exclusion of posthumously conceived children
"was intended to ensure certainty in identifying persons interests in an estate and finality in its
distribution").
380 See Nolan, supra note 7, at 1094 (noting that "an outright denial of establishing the
parent-child relationship is not justified" simply to provide for the efficient and accurate ad-
ministration of intestate estates).
381 Id. at 1095; see also Goodwin, supra note 121, at 275.
382 See infra Part I1I.B.
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of the estate, not that they receive that share immediately.383 This is a
process, and sometimes a quite lengthy process. 384 At a minimum, pru-
dent executors wait to distribute any of the decedent's assets to the heirs
until the period for creditors to file claims has expired.385 In many states,
a decedent's creditors have four months after the executor publishes no-
tice of the decedent's death to file a claim.3 86 While this is a fairly short
window, the executor may delay the distribution of assets much longer
until all disputed claims are resolved.387 In addition, other events often
delay the distribution of assets beyond the creditor period, such as the
payment of income taxes and estate taxes,388 the liquidation of real es-
tate, the winding up of a business, difficulty in locating heirs, or will
contests. Indeed, there are many situations in which an estate adminis-
tration is appropriately extended until all issues are resolved. The desire
to avoid inconveniencing presumptive heirs should not be elevated above
the desire to ensure the appropriate parties receive the appropriate share
of the estate-particularly when the parties include a decedent's potential
children.
Furthermore, whenever a decedent is married at his death, a signifi-
cant portion of the estate could be distributed in the "ordinary course" of
administration, notwithstanding the potential that a posthumously con-
ceived child may be later born. For instance, assume a married man dies
in the state of Minnesota, which has adopted the UPC with some revi-
sions,389 and that Minnesota recognizes such children for probate pur-
383 See 31 AM. JUR. 2D Executors and Administrators §§ 1, 915-917 (2002); see also 76
AM. JUR. 2D Trusts § 562 (2005) ("[T]he trustee cannot make a complete distribution until
provision has been made for all the expenses, claims, and taxes the trust may be obligated to
pay . . . .").
384 Certain assets that are not a part of the probate estate (either testate or intestate),
however, may be distributed promptly. Generally, this would include property held jointly
with a right of survivorship and assets with a beneficiary designation, such as life insurance
proceeds and retirement account benefits, provided the designation is not in favor of the dece-
dent's "estate." However, life insurance companies and retirement account custodians may
provide in their contract or plan documents their own "default rules" for the distribution of
assets or interpretation of terms.
385 Cf UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 3-109, 3-801, 3-807(b) (amended 2008) (placing liability
on the personal representative for premature distributions); 31 AM. JUR. 2D Executors and
Administrators § 649.
386 See, e.g., UNW. PROBATE CODE § 3-801.
387 See 31 AM. JUR. 2D Executors and Administrators §§ 917-918.
388 See id.. All estates must pay a decedent's final income taxes for the year of the dece-
dent's death, and the preparation of the returns may not be completed until the spring of the
following year. Further, if an estate must pay state or federal estate tax, the tax is due nine
months after the decedent's death, I.R.C. § 6075(a) (2006), and, in the author's experience, the
estate typically does not receive a closing letter from the state or federal government until six
to nine months after that. Prudent executors hold back an appropriate share of the estate until
receiving the closing letter.
389 See supra Part II. The result in any particular state would, of course, depend on that
state's specific provisions, and each legislature would have to consider this under their own
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poses. 390 The man's wife39' would, at a minimum, be entitled to the first
$150,000 of his estate, plus one-half of the remaining balance. 392 As in
any other administration, the executor could distribute these amounts to
the wife after the estate's debts and expenses are paid. 393 The birth of a
posthumously conceived child would not change this result.
Granted, there are situations where a posthumously conceived child
would alter the result, and the executor may wish to retain control of the
assets until a child is born or the frozen material is destroyed. For in-
stance, in the example in the prior paragraph, a posthumously conceived
child would alter the rights of the recipients of the remaining one-half of
the husband's estate if the decedent or his wife had a child from a prior
relationship. 394 Likewise, whenever a couple is not married, a posthu-
mously conceived child would always change the result. The estate
would be distributed first to the decedent's children, then parents, then
siblings (and so on).395 Thus, if the unmarried decedent had no children
while living, the decedent's parents (or siblings, if no parent survived)
would receive the decedent's entire intestate estate.396 However, if a
posthumously conceived child were born, that child would be entitled to
the entire intestate estate and would, in effect, "divest" the decedent's
parents of their share.397
specific circumstances. In particular, the results may be more complicated in the few commu-
nity property states, such as California. See Knaplund, supra note 122, at 634. That said,
application of Minnesota law provides a useful example for purposes of this Article.
390 In 2010, Minnesota adopted a provision precluding posthumously conceived children
from having any interest in the deceased parent's estate. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-120(10)
(West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.). However, this example demonstrates that to the
extent a goal of the legislation was to facilitate the orderly administration of estates, that goal
is only marginally met by the outright preclusion.
391 For simplicity and consistency, these examples refer to the decedent as male and the
surviving partner as female, though the gender of each is interchangeable.
392 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-102 (Westlaw).
393 31 AM. JUR. 2d Executors and Administrators § 917 (2002).
394 Id. § 524.2-103. If neither spouse had children from a prior relationship, the wife
would be entitled to the remaining one-half, as well. If either spouse had a child, the remain-
ing one-half of the assets would be distributed in that case to the decedent's closest heirs
(excluding the wife). Id. Thus, if the decedent had no children living at his death, a posthu-
mously conceived child could "divest" the decedent's parents or siblings of the share they
otherwise would have received. If the decedent had a child living at his death, a posthumously
conceived child would reduce the portion of the share distributable to that child. Accordingly,
the executor in this case would delay distributing this one-half share of the remaining balance.
395 Id. Non-relatives of a decedent, including a fianc6 or fiancde, never inherit through
intestacy.
396 Id.
397 See id. Alternatively, if the unmarried decedent had a child living (or in gestation) at
his death, that child would be entitled to the entire estate. See id. If a posthumously conceived
child were born, however, that child also would be entitled to a share of the estate. See id.
Even here, though, the distribution of assets need not be unduly delayed. Minors generally do
not receive assets from an estate outright until they reach eighteen or twenty-one years of age,
depending on the jurisdiction. In the meantime, assets are typically held for that child by an
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It is certainly true that in these cases, the potential heirs may be
inconvenienced by waiting some period of time to determine whether
they will receive a share of the decedent's estate. However, this is no
less true than if there were litigated claims, tax disputes, or other issues
that currently delay distributions. In fact, if this "waiting period" is rea-
sonably limited,398 any delay would be both foreseeable and short
term-a luxury not always available to the heirs when other claims re-
main pending. In addition, the potential heirs are not being deprived of a
right to those assets. 3 9 9 The state has the authority to control the terms of
one's inheritance. The overriding concern should be the decedent's
likely intent and the best interests of his or her children, not the conve-
nience of other potential heirs.
b) The Principles Underlying the Traditional Rule Do Not
Apply Here
A second possible benefit of the "no recognition" approach is con-
sistency: the approach does not disturb the traditional rule that all heirs
must be living or in gestation at the decedent's death. A traditional rule
should be extended to a new situation, however, only if the principles
underlying the rule apply in the new context. That is not the case here.
While the traditional rule ostensibly covers posthumously conceived
children, it was not created to do so. The rule has been traced back to
ancient Rome, at which time it adequately covered the possible scenarios
regarding procreation. 400 Posthumous conception was a scientific impos-
sibility at that time, and it remained so for over one thousand years. In-
deed, the first successful pregnancy from cryopreserved sperm was
reported just fifty-eight years ago, and the first child who developed from
a cryopreserved embryo was born just twenty-five years ago.4 0  The re-
ality that the traditional rule responded to has changed dramatically over
the past fifty years, and the traditional rule simply was not intended to
address the scenarios possible today.
In other instances, probate law has departed from its roots to keep
pace with a changing society. Under common law and early statutes,
appointed conservator or in a Uniform Transfers to Minors Act account. See UNIF. PROBATE
CODE § 3-915 (amended 2008); UNiF. TRANSFERS TO MiNoRs Acr § § 5-6 (1986), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edufblliarchives/ulc/fnact99/1980s/utma86.pdf. Thus, if a posthu-
mously conceived child had a sibling who was five years old at the child's birth, the sibling
would not have "relied" on those assets; the child would have had no access to those assets
until he or she reaches eighteen or twenty-one years of age. Except in the rare situation when
a sibling is eighteen years old at the parent's death, the assets would be accounted for and the
respective custodians could reallocate the assets as may be appropriate.
398 As suggested infra in Parts III.B.2 and III.B.3.
399 See supra notes 119-120.
400 See Knaplund, supra note 1, at 105-08.
401 See supra notes 33-35, and accompanying text.
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states refused to. recognize a parent-child relationship between
nonmarital children and either parent. 402 The law considered them filius
nullius, the child of no one. 4 0 3 Statutes referred to them as "bastards" or
"illegitimate." 404 Over time, however, society's view toward nonmarital
children changed,405 and the legal focus shifted from affecting a moral
judgment on the parents406 to protecting the best interests of the innocent
children. Accordingly, the law began to recognize a relationship with the
child and mother, but not the father.407 Now, most states recognize a
parent-child relationship between the child and both biological parents if
paternity is established.408 Likewise, early probate statutes presumed
that individuals did not intend for an adopted child to inherit through the
adoptive parent.409 Now, however, the probate codes in all states recog-
nize a parent-child relationship between an adopted child and the adop-
tive parents.410
In both of these examples, the traditional rule was discarded despite
that the underlying facts were no different when the rule was established
402 See Goodwin, supra note 121, at 241.
403 See, e.g., Weber v. Anderson, 269 N.W.2d 892, 894 (Minn. 1978).
404 A number of states passed laws requiring the replacement of all references to "bas-
tard" and "illegitimate" with "child born out of wedlock." See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-
1413 (enacted in 1941); N.Y. GEN. CONSTR. LAW § 59 (enacted in 1925); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10, § 6.5 (enacted in 1975). Only one state, Alabama, still uses the term "bastard" in its
parentage statutes. ALA. CODE §§ 26-11-1, -2 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.).
405 See generally Monopoli, supra note 112, at 857 (noting that the number of nonmarital
children born each year increased from 89,500 in 1940 to over 1.5 million by 2005).
406 See Joseph C. Ayer, Jr., Legitimacy and Marriage, 16 HARV. L. REv. 22, 37 (1902)
("It was in the interest of morals that the children born of a valid marriage should have privi-
leges denied children born of illicit unions. Parents were to be punished in their children's
disabilities more effectively than in themselves."). Additional reasons cited for the exclusion
of nonmarital children were to promote marriage, discourage promiscuity, and avoid eviden-
tiary problems when determining heirs. See Laurence C. Nolan, "Unwed Parents" and Their
Children Before the Supreme Court From Levy to Michael H: Unlikely Participants in Consti-
tutional Jurisprudence, 28 CAP. U. L. REv. 1, 7 (1999).
407 Id.; see also Goodwin, supra note 121, at 241.
408 See, e.g., Weber, 269 N.W.2d at 895, n.2. For example, section 2-117 of the Uniform
Probate Code now states that "a parent-child relationship exists between a child and the
child's genetic parents, regardless of the parents' marital status." UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-
117 (amended 2008). This change mirrors the change in parentage statutes. As noted by Mary
Patricia Byrn:
By the early 1970s, however, the Conference [of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws] recognized that such treatment of children was becoming scientifically, so-
cially, and legally untenable and took the 'revolutionary' step of promulgating an act
that identified two legal parents for both marital and nonmarital children. This
choice . . . led to similar changes in the parentage laws of every state in the country.
Byrn, supra note 15, at 165, 168-69; Banks, supra note 121, at 322-27.
409 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 287 (1940); see also, e.g., Wielert v. Larson,
404 N.E.2d 1111 (111. Ct. App. 1980) ("The undeniable effect of the 1955 amendment to the
[Illinois] Probate Act was to transform a presumption against inclusion of adopted children in
written instruments into a presumption in favor of such inclusion.").
410 Cf UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-118(a).
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than they are today. What changed was simply society's attitude toward
these situations and its concern for the children, who had no say in the
matter. With posthumously conceived children, however, the underlying
facts have changed-dramatically-since the traditional rule was estab-
lished. Society's view toward posthumous conception will undoubtedly
evolve as well, and the law may evolve with it. When legislatures draft
their initial response, though, the traditional rule should not be their
polestar. Rather, legislatures should feel free to address the issue in a
fresh and proactive way, unburdened by the traditional rule.
c) Default Rules Do Not Regulate Behavior
A third benefit cited for not recognizing posthumously conceived
children is that this practice promotes socially desirable behavior by en-
couraging individuals to raise children in a home with two parents-a
mother and a father. 411 This goal, however, will not be furthered by such
statutes. Probate rules are default rules that apply only to individuals
who have not thought through the inheritance issues.412 Individuals who
are aware of and dislike the applicable intestacy provisions are largely
free to write their own rules for the distribution of their assets.4 13 With
few exceptions, 4 14 individuals can "opt out" of probate rules simply by
executing a will or trust agreement, by making lifetime gifts, or through
beneficiary designations and retitling of assets-into joint tenancy with a
right of survivorship, for instance.4 15 By definition then, intestacy provi-
sions apply only to individuals who are either unaware of the law or are
aware but agree with the law.4 1 6 Thus, default rules are not an effective
411 See, e.g., Wardle, supra note 60, at 442-44. Others may characterize the benefit as
discouraging individuals from participating in socially undesirable behavior. See In re Estate
of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1263 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000). However, the United States
Supreme Court has "unambiguously concluded that a State may not justify discriminatory
treatment of illegitimates in order to express its disapproval of their parents' misconduct."
Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 854 (1978). The Court noted, however, that it has upheld
distinctions based on legitimacy that have a "substantial relation to the State's interest in pro-
viding for the orderly and just distribution of a decedent's property at death." Id. at 855.
412 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WuLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS div. I,
ch. 2 introductory note (1999); see also Monopoli, supra note 112, at 886-87.
413 See Monopoli, supra note 112, at 887.
414 In most separate property states, the probate statutes grant the decedent's surviving
spouse (and, in some cases, children) a limited interest in the decedent's estate that the dece-
dent cannot alter. These interests include a homestead allowance, UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-
402; the right to personal property under a designated value, id. § 2-403; a modest family
allowance, id. § 2-404; and an elective share of the decedent's "augmented" estate, id. §H 2-
201 to 2-214.
415 See Monopoli, supra note 112, at 887.
416 In my experience practicing law, the cause is often due simply to velleity. In any
event, individuals may opt out if they feel strongly enough about the result. See id.
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way to regulate behavior. 417 Though the legislation may encourage an
individual to create a will, it will not discourage him from allowing his
spouse or partner to use his genetic material after his death. Indeed, the
United States Supreme Court has "expressly considered and rejected the
argument that a State may attempt to influence the actions of men and
women by imposing sanctions on the children born of their illegitimate
relationships." 418
However, these statutes could provide incentive to a surviving
spouse or partner if they created a financial incentive to have a posthu-
mously conceived child. For instance, by having a posthumously con-
ceived child, a surviving spouse may be entitled to receive additional
Social Security survivor benefits 4 19 or, in some states, a larger share of
the decedent's estate.420 However, these incentives would apply only if
the couple was married. For instance, the additional Social Security ben-
efits are available only to a surviving spouse who provides primary care
to a child. 421 Likewise, an unmarried partner has no direct interest in the
decedent's intestate estate under any scenario. 422 Rather, if the couple
was not married, any financial benefits would flow solely to the child.4 2 3
Though the surviving parent may benefit indirectly from assets passing
to his or her child, the assets would be protected through a conservator-
ship or a Uniform Transfers to Minors Act account if the amount is
sizable. 424
Furthermore, even in the few cases where a surviving spouse would
receive a direct benefit, the financial gain typically would be extremely
modest. Intestacy laws, as default rules, apply only to the extent that an
individual did not do any formal estate planning. The larger the dece-
dent's estate, the more likely it seems that the decedent would have done
S0.425 Accordingly, though there may be exceptions, these statutes typi-
417 There are numerous regulations regarding assisted reproduction in other contexts,
however, that serve to promote quality of health care, to ensure that individuals undergoing
these procedures do so responsibly and safely, and to encourage traditional family structures.
See Wardle, supra note 60, at 416-21; cf Helene S. Shapo, Assisted Reproduction and the
Law: Disharmony on a Divisive Social Issue, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 465, 474-75 (2006) (sum-
marizing statutory approaches to surrogacy arrangements).
418 Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769 (1977); see also Monopoli, supra note 112, at
880 n.149 (quoting Trimble). Professor Monopoli adds, "If, as a matter of social policy, the
legislature chooses to encourage marriage, it should arguably privilege the spousal relationship
rather than impose burdens on the parent-child relationship." Id. at 880.
419 Cf 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (granting Social Security survivor benefits to a decedent's
surviving spouse who provides primary care to an eligible person).
420 See supra Part III.A.I.a.
421 Id.
422 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-101 to -103 (amended 2008).
423 Id. § 2-103.
424 See id. § 3-915; UNIF. TRANSFERS TO MINORS ACT §§ 5-6 (1986).
425 This is particularly so if the decision to freeze gametes was because the decedent had
cancer, was serving in active duty, or faced any other life-threatening scenario.
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cally will apply to decedents of modest means. Moreover, under many
states' statutes, the surviving spouse is entitled to at least the first
$150,000 of the probate estate, plus one-half of any remaining balance
(after the payment of any taxes, administration expenses, and statutory
allowances). 426 The possible gain to a surviving spouse by having a
posthumously conceived child would merely be the final one-half of the
remaining balance (and, again, the estate in these scenarios likely would
be modest to start with).4 2 7
It would be the rare case that a person would take on the physical,
emotional, and financial commitment of raising a child as a single parent
simply for a modest financial gain. Rather, in most cases, the survivor
would take on that commitment for much deeper personal reasons-rea-
sons which default rules would not change. While it is possible to create
a hypothetical in which the financial incentive may be large enough to
persuade the survivor to conceive the decedent's child, it would be the
rare situation in practice. These hypothetical exceptions should be con-
sidered, but they should not be elevated above the other appropriate
considerations.
d) Estate Tax Issues
A fourth benefit of the "no recognition" rule is that it may, in some
cases, simplify the estate tax return process. For instance, assume a de-
cedent's will provides that her entire estate shall be distributed into a
trust for her children or, if she has no children, to a named charity. The
decedent's representative has nine months from the decedent's death to
file an estate tax return 4 2 8 and pay any estate tax due. 4 2 91f the estate goes
to the charity, no estate tax would be due as a result of the charitable
deduction. 4 3 0 If the estate goes to a trust for her children, however, there
may be a tax due (depending on the size of the estate).4 3 1 Accordingly, if
the representative files a return that shows the assets will be distributed
to the charity (and thus pays no tax when filing the return), but a posthu-
426 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102.
427 Regarding the incentive created by Social Security survivor benefits, many may be-
lieve that, as a matter of policy, posthumously conceived children (and their surviving parent)
should not be entitled to receive survivor benefits in any event. In the author's opinion, how-
ever, that is an issue for the Social Security Administration to address and, until it does so,
states should not pass laws that would preclude its residents from receiving federal benefits
that may otherwise be available to its residents-particularly to its children.
428 I.R.C. § 6075(a) (2006).
429 Treas. Reg. § 20.6151-1(a) (2011). Although an estate is allowed an automatic six
month extension to file the return, id. § 20.6081-1(b), the estimated tax must still be paid at
nine months, id. § 20.6151-1(a).
430 I.R.C. § 2055(a).
431 See id. §§ 2053-2058 (providing deductions only for amounts needed to satisfy be-
quests to a charity or to a surviving spouse, as well as for amounts needed to pay certain debts,
expenses, or taxes).
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mously conceived child is born two years later, the estate may incur sig-
nificant underpayment penalties and interest.4 3 2
While one can think of a troublesome hypothetical to almost any
scenario, this concern too should be minimal. First, if the person has no
will, the estate can only pass to individuals. If the individual was mar-
ried, the spouse will receive a large share of, if not the entire, estate
regardless of whether posthumously conceived children are born.4 3 3 If
the individual was not married, other family members would receive the
estate. 434 While the identification of the individuals may change if one
or more posthumously conceived children are born, the tax effect would
not change because there is no deduction for distributions to any individ-
ual other than a spouse.435
Accordingly, this concern only applies in the class-gift context. In
light of the current $5 million federal estate tax exemption,436 relatively
few individuals will have a taxable estate in the first place.4 37 For those
that do, the penalties and interest could be avoided by instead paying the
estate tax at nine months as if the decedent has the child, and, if the child
is not born, amending the return before the statute of limitations expires
(and recovering the tax paid at that point). While this is certainly not
ideal, it would solve the problem for those few estates so affected. 438
e) Considerations That Support a Recognition Approach
For the reasons set out above, the perceived benefits to a no-recog-
nition approach may sound compelling in theory, but are minimal in ap-
432 See generally id. §§ 6651 (penalties), 6601 (interest). Notably, the statute of limita-
tions for the Internal Revenue Service to assess an estate tax deficiency is three years after the
date the return is filed, id. § 6501(a), and this date cannot be extended by agreement of the
taxpayer and IRS, see id. § 6501(c)(4)(A). Because the return must be filed either nine months
after the decedent's death, id. § 6075(a), or fifteen months after the decedent's death if an
extension is requested, Treas. Reg. § 20.6081 -l (b) (2011), the representative would have time
to supplement the return within the Uniform Probate Code's forty-five month window, UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-120(k) (amended 2008). If a child is born after the statute of limitations
expired, the representative would have no obligation to supplement the return. However, if the
return is a false or fraudulent return with the intent to evade tax, the statute does not apply.
I.R.C. § 6501(c)(1). Thus, a representative should clearly note on the return the contingency
that a posthumously conceived child could receive a share of the estate.
433 See, e.g., UNIP. PROBATE CODE § 2-102.
434 See, e.g., id. § 2-103.
435 See I.R.C. §§ 2053-2058 (providing no deduction for amounts that pass to any indi-
vidual other than a surviving spouse).
436 Id. § 2010(c)(3)(A).
437 The Tax Policy Center has estimated that, in light of the $5,000,000 estate tax exemp-
tion, only 3,300 individuals who die in 2012 will pay an estate tax. Jeffrey Rohaly & Kathe-
rine Lim, Wealth Transfer Taxes: How many people pay the estate tax?,
TAXPOLICYCENTER.ORG, http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/key-elements/estate/
how-many.cfm (last visited Sept. 28, 2011).
438 Legislatures in states with an estate tax and a significantly lower exemption amount,
however, should consider whether that state's estate tax laws merit consideration on this issue.
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plication. Furthermore, the approach wholly ignores two additional
interests: respect for the decedent's likely intent and the children's best
interests. Each of these interests is compelling in its own right, and both
support an approach that recognizes posthumously conceived children
under certain conditions.
Achieving the decedent's likely intent has long been the hallmark of
probate law. 4 3 9 Indeed, intestacy statutes represent a legislative attempt
to provide citizens a distributive scheme that mirrors the intent of most
decedents." 0 While a blanket "no recognition" rule may reflect the in-
tent of some individuals who freeze genetic material, there is no indica-
tion that it reflects that of the majority. Rather, the rule unnecessarily
proscribes any inquiry into an individual's intent-even if the intent to
provide for the child is undisputed. As discussed in more detail below in
Part III.B.1, an approach that conditions the child's status as an heir on
the decedent's intent to treat the child as his or her own would satisfy this
foundational principle of probate law.
Furthermore, the no-recognition rule wholly fails to consider the
best interests of the posthumously conceived children."' Not only does
it preclude them from receiving a share of their deceased parent's estate,
it prevents them from receiving benefits that are independent from the
estate itself but which could otherwise be available to them. For in-
stance, these benefits may include Social Security survivor benefits442 or
inheritance through (rather than directly from) the deceased parent.4 3
Instead of punishing these children-who of course had no say in the
method by which they were created-with a blanket exclusion, the better
approach would be to at least leave the door open to these children to
share in assets otherwise available to a decedent's heirs, subject to the
conditions discussed below in Part I.B.
2. Class-gift Context
Of the six state legislatures that have granted status to posthumously
conceived children, only Colorado's and North Dakota's expressly pro-
vide that these children may share in class gifts to descendants, heirs,
439 See Tritt, supra note 57, at 374, 379-80.
440 See id.
441 Some may argue the no-recognition approach considers the best interests of children
by encouraging individuals to raise children in two-parent homes. In other words, it encour-
ages individuals not to have posthumously conceived children in the first place. As discussed
in Part III.A. .b, this justification is misplaced in the context of default probate rules. Rather,
the focus should not be on the parents' conduct, but on a resulting child's best interests.
442 See supra Part II.B.
443 Nolan, supra note 7, at 1092.
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issue, or the like.4 4 4 In these states, which adopted the 2008 UPC
amendments, there is no time limit before which the child must be born,
unless the class is closing.445 If the class is closing, the child must be
conceived within thirty-six months or born within forty-five months of
the event that closed the class." 6
In California, Iowa, and Louisiana, the statutes grant status to post-
humously conceived children in the probate context if, among other re-
quirements, the child is in utero within two years of the decedent's death
(California and Iowa)" 7 or born within three years of the decedent's
death (Louisiana).448 Although the statutes do not expressly extend this
status to the class-gift context, it is likely that a court would do so in
these states. It is unclear, however, whether these time limits would ap-
ply in the class-gift context." 9
In New York, the Surrogate's Court held that posthumously con-
ceived children may share in a class gift, notwithstanding that the legisla-
ture has provided that posthumously conceived children have no interests
in the probate context.450 In Florida, the other state that grants status to
posthumously conceived children, the statute is silent regarding the inter-
ests of posthumously conceived children in class gifts. 4 5 1
Whether or not states recognize posthumously conceived children
for probate purposes, they should do so for class-gift purposes-at least
while the applicable class remains open. While a class remains open, the
existing members' interests are always subject to dilution.452 Further,
any concerns regarding finality of administration are inapplicable while
the trust is ongoing.453 Accordingly, the only "benefit" that may remain
444 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-11-705(2), -708 (West, Westlaw through 1st Reg.
Sess. of the 68th Gen. Assemb., 2011); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 30.1-09.1-05(2), -08 (West,
Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.).
445 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-705(7)(b) (Westlaw); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-09.1-
05(5)(b) (Westlaw).
446 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-705(7)(b) (Westlaw); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-09.1-
05(5)(b) (Westlaw).
447 See CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5 (West, Westlaw through ch. 312 of 2011 Reg. Sess. and
ch. 11 of 2011-12 1st Ex. Sess.); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.220A (West, Westlaw though 2011
Reg. Sess.).
448 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1(A) (West, Westlaw through 2011 1st Extraordi-
nary Sess.).
449 In Massachusetts and New Jersey, courts have recognized posthumously conceived
heirs for inheritance purposes. See Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257
(Mass. 2002); In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000). Al-
though the issue has not come up in the class gift context yet, the courts likely would include
such children in class gifts, as well.
450 See In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d 207, 212 (Sur. Ct. 2007).
451 See FLA. STAT. ANN §§ 732.608, 742.17 (West, Westlaw through ch. 236 of 2011 1st
Reg. Sess. of the 22nd Leg.).
452 See In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d at 210.
453 See id. at 210.
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is to discourage certain behaviors. However, as discussed above in Part
III.A.l.c, default statutes such as this are unlikely to affect behavior.
Once the class closes, though, many of the same concerns discussed
above in the probate context do apply (finality of administration, deter-
mination of beneficiaries, etc.). Thus, a state's class-gift rules should
then mirror its probate rules regarding posthumously conceived children.
In this regard, the 2008 UPC provides a good starting point-it imposes
no time limitations for the birth of posthumous children while the class
remains open, but it incorporates the thirty-six or forty-five month rule
once the class closes. 454 However, the 2008 UPC is flawed on this issue.
The 2008 UPC provides additional time to allow for posthumously
conceived children only if the class-closing event is the death of the post-
humously conceived child's parent. 4 5 5 This limitation is unnecessary
and could create inequitable results. For instance, assume a settlor has a
son and daughter and creates a trust for the settlor's issue that terminates
at the death of her last surviving child. If the son dies first, any posthu-
mously conceived children of the daughter would be included in the class
if born within forty-five months of the daughter's death because the class
would close at her death. However, no posthumously conceived children
of the son born after the daughter's death would be included-even if he
dies immediately before the daughter-because the class-closing event is
not his death. Alternatively, if the daughter dies first, her posthumously
conceived children would not be included after the son's death, while the
son's would. This arbitrary result could be avoided if, rather than limit-
ing the time extension to the children of the decedent who "closed the
class," the extension applied to all parties once the class closed.
B. Under What Conditions Should Legislatures Recognize A
Parent-Child Relationship?
If a legislature decides to recognize a parent-child relationship for
probate or class-gift purposes, it must decide what conditions, if any,
should apply. These conditions include whether (1) the decedent's con-
sent should be required, (2) the surviving parent should be required to
provide notice of his or her intent to use the decedent's genetic material,
(3) the surviving parent should be required to have the child within a
certain period of time, and (4) the parents must have been married at the
decedent's death. The following proposes a new way of adapting such
conditions that would further all three key interests: efficient estate ad-
ministration, the decedent's intent, and the children's best interests.
454 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-705(g)(2) (amended 2008).
455 See id.
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1. Consent
The first condition legislatures should consider is whether the dece-
dent must have consented to the posthumous use of his or her genetic
material for reproduction. To date, the answer has been a universal
"yes." Each of the six legislatures that have granted status to posthu-
mously conceived children has required the decedent's consent.456 Like-
wise, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court required the decedent's
consent.457 In New Jersey and New York, courts granted status but did
not discuss whether consent should be required. 458 This should be a
threshold question-if the decedent did not consent to the posthumous
use of her genetic material, the child should not be deemed an heir for
probate or class-gift purposes.
Less clear, however, is to what exactly the decedent must consent in
these states. Must the decedent have consented generally to the use of
his or her genetic material, to the posthumous use of the material, or to
support a posthumously conceived child? The California statute states
that the decedent must consent that the genetic material may "be used for
posthumous conception." 459 Similarly, the Iowa statute states that the
decedent must authorize his or her spouse to use the "genetic material to
initiate the posthumous procedure that resulted in the child's birth." 460
Massachusetts's highest court, on the other hand, required that the dece-
dent consent both to the use of his or her genetic material and to support
the child.461 Other states' statutes are vague regarding the consent re-
quired. The Colorado and North Dakota statutes require that the dece-
dent consented to "be treated as a parent."462 In Florida, the decedent
must have "provided for" the child in the decedent's will.4 6 3 The statute
456 See supra Part H.A.3.b.
457 Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 259 (Mass. 2002).
458 See In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000); In re
Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d 207 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2007). There is a question of whether the use of a
decedent's genetic material without his or her consent may violate a reproductive freedom
right-the right not to have children after your death. Knaplund, supra note 13, at 409. That
is a separate question from that addressed by this article, though, which is whether a par-
ent-child relationship will be recognized for probate and class-gift purposes once such a child
has been born.
459 CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5(b) (West, Westlaw through ch. 312 of 2011 Reg. Sess. and
ch. 11 of 2011-12 1st Ex. Sess.).
460 IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.220A (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.).
461 Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 259.
462 The Commissioners explain in their comments to the 2008 Uniform Probate Code
(which Colorado and North Dakota adopted) that being "treated as a parent" includes provid-
ing economic support. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-115 cmt. (amended 2008). Accordingly,
a court may (or may not) construe this language to require consent to support the child. In the
probate context, this would seem to mean an intent for the child to share in the decedent's
estate.
463 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17(4) (West, Westlaw through ch. 236 of 2011 1st Reg.
Sess. of the 22nd Leg.).
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does not clarify, however, whether "provid[ing] for" the child means fi-
nancially supporting or simply acknowledging the child.4 64
Scholars uniformly support a consent requirement as well,4 6 5 but
they too disagree on the specific consent that should be required. Some
argue that if a person consents to the posthumous use of his or her ge-
netic material, that person should be deemed to have consented to pro-
vide support as a matter of law.4 6 6 By analogy, if an individual chooses
to have sex with another, that individual will be financially responsible
for a child conceived from that act, whether or not either individual in-
tended for conception to occur.4 6 7 Similarly, "once one consents to hav-
ing a posthumously conceived child . . . , one's estate must bear the
consequences [imposed by] the applicable intestacy statute."46 8 Others
argue that the decedent's intent should always control and consent should
not be presumed. Rather, the posthumously conceived child should share
in the estate only if the decedent affirmatively consented to support the
child after his death.4 69 For instance, if a decedent had children during
his life, he may authorize his wife or partner to use his genetic material
to produce another child, but he may intend to share his estate only with
the children he knew.470
Notably, a consent requirement of any kind would be a bit of a
break from traditional probate law. The decedent's likely intent regard-
ing whom he or she would want to support has been the overriding con-
464 See id. The American Medical Association's position regarding the posthumous use
of frozen sperm is:
If the donor left no instructions, it is reasonable to allow the remaining partner to use
the semen for artificial insemination but not to donate it to someone else. However,
the donor should be advised of such a policy at the time of donation and be given an
opportunity to override it.
Am. Med. Ass'n Code of Medical Ethics, Opinion 2.04 (updated December 1994). Regarding
embryos, the American Medical Association states, "The gamete providers should have an
equal say in the use of their pre-embryos and, therefore, the pre-embryos should not be availa-
ble for use by either provider or changed from their frozen state without the consent of both
providers." Id., Opinion 2.141 (updated June 1994). See also Knaplund, supra note 1, at 96.
465 See, e.g., Kindregan, Jr. & McBrien, supra note 108, at 597.
466 Ronald Chester, Freezing the Heir Apparent: A Dialogue on Postmortem Conception,
Parental Responsibility, and Inheritance, 33 Hous. L. REv. 967, 995 (1996) (asserting that an
individual should not even be allowed to escape this obligation by intentionally omitting the
child in a will); see also Nolan, supra note 7, at 1094.
467 See Monopoli, supra note 112, at 887.
468 Ronald Chester, Posthumously Conceived Heirs Under a Revised Uniform Probate
Code, 38 REAL PRoP. PROB. & TR. J. 727, 735 (2004).
469 See Tritt, supra note 57, at 404-06.
470 Notably, the consent issue may also apply in situations where a spouse or partner uses
another's genetic material while that individual is living but incompetent. For example, this
may occur if an individual is in a long-term coma and his or her partner wants to have another
child. See Kindregan Jr., supra note 12, at 435. Consent issues also arise with postmortem
sperm retrieval. See generally Radford, supra note 93.
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sideration when establishing the framework for inheritance. 471
Legislatures would determine to whom most decedent's would want their
property to pass, and this determination then applied to all decedents who
died intestate. 472 Apart from a valid will, there is no other instance in
probate law when a decedent's actual intent regarding support supersedes
that framework. 473 For instance, it may be undisputed that a decedent
intended to give his entire estate to his alma mater, his girlfriend, or to
only one of his two children. But if the decedent did not "opt out" of the
intestacy provisions by creating a valid, properly executed will, his actual
intent is irrelevant. 474 The estate will be distributed to his closest heirs as
provided by the statutes.475 Indeed, if courts had to determine a dece-
dent's actual intent in every situation, this would place an enormous bur-
den on probate courts and delay in the administration of estates.
Posthumous conception, however, is not a traditional method of
procreation, and the traditional approach to intestacy does not fit. At a
minimum, legislatures should require proof that the decedent consented
to the posthumous use of his or her genetic material. Absent this require-
ment, the door would be open to the possibility of improper posthumous
use of one's genetic material-for instance, postmortem sperm retrieval.
However, regarding consent to support the child, it is more appropriate
for the legislature to establish an objective rule that fits the majority of
cases. Though I am not aware of objective data regarding this, I believe
that the majority of individuals who have invested the "significant time,
effort, and expense of assisted reproduction" 476 and have consented to
the posthumous use of their genetic material by their spouse or partner
would intend to support the resulting child. Thus, an irrebuttable pre-
sumption of intent is appropriate. For the minority of decedents who
471 See Tritt, supra note 57, at 374, 379-80.
472 Id.
473 When a decedent dies testate, courts will consider the decedent's intent when asked to
construe an ambiguous or vague will or trust agreement. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.2 (1999).
474 Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 231 F. Supp. 2d 961, 967 (D. Ariz. 2002) ("The law of
intestate succession provides for a specific order of distribution of a decedent's property when
no will exists. The intent of the decedent is not a factor."), rev'd on other grounds, 371 F.3d
593 (9th Cir. 2004). Individuals may also carry out their intent by a combination of other
estate planning vehicles, such as revocable and irrevocable trusts, beneficiary designations,
and joint ownership of assets. However, any assets that constitute the intestate estate will be
distributed according to the intestacy laws, regardless of intent. See id. For instance, about
half of the states disregard an unwitnessed holographic will, even though it may clearly state
the decedent's intent in her own handwriting. See, e.g., Wilson v. Speer, 499 N.W.2d 850, 857
and 857 n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that about half of the states do not recognize
holographic wills, including Minnesota, "despite the fact holographics can be authenticated as
a true desire of a deceased's intentions").
475 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-103 (amended 2008).
476 KINDREGAN, JR. & MCBRIEN, supra note 10, at 20.
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would not wish to support the child they consented to creating, it would
be their obligation to provide otherwise in a will.
Finally, whichever consent is required, the statute should state the
required burden of proof and who bears it. For instance, the Iowa, Loui-
siana, and California statutes require that the consent be in writing.477 In
Florida, the writing must be a will.4 7 8 In Colorado and North Dakota
(the two states that have adopted the 2008 UPC), the consent may be in
writing or established by clear and convincing evidence. 479 However, if
the parents were married at the decedent's death, their consent will be
presumed unless proven otherwise by clear and convincing evidence. 4 8 0
In Massachusetts and New Jersey, the courts did not discuss the required
level of proof.481
A clear and convincing burden of proof is appropriate to protect
against the possibility of fraudulent claims by surviving partners. How-
ever, a writing requirement is problematic because these are default
rules.4 8 2 If an individual is thinking about these issues, she typically will
create a will or otherwise take steps to address them while living. While
that is certainly preferred, these statutes, like all intestacy statutes, would
not apply to those individuals. Rather, these statutes are intended to ap-
ply to individuals who did not take such steps (possibly because they
were unaware of the requirements). If a writing is required, a decedent's
clearly expressed but unwritten intent may not be carried out, even if the
decedent's intent is not otherwise disputed. In any event, the key here is
that the legislature be clear in its statute regarding (1) whether consent is
477 See IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.220A (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1(A) (West, Westlaw through 2011 1st Extraordinary Sess.); CAL.
PROB. CODE § 249.5(a) (West, Westlaw through ch. 312 of 2011 Reg. Sess. and ch. 11 of
2011-12 1st Ex. Sess.).
478 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17(4) (West, Westlaw through ch. 236 of 2011 1st Reg.
Sess. of the 22nd Leg.).
479 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-120(6) (West, Westlaw through Ist Reg. Sess. of
the 68th Gen. Assemb., 2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-19(6) (West, Westlaw through
2011 Reg. Sess.).
480 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-120(8) (Westlaw); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-19(8)
(Westlaw).
481 See In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d.1257 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000); Woodward
v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002). Some parentage acts require that
consent for posthumous use be recognized by a licensed physician. It is unclear how such
parentage statutes may be applied, if at all, in the probate context. See supra Part II.A.I.d.
482 Alternatively, states may require clinics providing assisted reproductive technology to
provide forms to patients that ask their intent regarding posthumous use. See MODEL ACT
GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 501 (2008). While this would be helpful, it is more of
a regulatory approach regarding assisted reproduction in general and is (or should be) separate
from probate considerations. In other words, a posthumously conceived child should not be
precluded from inheriting if the decedent's intent can be proven but the clinic fails to provide
the required form.
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required, (2) what exactly that consent must address, and (3) what level
of proof will be required regarding such intent.
Finally, unlike any other approach proposed to date, consent should
be the single condition regarding a child's status as an heir. If the dece-
dent did not consent to the posthumous use of his or her genetic material,
the child should not be an heir for probate or class-gift purposes. If the
decedent did consent, the child should be deemed an heir. The condi-
tions discussed in the following Parts would then determine whether it
would be equitable, in light of the interests of other potential heirs or
beneficiaries, for the child to in fact receive assets from a trust or estate.
This distinction is critical. Under the existing approaches, a child is
not an heir unless all conditions are met.4 8 3 However, the remaining
conditions (notice requirement and time limitation) really are procedural
conditions that relate to the efficient administration of the decedent's es-
tate and the interests other parties have in that estate. This distinction
would allow the posthumously conceived child to still receive benefits
that are unrelated to the decedent's estate. For instance, the child, as an
heir, may still inherit through the deceased parent at the death of other
family members (e.g., from the decedent's parents, who would be that
child's grandparents). Additionally, the child, as the decedent's heir,
could still receive Social Security survivor benefits.484
For example, compare this to Iowa's statute. There, a child born
twenty-three months after the parent's death would be an "heir" and eli-
gible to inherit from the decedent, to inherit through the decedent, and to
receive Social Security survivor benefits. 485 However, a child born at
twenty-five months would not be an "heir" and, thus, not entitled to any
of these benefits.486 If, on the other hand, the statute defined both chil-
dren as heirs, both children would still inherit through their deceased
parent and receive survivor benefits. 487
483 See supra Part II.
484 Nolan, supra note 7, at 1092.
485 IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.220A (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.). In Beeler v.
Astrue, 651 F.2d 954 (8th Cir. 2011) (discussed supra Part II.B.6), the child was born one
week before the second anniversary of the decedent's death. Under current law, that child
would have been an heir. But if she had been born seven days later, she would not have been
an heir.
486 IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.220A (Westlaw).
487 Some may disagree with the policy that posthumously conceived children should re-
ceive survivor benefits in any event. That, however, is an issue for the Social Security Admin-
istration to address. In the meantime, states should not pass laws that would preclude its
residents from receiving federal benefits that may otherwise be available to its residents-
particularly to its children. See Banks, supra note 121, at 267. For a discussion of the policies
underlying the Act, see Banks, supra note 121, at 305-20.
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2. Notice
The second condition legislatures should consider is whether (and if
so, by when) the surviving spouse or partner must give notice to a fiduci-
ary or custodian holding the decedent's assets of the survivor's intent to
use the decedent's genetic material. 4 8 8 Only California's legislature has
established a notice requirement. 4 8 9 Specifically, the person with "con-
trol of' the genetic material must notify each person with control over
the decedent's assets that that person intends to use the genetic mate-
rial. 4 9 0 This notice must be provided no later than four months from the
date of the decedent's death certificate or the date a judgment is entered
declaring the decedent's death. 4 9 1
The California approach is desirable for three reasons. First, it
places responsibility on the surviving spouse or partner to advise the fi-
duciary. This is particularly appropriate in the context of retirement as-
sets or insurance proceeds, when the custodian may have no personal
connection to the decedent and no knowledge of frozen genetic material.
However, it certainly could be the case for estate or trust assets, as well,
particularly if a corporate fiduciary is involved. Second, even when a
custodian or fiduciary has knowledge, there may be many instances
when the surviving spouse or partner has no intention of using the dece-
dent's genetic material after the death. Without this notice requirement,
a careful fiduciary would want to obtain some sort of claim waiver, in-
demnity agreement, or other protection from the surviving spouse or
partner before distributing assets. Third, this would protect the other
beneficiaries from transferee liability. It would provide a clear method
for the surviving parent to protect the future child's interests, but, if those
simple steps are not taken, it would allow the other recipients to use the
assets they receive without facing future liability for doing so. Finally,
as with creditor claims, the statute should require that the notice provided
to the fiduciary be in writing to avoid questions of fact regarding the
fiduciary's knowledge.
As for the time period for this notice, four months, as California has
provided, provides enough time for the survivor to overcome the initial
shock of his or her partner's unexpected death, obtain legal advice if
488 In this context, "fiduciary" refers to a personal representative of a decedent's estate or
trustee of a trust, whereas "custodian" refers to a life insurance company, retirement account
custodian, or other financial institution with custody of assets but limited fiduciary
responsibilities.
489 The Massachusetts Supreme Court stated that a claim may be brought if "time limita-
tions do not preclude" the claim, but it did not provide any specific time frame or other proce-
dural requirements. Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 259 (Mass. 2002).
490 CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5(b) (West, Westlaw through ch. 312 of 2011 Reg. Sess. and
ch. 11 of 2011-12 1st Ex. Sess.).
491 Id.
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necessary, and provide notice. The notice need not state that the individ-
ual is actively attempting to have the child (which the survivor may not
be emotionally prepared to do after just four months), but simply that the
survivor has the decedent's frozen genetic material and may use it in the
future. Further, four months coincides with the period that creditors have
in many states to file a claim against the estate.492 Accordingly, if the
fiduciary has not received notice after four months, the fiduciary could
confidently advise the heirs or devisees of their respective share of the
estate and distribute assets without liability.
Unlike California's statute, however, the failure to provide this no-
tice should not bar a future child from receiving assets. In other words,
the child's status as an heir should not depend on this procedural condi-
tion is met-which neither the child nor the decedent has any control
over. Rather, the survivor's failure to provide such notice should simply
limit the fiduciary and recipient's liability for distributions made after the
notice period expires without knowledge by the fiduciary of the survi-
vor's intent to have the decedent's posthumously conceived child. Un-
like a creditor's claim (which would be barred absent notice within four
months), this is not a business deal or third-party interaction. It is a (po-
tential) future child of the decedent-whom the decedent had consented
to support. If the fiduciary does not receive notice that the future parent
intends to use the genetic material, the fiduciary may distribute the assets
without liability after four months. Furthermore, if the fiduciary does
receive written notice after this period has expired, the fiduciary then
should have a duty to hold all or an appropriate portion of the assets still
in the fiduciary's possession for a longer period of time, as discussed
next.
3. Time Limitations
The third condition a legislature should consider is whether the
child must be born within a specific period after the deceased parent's
death. For instance, in Iowa the child must be born within two years
after the decedent's death. 493 In California, the child must be "in utero"
within two years after the decedent's death. 494 In Louisiana, the child
must be born within three years after the decedent's death.4 9 5 In Colo-
rado and North Dakota, the child must be in gestation within three years
or born within forty-five months after the issuance of the decedent's
492 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-801 (amended 2008).
493 IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.220A (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.).
494 More specifically, the limit is two years from the date of the death certificate or of a
judgment declaring the decedent's death. CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5(b) (Westlaw).
495 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1(A) (West, Westlaw through 2011 1st Extraordinary
Sess.).
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death certificate. 496 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court provided
simply that the posthumously conceived child may be an heir if "time
limitations [do not] preclude" this result.4 9 7 It did not provide any gui-
dance on what length of time, or other factors, may serve as a bar.
Neither the Florida legislature nor the New Jersey Superior Court ad-
dressed a time limitation.
It is important to establish a limitation period to provide finality to
the administration process in those scenarios where a posthumously con-
ceived child could "divest" others of all or a part of their share of the
decedent's estate. Without this, an estate could remain open indefinitely
while the executor waits for a posthumously conceived child to be
born-an event which may never happen. If a notice requirement is not
adopted, this time limitation also helps to protect fiduciaries who may
distribute assets while unaware that the decedent left preserved genetic
material.
Similar to the notice requirement-and unlike any approaches pro-
posed or enacted to date-the limitation period should relate to liability
for distributions, not a child's ability to receive distributions. Once the
time limitation has passed, a later born child, as an heir, should still be
entitled to receive a share of any assets that remain in the estate at the
time of that child's birth.498 In the meantime, however, the fiduciary
should be entitled to distribute assets to the devisees or beneficiaries as
they then stand, and neither the fiduciary nor the recipient shall have any
liability to later-born children for doing so.
Importantly, this distinction would provide the fiduciary with dis-
cretion to retain the assets (or some portion of the assets) if the fiduciary
knows that the surviving spouse or parent is attempting to use the dece-
dent's genetic material but has not yet achieved a successful pregnancy.
The justifications given for a two- or three-year window are that it (1)
provides a grieving spouse or partner time to prepare emotionally to have
a child after the decedent's death, (2) allows a period to become pregnant
if an initial attempt is not successful, and (3) creates finality by establish-
ing a cut-off date that fiduciaries and other beneficiaries can rely on.
While these are appropriate considerations, each can be satisfied without
the absolute cut-off. An approach that limits fiduciary and transferee
liability after a certain point, but does not close the door completely, still
496 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-120(11) (West, Westlaw through Ist Reg. Sess. of
the 68th Gen. Assemb., 2011); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 30.1-04-19(11) (West, Westlaw
through 2011 Reg. Sess.).
497 Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 259 (Mass. 2002).
498 For an alternative view, see Browne C. Lewis, Dead Men Reproducing: Responding to
The Existence ofAfterdeath Children, 16 GEo. MASON L. REV. 403, 443 (2009) ("A specific
time should be stated in order for the child to be conceived. After that time period has expired,
the class of the decedent's heirs should be closed.").
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satisfies each of these goals. But it also allows (though does not require)
a fiduciary to leave the door open for those who have tried unsuccess-
fully, but continue to try, to have the child.
How long, then, should this limitation period be? As noted above,
two or three years allows for a period of grieving, one or two attempts to
become pregnant, and a fairly efficient estate administration. In addition,
any longer period could create some difficulty from an income tax stand-
point. All estates and most trusts are taxpayers for income tax purposes
during their administration.499 For an estate, this period starts at the de-
cedent's death and runs through the "period actually required by the ad-
ministrator or executor to perform the ordinary duties of administration,
such as the collection of assets and the payment of debts, taxes, legacies,
and bequests . .. "500 For a trust, this period includes some time after
the duration of the trust ends for the trustee to perform its final duties.501
However, if the administration is "unduly prolonged," the estate or trust
will be considered terminated for federal income tax purposes, 502 and the
gross income, deductions, and credits of the estate or trust are thereafter
considered the gross income, deduction, and credits of the persons suc-
ceeding to that property.503
Whether an administration has been unduly prolonged is a question
of fact, and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) will not issue advance
rulings on this issue.50 Although an administration may be considered
complete if the only task left is to distribute assets to ascertained benefi-
ciaries, 505 it is not complete while there is ongoing litigation regarding
the identity of the beneficiaries.5 o6 The IRS has not addressed this in the
context of posthumously conceived children, but a strong argument could
be made that retention of assets until the beneficiaries are finally deter-
mined is not "unduly prolonging" the administration. If, however, the
IRS disagrees, the income from those estate or trust assets could be
charged to (and the tax, therefore, paid by) beneficiaries who may never,
in fact, receive the assets. Admittedly, however, this result is unlikely.
499 I.R.C. § 641(b) (2006). Although "grantor" trusts are not taxpayers under Internal
Revenue Code sections 641-48, the grantor trust status of a revocable trust ceases at the
deemed owner's death.
500 Treas. Reg. § 1.641(b)-3(a) (2011).
501 Id. § 1.641(b)-3(b).
502 Id. § 1-641(b)-3(a) and (b).
503 Id. § 1-641-3(d).
504 Rev. Proc. 2011-3, 2011-1 I.R.B. 111, § 3.01(51).
505 See Estate of Berger v. Comm'r, 60 T.C.M (CCH) 1079 (1990).
506 See Wylie v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 180 (N.D. Tex. 1968).
A CHIP OFF THE OLD ICEBLOCK
4. Relationship of Parents
The final condition legislatures must consider is whether the dece-
dent must have been married to the surviving party at the time of the
decedent's death. In Iowa and Louisiana, the parties must be married at
the decedent's death in order for the future child to be deemed his
heir.5 07 This would exclude engaged couples and, in most states, same-
sex couples. The 2008 UPC (adopted in Colorado and North Dakota)
and the California statute apply regardless of the decedent's relation-
ship.508 The Florida statute does not address the parties' relationship, nor
did the Massachusetts Supreme Court or the New Jersey Chancery
Court.50
The marital status of the parents should not be a requirement in the
probate or class-gift context. First, statutes that distinguish between the
marital status of a child's parents may face equal protection challenges.
For instance, the United States Supreme Court has struck down, on equal
protection grounds, a statute that permitted only marital children to bring
a wrongful death claim510 and statutes that permitted a nonmarital child
to inherit from the child's father only if the child's parents had later mar-
ried.51' Aside from that, however, this decision boils down to whether
the legislature's primary goal is to (1) regulate or incentivize behavior,
(2) carry out the decedent's most likely intent, or (3) protect the best
interests of the child. If the first is the goal, a legislature may require that
the couple be married. For the reasons noted above,512 however, such
default rules will not effectively regulate behavior in this context. If the
purpose is to carry out the decedent's intent, it is purely anecdotal
whether more married individuals would consent to the posthumous use
of their genetic material than would single individuals in a committed
relationship. Alternatively, if the goal is protecting the best interests of
the child, then the marital status of the decedent should not be relevant.
As explained above,513 in the majority of cases a surviving spouse is
entitled to the entire estate regardless of whether the decedent had chil-
dren. Thus, if a statute gave interests only to posthumously conceived
children whose parents were married, the statute would, in almost every
507 IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.220A (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.) (referring to
"surviving spouse"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1(A) (West, Westlaw through 2011 1st
Extraordinary Sess.) (referring to "surviving spouse").
508 See supra Part II.A.
509 Id.
510 Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
511 Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852 (1986) (abrogating a Texas statute); Trimble v.
Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (abrogating a Illinois statute); see also Monopoli, supra note
112, at 860-68 (reviewing United States Supreme Court cases that have addressed equal pro-
tection in the context of non-marital children).
512 See supra Part III.A.l.c.
513 See supra Part III.A.l.a.
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case, effectively provide no relief to any children-whether their parents
were married or not.
C. Additional Drafting Considerations
In addition, legislatures should keep in mind three specific drafting
considerations. First, for the reasons detailed in Part II.A.1.d, legisla-
tures should address these issues in probate statutes, not parentage stat-
utes. Second, legislatures should be sure that any rules of construction
relating to posthumously conceived children apply to any testamentary or
donative document, not just to wills. This is particularly important as
more individuals use revocable trust agreements in place of wills and
create irrevocable trusts for their families. 514 This would also capture
beneficiary designations (to the extent, at least, the custodial institution
does not provide otherwise in its plan documents, insurance contracts, or
the like). Third, legislatures should give great care to the words they
choose.515 For instance, the term "conceive" may create an ambiguity
when applied to assisted reproduction using thawed sperm or eggs (when
conception truly occurs after thawing) and IVF (when conception techni-
cally occurs before thawing). Legislatures should define what they mean
by conceive or, if appropriate, use terms such as "transferred," "in gesta-
tion," or "in utero."516 Likewise, courts have struggled over whether
"survive" and "surviving" means that the child had to be alive at the time
of the parent's death or at any time after the parent's death.517 Moreover,
legislatures should define assisted reproduction broadly to include the
various forms available-and that may be available in the future.518 Fi-
nally, legislatures should be specific regarding the genetic material. For
instance, Virginia uses "embryo" in its statutes, which could exclude fro-
zen sperm or eggs (or, possibly, even zygotes or pre-embryos) if read
strictly.
514 In 2009, trustees of over 2.6 million irrevocable trusts filed income tax returns. See
2009 SOI Tax Stats, supra note 73.
515 Though this of course is always important for legislatures to do, it is particularly easy
to choose a word that creates ambiguity in this context given the rapidly changing technology.
516 For instance, the Iowa statute refers to "a child of the intestate conceived and born
after the intestate's death or born as the result of the implantation of an embryo after the death
of the intestate." IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.220A (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.).
517 See Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 231 F. Supp. 2d 961 (D. Ariz. 2002).
518 For instance, the California statute excludes cloned individuals. CAL. PROB. CODE
§ 249.5(c) (West, Westlaw through ch. 312 of 2011 Reg. Sess. and ch. 11 of 2011-12 1st Ex.
Sess.). In addition to cloning, the next frontier of artificial insemination may include artificial
wombs, Knaplund, supra note 1, at 99, and the creation of artificial sperm from bone marrow.
Tritt, supra note 57, at 393 (citing Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., Thinking About the Law of As-
sisted Reproductive Technologies, 27 Wis. J. FAM. L. 123 (2007)).
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CONCLUSION
Almost ten years ago, Chief Justice Margaret Marshall of the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recognized:
As these [artificial reproduction] technologies advance,
the number of children they produce will continue to
multiply. So, too, will the complex moral, legal, social,
and ethical questions that surround their birth. The ques-
tions present in this case cry out for lengthy, careful ex-
amination outside the adversary process, which can only
address the specific circumstances of each controversy
that presents itself. They demand a comprehensive re-
sponse reflecting the considered will of the people.519
To date, Massachusetts's legislature has ignored this appeal-as have the
majority of legislatures around the country. Instead, they have passed
the cost and burden of sorting out these issues to their citizens and courts.
The use of both assisted reproduction and cryopreservation will only
continue to increase, however, and the issues they create require the at-
tention of legislatures.
Specifically, legislatures should recognize posthumously conceived
children as a child of the deceased parent for probate purposes and for
class-gift purposes if the decedent consented to the posthumous use of
his or her genetic material for reproduction. Denying status in these con-
texts would neither regulate their parent's behavior nor, in most cases,
create more efficient estate administrations. Recognizing these children,
however, would carry out the decedent's intent, a hallmark of probate
law, and protect the best interests of the innocent children by allowing
them to qualify, at a minimum, for benefits unrelated to the decedent's
estate (such as Social Security survivor benefits and inheritance through
the deceased parent). However, courts should allow fiduciaries or custo-
dians to distribute assets, without liability to themselves or the recipients,
if the surviving spouse or partner does not notify them within four
months after the decedent's death of his or her intent to use the dece-
dent's genetic material. Further, the fiduciary or custodian should be
free (but not required) to distribute the assets to the presumptive benefi-
ciaries if the child is not born within a certain period of time after the
deceased parent's death, such as three years. Importantly, though, the
failure of the survivor to provide notice or to have the child within this
period of time should not affect the child's status as an heir. Rather, it
should just protect the fiduciary, custodian, and existing beneficiaries. A
later-born child would still be eligible to receive other benefits as an
519 Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 272 (Mass. 2002).
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"heir" (such as Social Security survivor benefits), to inherit through the
decedent, to be a member of a class that remains open after the dece-
dent's death, and to share in any assets that remain undistributed when
the child is born.
